Scott Brown is a Liberal Republican

I'm not about to get into a discussion of the theology of Pat Robertson, and it seems that the only alternative this week is to post on the Massachusetts Senate race. Here's something from my colleague Boris Shor, who's done work with Nolan McCarty on estimating the political ideologies of state legislatures. Boris writes:

A special Senate election is being held next Tuesday in Massachusetts to finish Edward Kennedy’s term. The candidates are Martha Coakley (D), and State Senator Scott P. Brown (R). . . . recent polls show Brown matching or even exceeding Coakley’s electoral support, in one of the most liberal states in the entire country . . .

Brown is attracting very positive national and state Republican and conservative attention. On the other hand, State Assemblywoman Dede Scozzafava attracted very negative attention from conservatives in her special election campaign for the 23rd Congressional District of New York.

Brown is actually a liberal Republican who is to be found to the left of Dede Scozzafava! So why, then, the enthusiasm gap in support for the two? This post documents this assertion, and then answers this puzzle.

How liberal or conservative is [Scott Brown]? We have evidence from multiple sources. The Boston Globe, in its editorial endorsing Coakley, called Brown “in the mode of the national GOP.” Liberal bloggers have tried to tie him to the Tea Party movement, making him out to be very conservative. Chuck Shumer called him “far-right.”

In 2002, he filled out a Votesmart survey on his policy positions in the context of running for the State Senate. Looking through the answers doesn’t reveal too much beyond that he is a pro-choice, anti-tax, pro-gun Republican. His interest group ratings are all over the map. Business and gun rights groups typically rate him very highly, labor and and environmental groups have rated him both middling and high over time. The teacher’s union rated him low in 2001, and high in 2005.

All in all, a very confusing assessment, and quite imprecise. So how do we compare Brown to other state legislators, or more generally to other politicians across the country?

My [Boris's] research, along with Princeton’s Nolan McCarty, allows us to make precisely these comparisons. Essentially, I use the entirety of state legislative voting records across the country, and I make them comparable by calibrating them through Project Votesmart’s candidate surveys.

By doing so, I can estimate Brown’s ideological score very precisely. It turns out that his score is –0.17, compared with her score of 0.02. Liberals have lower scores; conservatives higher ones. Brown’s score puts him at the 34th percentile of his party in Massachusetts over the 1995-2006 time period. In other words, two thirds of other Massachusetts Republican state legislators were more conservative than he was. This is evidence for my [Boris's] claim that he’s a liberal even in his own party. What’s remarkable about this is the fact that Massachusetts Republicans are the most, or nearly the most, liberal Republicans in the entire country!

Boris continues:

Of course, while the Republicans [in Massachusetts] are liberal, Democrats are incredibly liberal. In comparison to them, Brown is a conservative. He was also the most conservative of the tiny handful of Republican State Senators.

Perhaps the most important context in which Brown can be considered a conservative is the electoral one. We’re talking about Massachusetts here, one of the most liberal states in the country, delivering 62% of the vote for Barack Obama, in comparison to 36% of the vote for John McCain. And as liberal as Brown may be, he’d be far more conservative than Edward Kennedy (-.92), or Martha Coakley (no score as she has never been a legislator, nor has she filled out the Votesmart survey – but ACORN has given her its top rating). . . .

It makes perfect sense that Scott Brown, a liberal Massachusetts Republican, has attracted Republican and conservative support. He’s perfectly suited for his liberal state electorate. Dede Scozzafava, in fact considerably more conservative than Scott Brown was not nearly so well matched to her intended constituency, the relatively conservative 23rd District that had returned moderate conservative John McHugh since the 1992 election.

What this shows, however, is that the conservative base in the United States, far from dragging their party moblike into an unelectable extreme, has made the decentralized decision to support the realistically best candidate they can relative to the context in which he’s being elected. The 23rd special district election can also be seen in this light; throwing Scozzafava overboard made far more sense in the context of that electorate.

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One Massachusetts Poll That Democrats Shouldn't Panic About

Worry about Suffolk. Worry about what PPP and Rasmussen are going to have to say over the weekend. But for the love of God, don't worry about the Pajamas Media poll which reports a 15 point lead for Scott Brown, which I'm not going to do the favor of posting a link to.

The poll was conducted by a firm connected with the Black Rock Group, which bills itself as a "strategic communications and public affairs firm" and whose chief spokesman/strategist, Carl Forti, just so happens to be the spokesman for this polling firm that nobody has ever heard of and just so happens (as David Dayen dutifully reports) to be the spokesman for a big pharma lobbying group that's pushed the death panels meme and just so happens to be the lead PR flak for Pajamas Media.

The polling firm also has almost no track record and the one poll they did issue showed New Hampshire Governor John Lynch with just a 44/38 (+6) approval rating whereas every other pollster in that state shows Lynch at between a +20 and a +43. So, if you account for their roughly 25-point GOP house effect, a poll showing Martha Coakley only 15 points down might be just about the best news she's gotten all week.

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A Qualified Defense of Pat Robertson

We are pleased to present a guest post on the very current issue of Haiti, written by Robert Taber, a doctoral candidate in Carribbean History at the University of Florida. Accordingly, he is well-versed in historical and cultural factors of Haiti, having spent significant time in the country.

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Contrary to most people’s reactions to Pat Robertson’s remarks on Wednesday, his reference to Haiti’s “pact with the devil” did not appear out of thin air. As Matt Yglesias has pointed out this was a reference to the Bois Caiman ceremony at the beginning of the Haitian Revolution in 1791. This is not strictly a mangling of history on Robertson’s part. His comments come straight out of a blend of theology and history that, at the grassroots, pervades Haiti’s political discourse. Labeling the event at Bois Caiman a satanic pact touches on the most potent part of a vibrant oral tradition, a national myth that attempts to explain Haiti’s relationship with God and the world.

The French Revolution had been going on for two years when slave leaders gathered in the Caiman woods outside of what’s today Cap Haitien. The fighting between and within the white elite and the free mulatto population presented an excellent opportunity for general revolt. Most of the slaves present worked as overseers or coachmen for their respective masters, giving them freedom of movement and the right to carry swords. Dutty Boukman, a slave originally from Jamaica, and a priestess of disputed identity led a Voudou ceremony where they allegedly charged the gathered slaves “to throw away the image of the god of the whites who thirsts for our tears and listen to the voice of liberty that speaks in the hearts of all of us.” They then made an oath of secrecy and revenge, sealing it by drinking the blood of a sacrificed pig, a ceremony possibly West African in origin. This event bears a similar relationship to the Haitian Revolution as the Boston Tea Party does to the American Revolution—a critical event that helped galvanize the founding generation and forms a centerpoint for revolutionary legend today.

One of the first things that comes to mind in any discussion of Haiti, Voudou is a complex blending of West African and popular Catholic traditions. Paul Farmer gave the best description of Voudou’s place in Haitian culture and society when he thus described a firmly Christian peasant: “Of course he believes in Voudou. He just believes it’s wrong.” The Voudou question strikes at the heart of Haitian religious life. For its practitioners, Voudou offers a pantheon of friendly spirits, or lwas, that offer avenues to healing and hope. For its opponents, including many conservative Protestants and Catholics, it is spirit possession and satanic worship. The two sides disagree on what percentage of Voudou involves curses and malevolence, but both agree that such things are part of the religion. And, for those who oppose Voudou, Boukman’s ceremony in Bois Caiman sold the country to the devil.

For religious conservatives in Haiti and abroad, the idea that the leaders of the slave revolt led and participated in a Voudou ceremony provides a troubling contrast to presentations of the United States’ founding fathers as devout Christians, one that explains their vastly different fortunes. Many view the U.S. invasions and the rule of the Duvaliers as indications of the devil’s two hundred year lease on the country.

I first heard the story of the pact in late 2003. Protests against President Bertrand Aristide were rocking the small town of Petit-Goâve where I was volunteering for an international non-profit. My Haitian roommates explained that Aristide, as a poor Catholic priest, was involved in Voudou and had used the more violent lwa to build his political support. Once the first two hundred years of independence ended with the bicentennial on January 1, 2004, the devil’s hold on Haiti would loosen and Aristide’s support would vanish. I heard similar stories from other residents of Petit-Goâve and later from Haitians in the United States. Voudou had been responsible for independence, and it was responsible for Haiti’s inability to find a place on the world stage, for the reigns of the Duvaliers, for the ineptitude of Arisitide, and for the natural disasters that plagued the country. All of this, they said, would change once the bicentennial came.

Aristide left Haiti in February of 2004, but the happier, more prosperous era my associates hoped for has yet to arrive. Under the interim government of Gérard Lartortue, Port-au-Prince saw an increase in fighting between rival gangs and criminal networks perfect the art of kidnapping foreigners. Major hurricanes slammed the country repeatedly in 2004 and 2008, with the soaring cost of food causing its own problems. Then came this week’s earthquake. For the many Haitians who believe in the pact and the curse, who hoped for its end in 2004, the terrible devastation of Port-au-Prince raises existential questions for which there are few answers.

The history of Haiti is one of remarkable courage in the face of daunting odds. Fears of spreading slave revolt led the global community to isolate newly independent Haiti. In exchange for recognition of its hard-fought independence, France demanded a war-damage payment of 150 million francs—estimated at $21 billion in 2004 US dollars—that Haiti spent eighty years paying. Post-Castro worries about communism spreading in the Caribbean meant that the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations looked the other way as Jean-Claude Duvalier solidified his iron grip. In 1983, The US Department of Agriculture’s concerns about African swine fever led to the indiscriminate slaughter of the pigs that formed the backbone of Haiti’s rural economy. One need not look to supernatural realms to find the devils plaguing Haiti.

The most generous reading of Rev. Robertson’s statement is one of searching for positive direction and building anew. Port-au-Prince last rose out of the rubble in 1770, twenty-one years before the people of Haiti began the West’s only successful slave revolt. We need to begin the discussion of how this rebuilding can match the glory of that remarkable achievement.

Robert Taber is a doctoral candidate in Carribbean History at the University of Florida. He can be contacted at robtaber@ufl.edu.

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Liberal Website Helpfully Tests Messages Against Vulnerable Democrat, Finds Them Wanting

The website FireDogLake has commissioned a new survey to ask the constituents of Democrat Vic Snyder in the Arkansas 2nd district, one of the most conservative to have voted for health care reform, about about their opinion of the individual mandate. The survey fails to provide context about the individual mandate, and arguably biases the respondent against it through its choice of question wording and question order. Although the survey finds Snyder in a very tough position, it shows little evidence for a further decrease if an individual mandate is adopted as part of health care reform. Let's go through the survey in detail.

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the job Barack Obama is doing as President?
(Approve 33, Disapprove 66)

2. If there were an election of US House of Representatives today, and the only two candidates on the ballot were Democrat Vic Snyder and Republican Tim Griffin, who would you vote for?
(Snyder 39, Griffin 56)

This is great news! For Vic Snyder!

3. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of the health care you receive?
(Satisfied 79, Dissatisfied 18)

4. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what you have to pay when you need health care?
(Satisfied 64, Dissatisfied 34)

Most people are happy with the health care coverage they receive ... that finding has been shown in poll after poll. And it's one reason why the bill has been a tough sell for Democrats. The number of people who are too sick and/or too poor to get health care constitute a minority, and an extremely disempowered minority.

But asking people to focus on their own experience with health care right out of the gate is potentially a little biasing, as it gets them in the mindset that there's no need to change the status quo. If you had asked, for example, what they think about the health care situation overall in America, you might be getting significantly different responses to the questions you asked about later on.

5. There are many pieces to the health care reform law that is being considered by Congress. One change, called the individual mandate, would require every American to carry health insurance, whether they want insurance or not. Are you familiar with this piece of the legislation?
(Yes 75, No 23)

6. Is it a good idea or a bad idea to require Americans to carry health insurance?
(Good Idea 36, Bad Idea 58)

Nothing too bad here, but the phrase "whether they want insurance or not", versions of which they've used before, is redundant and argumentative.

7. Under one proposal, if a person does not carry health insurance from a private insurance company, they would be fined up to 2% of their income. Is this fair, or unfair?
(Fair 17, Unfair 76)

8. Thinking about the proposal that requires everyone to either carry private health insurance or be fined, are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed?
(Favor 33, Oppose 61 -- Strongly Oppose 45)

It's fine to mention the fine. But it's perhaps not so fine to mention the fine without providing any additional context. Why is there a fine? Well, because otherwise people will game the system and cause everyone else's premiums to go up by 30 or 40 percent. What's fair about that? But of course there's no effort to provide that context.

The choice of the fair/unfair phrasing is also a bit unusual and some pollsters would avoid it for being emotionally loaded. This is getting pretty close to asking: "This bill would raise your taxes, dude! -- Is that fair or unfair?". How do you expect that people are going to respond when you ask a question like that?

9. Would you prefer Representative Vic Snyder to vote… for the version of the health care law that includes the requirement to carry private health insurance, to vote for a version of health care reform that does NOT include this requirement, or to vote against any health care bill?
(For Bill With Requirement 23, For Bill Without Requirement 27, Against Any Bill 44)

I'm not sure this bolsters their argument at all; the plurality is against any health care reform bill, and among those that aren't, opinion is about evenly split -- even though they've already presented the mandate in a negative light.

Of course it would be great if we didn't have to fine people who didn't buy health insurance, but that would cause the rest of the bill to become very different in a way that would be politically and fiscally untenable.

10. If Vic Snyder votes to pass the version of the health care law that DOES require every American to carry private health insurance, does your opinion of Snyder go up, go down, or stay the same?
(Goes Up 11, Goes Down 58, Stays the Same 29)

We get it! People don't like the individual mandate -- at least not when it's presented to them in this fashion. But taking #9 and #10 together, it would seem that most of this opposition has to do with the overall health care reform bill, and not the mandate itself.

11. If Vic Snyder votes to pass the version of the health care law that DOES require every American to carry private health insurance, and in return brings additional federal money to Arkansas’ 2nd congressional district, does your opinion of Snyder go up, go down or stay the same?
(Goes Up 15, Goes Down 49, Stays the Same 34)

This is kind of a pointless question. If it were just a matter of FDL wasting its money, I certainly wouldn't care. But do you really want to ask a confusing, 47-word question when you're using a robopoll and have enough trouble keeping people on the phone as is? A good general rule of thumb is that a robopollster shouldn't ask a question that would require a human interviewer to pause for breath.

12. Assume Vic Snyder votes to pass the version of the health care law that DOES require every American to carry private health insurance. If there were an election for US House of Representatives and the only two candidates on the ballot were Democrat Vic Snyder and Republican Tim Griffin, who would you vote for?
(Snyder 35, Griffin 58)

So, for all that work, the poll shows a whopping 4-point decline in Snyder's poll numbers, and a 2-point increase in Griffin's -- not even outside of the margin of error. We don't know how much of that has to do with opposition to the mandate versus the balance of the bill since the poll doesn't unpack them -- they could have asked an additional question or two to tease this out, but they didn't.

And that 4-point decline -- which may or may not be statistically significant and which may or may not have anything to with the individual mandate -- comes only after they'd asked five or six questions in a row that framed the mandate in a negative light, and also reminded people for no particular reason about just happy they are with their coverage in the status quo -- all while using robopolling technology that was never really designed to ask complex sets of policy questions like these.

Great work, guys!

Is this supposed to be an impressive finding? If anything, it suggests that the downside to Republican argumentation about the mandate is pretty limited -- even in a world where the other side doesn't get the favor of arguing back.

But perhaps it will impress Snyder into not voting for a health care bill at all (Snyder's opponent has already tweeted about the results). That's the only effect it seemingly could have, because as tough a load as the health care bill has become for a Democrat like Snyder, Nancy Pelosi is not about to ask him to go back to his district after having voted for a mandate-less bill that would raise premiums by 30 percent.

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OK, It's a Toss-Up

Earlier today I tweeted about how there wasn't enough evidence to describe the Massachusetts special election as a "toss-up", as some other forecasters have done, based on the information available to us at that time.

Well, now there's some new evidence. And it isn't good for Martha Coakley.

In particular, the evidence is a Suffolk University poll that shows the Republican, Scott Brown, ahead by 4 points, 50-46.

Suffolk is a fairly average pollster, and I'm sure if we looked long and hard enough, we could develop some critiques of the poll. But there are no particular red flags and ... c'mon, let's not be silly, because there are a lot of other polls that you'd also have to critique in order to discredit the notion that the race is too close to call, including the PPP poll that showed Brown up by one point a week ago (since which time he's almost certainly gained ground), the Rasmussen poll that showed a 2-point race for Coakley, and Coakley's internals, which reportedly have shown her ahead by just 2-5 points. Look at what we get when take a simple linear trendline of all public polls conducted since the start of the year, excluding all published and rumored internal polls.



That's a toss-up, ladies and germs! Both candidates are tied at 48 percent on the nose.

You can still argue that Coakley is favored -- and I might even believe you. Hell, I might even wind up making that argument myself. But at this point, you can't really cite the public polling as a data point in favor of your argument.

EDIT: By the way, here's that same graph without the Suffolk poll -- it would have had Coakley favored by about 4 points, which was my impression of the race as of this afternoon.



In other words, I don't think that I'm overreacting (although I'm sure I'll get accused of it in the comments). There aren't that many polls, so adding another one can indeed make a fair amount of difference in the way that we evaluate the race.

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With or Without Reid, Poll Suggests Trouble For Dems in Nevada

In my article Monday on Harry Reid, I suggested that:

Considering the unimpressive Republican opposition, and that Democrats have developed a sizeable registration advantage in the state, we would probably characterize the contest as "Lean Democrat" if Reid were to be replaced by another candidate like NV-1 Representative Shelly Berkley.

Well, not so much, if a new poll from Public Policy Polling is to be believed. Their survey has Berkley and another Democrat, Secretary of State Ross Miller, also trailing the leading Republican candidates in prospective horse-race matchups:



This is what you get, I suppose, if you have an electorate where President Obama has just a 44 percent approval rating, as PPP shows -- this in a state where he got 55 percent of the vote in 2008. That's an unusually large drop-off, by the way (consider that nationally, Obama got 53 percent of the vote and now has an approval rating averaging 48 percent), but it's consistent with what other polls of the state have shown (although bear in mind that the polls significantly underestimated Obama's margin of victory in the Silver State).

Still, I don't know if the answer is quite as simple as "Democrats are screwed either way." For one thing, although Berkley and Miller trail the Republicans by about the same margin, they do so in a universe where there are more undecided voters; the Republican candidates get 44-47 percent of the vote against them, whereas they're already up to 50-51 percent against Reid. When you're losing, you want more undecideds rather than fewer.

The other thing is that there's reason to believe that perceptions of Reid are going to be more "sticky". As I pointed out on Monday, Reid's approval rating turned sour as early as mid-2007, a time when Democrats were perceived very favorably by the country at large. So even if the national environment improves for Democrats -- and it may have to, for them to hold this seat -- I'm not sure that Reid is poised to take advantage of that, whereas someone like Berkley probably could.

Or the Democrats could nominate someone perceived to be more independent-minded, like Las Vegas mayor Oscar Goodman, who polls evenly against both Republicans and holds them to 40 percent of the vote. The problem is that Goodman is so independent that ... he actually is an independent, as he recently changed his party registration to unaffiliated to prepare for a potential run for governor as an independent candidate. Still, on the off-chance that they could get him interested in the Senate race instead, he would clearly be the Democrats' ideal candidate.

Otherwise, however, the case that Reid should resign is much less clear than it was for Chris Dodd in Connecticut, a much bluer state where the Democrats had an überpopular replacement in the form of Attorney General Blumenthal. I still think that, conceived narrowly in terms of electoral politics, the Democrats would be better off with Berkley or Miller than Reid, but it's not a slam dunk, especially when Reid has the money to cut commercials as beautiful as this one.

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Vicki and the Tea Partiers

For a moment let's put aside all the confused buzz about the poll numbers in Massachusetts' Senate special election race--Nate has already written about that here--to discuss the big development of the closing week: The emergence of Ted Kennedy's widow Vicki.

MSNBC's "First Read"--the network's online morning political hotsheet--reports that Kennedy will cut an ad on behalf of Democratic nominee Martha Coakley. A fundraising letter sent out in Vicki Kennedy's name has already raised more than a half-million dollars for Coakley, which means Kennedy is not only starring in the TV ad but effectively has paid for the air time. Presumably the ad's message will echo the overall message of Mrs. Kennedy's endorsement, namely, that Coakley is the right candidate to properly honor her late husband's legacy and carry forward his agenda.



Kennedy's "we need Martha, we want Martha" endorsement speech a week ago, above (start around 2:40 mark), was clearly what one would expect from such a speech, and what the campaign needed. What's less clear is whether Vicki's emergence was planned all along. After all, it makes perfect sense to do the "roll out"--to use the common campaign term, though I hesitate to invoke in regard to a recently widowed woman--of an endorsement and ad during during the election's late stages, as voters start thinking about their decision. And maybe that was the plan from the jump.

However, just last week Coakley said she thought it would be impossible for Kennedy to make an ad for her so late in the campaign. Why? the time it takes to cut an ad isn't much more than it is to turn out in public to make an endorsing speech. Which suggests the campaign perhaps did not plan to utilize Kennedy, or make the necessary overture, until operatives or Coakley herself realized they needed a Kennedy boost. Alternatively, maybe the campaign or Coakley wasn't fully confident that they could ask and receive from Kennedy a commitment to make the ad? I dunno. I realize the time between the special primary election and general election was just six weeks, but that was still ample time to secure the commitment and then make the logistical arrangements for a Kennedy endorsement speech and ad, if that was in fact the plan from the very beginning.

Whatever the backroom negotiations--or hesitations--what's clear is that the Coakley team realized she needed a booster shot. As I wrote previously, the timing and scheduling of this race couldn't be more favorable for the Republicans and Scott Brown: i.e., a special election in off-year cycle for a federal office when Democrats control the White House and both chambers of Congress, and conservatives and Republicans from around the country have the luxury of focusing solely on what would inarguably be a major trophy win if they bagged Ted Kennedy's former seat.

So it's the smart, safe bet to bring Vicki forward, even if there will surely be some voters turned off by it. (Though I suspect most of them were not inclined to vote for a Democrat anyway.) Why the entire roll out wasn't planned a bit better--endorsement, fundraising letter, ad--is a bit puzzling.

Relatedly, MA Rep. Jim McGovern and former president Bill Clinton will join Coakley at a campaign rally at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Worcester tomorrow afternoon. All stops are being pulled out.

Meanwhile, Brown is having a bit of trouble of his own. He denied to reporters that he knew about the Tea Party movement, even though Tea Partiers hosted a fundraiser for him. Though the fundraiser was listed on Brown's campaign website, it does not appear that he attended, so I suppose it's possible he's unaware of the Tea Partiers who, if they really wanted to help him, ought to hold a phony, wink-and-a-nod public demonstration opposing Brown for being insufficiently conservative. UPDATE: With hat tip to a 538 commenter below, DKos' Jed Lewison wrote a post earlier today with video of Brown at a Tea Party rally last April.

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DCC Trying to Encourage Regional Primaries

The titanic battle between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination will be remembered for a long, long time. For political junkies and political scientists like me, it provides a great "teachable moment" for how rules actually matter in presidential politics--that it's not all about spin, buzz, money and momentum.

Jeff Berman, who became an electoral celebrity among political junkies for his role as Obama's delegate guru in 2008--he was hailed as the "mastermind" and "unsung hero" of Obama's delegate strategy--is also a member of the Democratic Change Commission formed early last year and tasked with proposing changes to the Democratic primary process. A Harvard-trained lawyer for Bryan Cave law firm, Berman was a longtime adviser to former congressman and Democratic presidential contender Dick Gephardt. He also supervised the development of the Democratic Party's 2008 national platform.

As a follow-up to Monday's post about the DCC's proposed changes, Berman was kind enough to join 538 by telephone from his Washington office to talk about the proposed party rule changes and the objectives of Commission that wrote them. I think a key point missed in much of the preliminary reporting about the proposals, most of which focused on removing the voting independence of superdelegates', is the fact that the DCC really wants to steer the states toward grouping into regional or sub-regional primaries, like the one conducted jointly by Maryland, Virginia and Washington, DC, in 2008.

fivethirtyeight: So the Commission was charged with considering three issues: the primary and caucus calendar; the role and number of superdelegates; and “improving the caucus system.” How would you say the Commission met each of those challenges?

Jeff Berman: The Commission discussed each one of these issues during their meetings and produced recommendations for each area.

The first issue is the timing of the primaries and caucuses, and the Commission is sending two major recommendations to the DNC. The first major timing recommendation is to move the start of the window back so that the pre-window contests of Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina are held during the month of February, and that the window for other state contests begins in early March. That would be pushing these timeframes back one month from their placement in the 2008 cycle, when the contests began in very early January and there was a lot of uncertainty even about whether they might be held in December of 2007.

The second major timing recommendation of the Commission is for the states to organize their dates around regional or sub-regional groupings, to address frontloading that occurs within the window. This would include the DNC Rules Committee looking at offering “bonus delegate allocations” for states that schedule their contest in these groupings. The idea here is to try to make the calendar more rational by having states cluster together on a voting day so that the candidates can campaign efficiently in contiguous states, as opposed to situations which we’ve seen in prior cycles where candidates had to campaign for contests held on the same day on both the East Coast and the West Coast. It’s just more efficient for candidates to conduct bus tours and other retail campaigning and to purchase advertising in overlapping media markets when multiple contests are held in contiguous states.

The next area covered by the Commission is the unpledged delegates, also known as the superdelegates. The Commission is taking a measured approach to change the rules in this area. The recommendation is to retain all the current superdelegate categories, except the add-on unpledged delegates, and enable the persons in these categories to attend the National Convention as pledged national party leader and elected official delegates, known as NPLEOs who would be pledged in accordance with the statewide primary or caucus results. In the event that an individual eligible to be an NPLEO did not want to pledge, they could serve as a non-voting delegate to the National Convention, with the same credentials and hotel accommodations, and participate in all matters with their state delegation, except for the votes on the floor. This non-voting option would not be available to any other potential delegate to the National Convention and reflects the desire of the Commission to ensure that all of our senior elected officials and Party members attend the National Convention as part of their state delegation.

The last area for Commission review was the operation of the caucus systems. The Commission discussed the uneven performance of caucus operations in some states and how to assist these states in improvements to their caucuses. There are numerous states that run very professional caucuses systems, but there are other states in each cycle that face special challenges in running their caucuses. For instance, it might be the first time the state is conducting caucuses because the legislature de-funded the primary, or it may be there has been turnover in management personnel at the state party and the new people do not have deep experience in overseeing a caucus system. Whatever the reasons, there needs to be a more thorough effort on behalf of the national party to make sure the state party has adequately prepared for the caucus system, and the Commission is recommending that the DNC Rules Committee undertake more detailed oversight in this area.


538: You mentioned something called a “bonus delegate allocation.” Is that something that is a carrot to induce states to participate in a regional primary but without a requirement to do so? And would those states actually have more delegate votes at the National Convention?

Berman: Yes, the Commission is proposing a bonus delegate system to encourage states to cluster their primaries and caucuses by region or sub-region. The DNC has experimented with bonus delegate systems in the past, offering a larger number of delegates to states that move to the back end of the calendar window. In fact, a larger bonus was offered, the farther back in the calendar a state scheduled its contest.

Unfortunately, few states accepted these bonuses as sufficient incentive to move to the back of the window, perhaps in part because there was no other rationale to scheduling a contest late in the Calendar. With a regional approach, states will have a good reason to cluster on a date other than the opening day of the window, and bonus delegates will reinforce such a decision. The Commission noted the success of the Potomac primary in 2008, when Virginia, Maryland and Washington, DC voted on the same day and drew strong presidential candidate attention.

The Commission believes that the awarding of bonus delegates to the states can reinforce the advantages of regional clustering and thus have a better chance of reducing the heavy congestion of Super Tuesday contests than was achieved with earlier bonus systems.


538: I want to talk about Michigan and Florida. There were already rules in place in 2008 when Michigan and Florida rebelled, causing headaches for the party and, as it turned out, Hillary Clinton. What was done—what can be done, really—to prevent that from happening with some other state in 2012?

Berman: A number of states will be looking at new dates in 2012 if these recommendations are adopted and the start of the primaries and caucuses is pushed back in the next presidential election cycle.

And so there will be a need for movement to a later date on the part of many states, some with Democratic state control, some with Republican state control and some which are mixed. There may be a possibility that Republican rules will call for a later start to the 2012 primary calendar also.

No state will singled out for different treatment in the seating of their delegates and all will be encouraged to find the right date for their contest within the rules. Michigan and Florida Democrats will need to consider the totality of the new options available to them, including a regional primary approach and the possibility of receiving more – not fewer – delegate votes at the National Convention.


538: Did the Commission discuss the possibility of removing New Hampshire and Iowa from their traditional positions at the front of the queue?

Berman: No. The Commission was not tasked by the National Convention to address changes to the identity of the states that are approved to hold contests in the pre-Window period.


538: OK, let’s turn to the superdelegates. The proposal is for the new class of NPLEO delegates to vote in accordance with their statewide primary or caucus results. This means there will be no superdelegates—not a single person who has a vote ex officio that can be exercised independently-right?

Berman: Yes, that’s the recommendation. The recommendation is to convert the existing unpledged delegates, known as superdelegates, to pledged delegates.


538: Did you get the sense that some of the members of the Commission whom are superdelegates, or have been at some point in their career, did not favor this proposal?

Berman: The Commission vote to adopt these recommendations was unanimous. The overwhelming view was that reforms needed to be made to ensure that the preferences of the voters was not overridden by unelected delegates, while at the same time the Party benefits from having its most senior members in the Convention hall in the event of a challenging nomination decision.

The recommendations attempt to meet these twin objectives.


538: In terms of the number of total delegates and superdelegates—which is roughly 4,000 and 800, respectively—is there going to be any change in those totals or will it be about the same?

Berman: There could be a change in these totals, particularly depending on the structure and use of the bonus delegate system, which will be addressed by the Rules committee.


538: So these totals could go upward?

Berman: Yes, they could increase.


538: Because of the bonus situation, then, the allocation proportionally across states could also change. It changes normally because of presidential outcomes. I’m talking above and beyond that—that weighting for each state could be different from what it was in 2008. That’s also possible, right?

Berman: Yes, states that qualify for a bonus allocation of delegates under the rules adopted for 2012 would have a relatively larger delegation size than states that do not qualify.

This was the same under bonus delegate systems that were used in the past.


538: In terms of the caucuses relative to the primaries, one of the complaints I suppose some people made—or something many observers gave you credit for—is that Obama got more delegates per voter than Hillary Clinton because of his attention to the caucus system. Is there anything that is going to change the imbalance—whether one views that as fairly or not—between the amount of support a candidate needs in order to win a delegate in a caucus state relative to a primary state?

Berman: No, the DNC uses standard formulas to allocate delegates to each state based on population and Democratic voting strength.

Each state is permitted to choose either a primary or a caucus to select its delegates and that decision does not affect the state’s allocation to the National Convention. Of course, a candidate needs less support to win a delegate in a state which has a lower turnout, whether of primary voters or caucus attendees, than in a state with a higher turnout. While primaries generally do have higher turnout than caucuses, we saw substantial increases in caucus turnout in 2008 and could see additional increases in a future competitive cycle.


538: Two quick questions as exit questions. It goes to the DNC Rules and Bylaws Committee and then theoretically to the DNC in full. Do you anticipate any of the proposals being changed or even rejected at this point?

Berman: It’s not theoretical that it will go to the full DNC. The Rules and Bylaws Committee will draft the rules for the next national nominating process and those rules must be adopted by the full DNC to become effective. A full discussion of the recommendations will be held at the Rules and Bylaws Committee and there will be a diversity of opinions on various issues.

The need for new language to implement recommendations will provide an opportunity to refine concepts and accommodate a diversity of opinions on different subjects.


538: Last question—and I’m not sure if you even have a sense or if it’s even appropriate to speculate—but do you think the new rules will favor a certain type of candidate? Does it favor a candidate who surges early like in the old Iowa and New Hampshire model, or a candidate who is strong regionally, or a candidate with wide but not deep support across the whole country? Rules do matter and I’m wondering if the new rules favor or disfavor a particular type of candidate.

Berman: It is too soon to say exactly how the new rules will affect candidates in 2012 or 2016.

The calendar still will begin with the familiar approved pre-Window contests that typically winnow the field. This means candidates will need to be able to run a strong, well-financed campaign in the year prior to the primaries and be successful at retail campaigning and intensive organization in the early states in order to make it through the opening stage of the process.

After that, the lineup of the states within the Window likely will be much different than what we saw for 2012, and there is no telling what type of candidate they might favor.

The 2008 campaign, however, showed us that the candidate who best understands the rules and calendar and strategically prepares to maximize his or her delegate performance will have a leg up on the competition once the process unfolds.

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Haiti and United States Inextricably Linked

The earthquake that struck the Carribbean nation of Haiti last evening has brought rapid and significant attention to the impoverished and conflict-affected country. With more than 10 million people and land area slightly smaller than Belgium (or about the same as Massachusetts), Haiti has long been the poster case for the vicious circle of colonial and foreign intervention, poverty, violence and political instability.

In the case of Haiti, however, natural disasters, along with environmental and agricultural overuse and degradation, have exacerbated the earlier trends to create an even more devastating situation of both political and environmental instability. In addition to relatively rare major earthquakes, each summer about seven to ten tropical storms crop up in the south Atlantic, with a few turning into hurricanes. Invariably, at least a few hit the island of Hispaniola, and batter the Haitian people.

Located just 50 miles east of Cuba and 700 miles southeast of Miami, Haiti has long been within the sphere of influence of the United States. As such, the United States has played a highly influential role in the modern history of Haiti, which continues to this day.

Following colonial exploitation of the island for gold, sugar, tobacco and coffee production by successive waves of Europeans, Haiti became an independent nation following the Haitian Revolution in 1793. Throughout the following period, however, the business interests of the global and regional powers at the time, namely French, English, American and German merchants and commodity sellers, dominated the political and economic scene.

While an early sandbox for European expansionism, once the rise of the United States as a global power was complete at the turn of the 20th century, the Americans were the major foreign player in the country. In 1888, US Marines landed to "protect American lives and property," as explained by Marine Historian Edwin Simmons, beginning several decades of off-and-on military operations. U.S. military interventions in Haiti came to head in July 1915, when President Woodrow Wilson ordered several hundred U.S. Marines to invade and hold the capital Port-au-Prince, in what became a 20 year occupation of the country.

While the US Government, through its governing advisors, had the final decision about all policies that were made during that period, the U.S. did not want to be portrayed as a colonial power. Indeed, the American leadership left the Haitian parliament in function and treated all Haitians --many of the elites were of mixed black and white heritage and used to preferential treatment from European colonialists-- with an equal measure of racial distaste.

Nonetheless, many have argued that economic interests, such as perceived threats to the Haitian-American Sugar Company (HASCO) by the Haitian government that came to power in early 1915, drove the intervention and occupation.

It was not until the "Good Neighbor" policy of the F.D. Roosevelt administration of the early 1930s when U.S. military and administrative forces were removed from the country, with power turned over in 1934.

U.S. forces again briefly occupied Port-au-Prince from September 1994 to March 1995, in response to a UN Security Council mandate to support constitutional government.

Today, the U.S. remains the largest trade destination for Haitian goods (more than 70 percent of exports), while imports from the United States (34 percent) are even higher than Haiti's next door neighbor, the Dominican Republic (23 percent). U.S. official aid to the country is quite significant (USD 260 million according to OECD DAC), though quite variable, with large spikes during Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 and 1995, and a tripling of aid from 2004 to 2008, after the 2004 coup that threw President Jean-Bertrand Aristide out of power for the last time.

Yesterday's earthquake opens the door to some obvious questions for the Obama administration, who have pledged to make major changes in U.S. policy towards neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. As discussed this summer, Obama stated in an April speech that, "while the United States has done much to promote peace and prosperity in the hemisphere, we have at times been disengaged, and at times we sought to dictate our terms. But I pledge to you that we seek an equal partnership."

The key question will be if that partnership for Haiti entails simply a year or two of above-average food-aid and reconstruction assistance, then a drop off the radar screen until the next hurricane, coup or food shortage, or instead something that more fundamentally changes the equation.

For example, what is to be done about the American and European agricultural subsidies that make farming in Haiti (among most of the developing world) economically infeasible for so many? And as well, how will the devastated natural environment, including degraded land and polluted water and air, be revitalized to support a sustainable society, economy and government?

These are the key elements of soft power and "equal partnership." And it is yet to be seen if the Obama administration seeks to make a true break from the past, or prefers to ignore it, portending decades more of the same cycle of poverty, conflict and political chaos.
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Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international affairs columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com

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Please Don't Run, Harold

Harold Ford says he's "gearing up" for a primary challenge against fellow Democrat and incumbent, New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand. The former congressman and failed Senate candidate from Tennessee could beat her, I suppose; if he does, he could win and maybe even hold the New York seat for a long time. Surely it would be good to have an African American in the Senate after Barack Obama’s departure left the exclusive club of 100 soon-to-be-lacking yet again even one African American in a country where African Americans are about one-eighth of the national population.

But I hope he doesn't run.

Now, let me admit up front my distaste for Ford. Writing for Salon three years ago, when Ford was announced as the new Democratic Leadership Council chair, I chided him for the despicable way he comported himself during his 2006 Tennessee Senate bid. By engaging in painfully transparent symbolism like wearing camouflage hunting caps, Ford bought into and reinforced nearly every trope Republicans have been peddling about Democrats for years. He spoke out against the gay marriage ruling in New Jersey, and in general talked the conservative talk on social issues. His behaviors do not excuse the patently racist television ad the Republicans ran against him, but Ford's refusal, when asked on live television, to call that ad racist was a selfish act of electorally-minded cowardice.

I'm sorry--OK, maybe I'm not--but the bottom line is that this is a vanity bid. This is a man who thinks the single best possible development for a Senate increasingly paralyzed by filibusters would be his election to the chamber.

Ford knows that when it comes to the Senate, New York, despite the famous Frank Sinatra lyrics, is actually quite amenable to what might be termed the "reverse Sinatra" effect: You can maybe still make it there even if you can't make it anywhere (else). Perhaps that's why the Empire State has been a favorite magnet for carpetbaggers past. Bobby Kennedy could have won in Massachusetts had a seat been open there in 1964, but Hillary Clinton in Arkansas in 2000? Not so sure.

The point is that Ford would have a great shot in the general election, and knows it. New York is so reliably blue, even a reddish Democrat need not don a camo baseball cap to be competitive. Which means Ford's bigger obstacle to office is Gillibrand in the primary. And yet surely Ford calculates that, because she attained office via appointment and hasn't had sufficient time since then to introduce herself to everyone in what is still the nation's third most populous state, Gillibrand is potentially quite vulnerable.

What's galling is how Ford is sporting his bluer stripes now that he's north of the Mason-Dixon line. Here's the key excerpt from his op-ed in the New York Post in which he publicly confirmed that he's "seriously considering" a Senate bid:

I am pro-choice--have always been since I entered politics almost 15 years ago. My cumulative grade with NARAL during 10 years in Congress was right at 80 percent. Any assertions to the contrary are false.

I remain committed to promoting gun safety and handgun control, and I look forward to working with Mayor Bloomberg and Newark Mayor Corey Booker and their coalition to reduce handgun violence in cities across America.

Despite what critics say about me, I enjoyed uninterrupted support from organized labor throughout my time in Congress.

And from the moment I arrived in Congress, I supported civil unions. Like New York's senior senator, after listening to and participating in the national conversation about full equality and fairness, I support same-sex marriage.

Suffice to say this wasn't the image Ford was projecting back in 2006.

Gillibrand hasn't been perfect, but she's darn good. Liberals in New York and Washington undoubtedly prefer that she be less of a Blue Dog and more of a bull dog. But, long term, I think she'll make a fine senator, both back home in the state where I grew up as well as in committee and on the floor of the chamber. She also deserves special dispensation if only for one reason: She took out one of the slimiest Republicans in Congress, former Rep. John Sweeney.

Ford offers little, if anything, in the way of a trade-up from Gillibrand. He'll only be wasting party resources that could be spent better elsewhere. And the fact that he is ignoring the wishes of the state's senior senator, Chuck Schumer, reveals the order in which Ford ranks his ambitions and his party's fortunes.

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Massachusetts: It's Not Just About Turnout

Obviously, turnout is the single most important factor that will determine whether Martha Coakley actually manages to lose the Massachusetts Senate seat to Republican Scott Brown.

But it's not just about turnout. The Rasmussen poll that just came out -- one which shows Coakley's lead shrinking from 9 to 2 points -- also shows Barack Obama with a 57 percent approval rating (versus 41 percent opposed) among likely voters, and the health care bill favored by 52 percent of likely voters (versus 46 percent opposed).

According to the poll's internals, right now about 8 percent of the electorate both (a) favors health care reform, and (b) has not been brought into Coakley's column. This includes 5 percent of the electorate which favors health care but is planning to vote for Scott Brown, 2 percent for the independent candidate, and 1 percent who favor health care who are undecided.

In addition, about 11 percent of the electorate approve of Barack Obama but are not planning to vote for Coakley.

If this were just about turnout, I would feel relatively safe about Coakley's position. The Democratic establishment has, somewhat belatedly, woken up to the closeness of the race, and polls like these will wake voters up too. And the Democrats have an experienced GOTV team on hand, with veterans from both the Obama and Hillary Clinton campaigns.

But if the Rasmussen numbers are right, there's also a chance that Coakley could lose even with a less-than-worst-case turnout scenario. Although I sometimes have concerns about the tightness of Rasmussen's likely voter screens, the fact is that an electorate which gives a 57 percent approval rating to Barack Obama is one that they ought to be reasonably contented with on election day.

In other words, there are still some swing voters here, and there is still some persuasion to do. And bear in mind that while every new voter that you turn out gets you a +1, every swing voter you persuade is worth a +2, since you're both adding a vote to your own tally and taking one away from your opponent.

Coakley's latest attempt at persuasion -- a commercial tying Scott Brown to the national GOP agenda -- feels like the right tune sung in the wrong key. Voters need to be reminded of just how oppositional the Republicans in Washington have become -- voting with near unanimity against not just the health care reform bill (which the commercial strangely sidesteps) but also the fair pay act for women, the jobs bill, the cap-and-trade bill (which ought to be popular in Massachusetts), the financial regulation bill, and the stimulus package. Then they need to be persuaded that Brown will support that pattern of obstruction and be a pawn in the Republicans' arsenal. Really, then, I'd take this commercial out of rotation and replace it with two separate spots (or one 60-second spot) which tackle the two flavors of the argument in a less compressed way. And Coakley could probably also use a third spot as a closer, which talks more optimistically about the Obama agenda, the Kennedy legacy, and relatively popular upcoming programs like the jobs bill.

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Politics of Afghanistan Part II

Foreword: The folks over at the National Security Network have put together a critique of the 2010 Politics of Afghanistan post from Friday. [Original Post] In the spirit of vigorous debate as a tool for good new ideas, which we are highly supportive of here at FiveThirtyEight, we agreed to run the (660 word) critique by NSN*, followed by a brief response from me.
---
National Security Network:
Renard’s first argument is correct – there are indeed strong reasons for the administration and democratic allies in congress to hope that Afghanistan does not become a political football in the 2010 midterms. But his next conclusion - that this mood of ambivalence spells an opening for anti-incumbents - is difficult to accept, at least insofar as the GOP is concerned.

While there may be exceptions for particular circumstances, on a national level, it will be difficult for Republicans to run on an Afghanistan platform in 2010. The first reason for this is that widespread ambivalence over the war restricts the GOP’s ability to turn a pro-war position to their political advantage. At times during 2009, support for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was well below 50%, a view fueled by dramatic increases in U.S. casualties during the spring and summer, as well as broader indications that the war was not going well.

While public confidence received a boost from the President’s strategy announcement, it will likely dip again as more American troops flow into the country, and casualties rise in relation. In this atmosphere, it’s hard to imagine GOP challengers finding an audience in favor of the war, or increased American involvement, except in very particular circumstances. At best they will argue that the Obama administration has mishandled the war, similar to the message many Democrats adopted in 2004, but not significantly to their advantage.

So what about anti-incumbent Republicans who oppose the war? Her again, they are constrained from using their position to an advantage. This time however, the constraints come more from their own party, than national public opinion.

Anti-War Republicans run into the problem that their party leadership has moved uniformly to support the war, making it difficult for challengers to take opposing positions. McConnell, Kyl, Boehner, Cantor – the entire GOP leadership is firmly in support of an expanded military mission in Afghanistan, even hinting that they would support further escalation if military commanders deemed it necessary.

They are joined by GOP ranking members on the relevant foreign policy committees, with the possible exception of Richard Lugar, who has attenuated his support with a push for greater focus on Pakistan. On HR 2647, Congressman McGovern’s bill requiring the Pentagon to provide an exit-strategy - probably the best stand-in for an up or down vote in support of the war - House Republicans were in lock-step, voting 164-7 against the amendment.

Now the republicans in congress do not perfectly represent the views of republicans nationwide, but even there, GOP leadership strongly supports the war. Following Obama’s West Point speech in December, RNC Chairman Michael Steele released a statement endorsing the war effort, but criticizing the President for wavering in his commitment. Republican campaign committee chairs John Cornyn and Pete Sessions echoed Steele’s message, endorsing a troop increase, while also blasting the Administration for not committing whole heartedly to the war effort. It’s difficult to see where GOP challengers could make hay from opposing the war, without bucking what appears to be a consensus among their party’s leadership.

The actions taken by GOP figures on Afghanistan are intended to create a security threshold for the administration that it cannot reach. If a Republican candidate went against this narrative they would be failing to reach their own party’s threshold. Running against the war also risks undermining the “we listen to the commanders on the ground” narrative, potentially setting the challengers against the military as well.

Though the divisions within the Democratic Party on the war should present an opening for Republicans, the constraints posed by national ambivalence about the war, along with GOP endorsement of an expanding the conflict means they won’t take it.

Ryan Keenan is the Outreach director for the National Security Network. Pat Barry is a researcher, also with the Network.

----
Response from the author (Renard Sexton):
The basic argument that Ryan Keenan and Pat Barry make in their post is that because the Republican leadership in Congress and the RNC are supportive of expansion and escalation of the Afghanistan war, it is "difficult to see where GOP challengers could make hay from opposing the war, without bucking what appears to be a consensus among their party’s leadership."

Indeed, I argued in my Friday article that anti-incumbent "challengers should jump on [Afghanistan] in a big way."

The problem with Keenan and Barry's argument, while perhaps exactly right in a 2004 context or earlier, is that the American right is currently heavily factionalized, a point I explored in detail on Friday.

Republicans in Congress, particularly among the Republican leadership, are generally quite hawkish, with a few exceptions like Ron Paul or Dick Lugar. However, as it has been widely discussed, the energized portion of the conservative electorate is not the "mainstream" Republican leadership, but in fact the tea party activists, some social conservatives and other more populist movements. In addition, individual GOP politicians, an example being Jim DeMint's "Senate Conservatives" PAC, are making big pushes to support particular candidates that may or may not line up with the GOP leadership's vision.

Bottom line is, the GOP leadership, which is quite discredited even among Republicans, will indeed likely set a "threshold" on the Afghanistan issue, including nominating a particular view on the issues as the standard party line. But what we have learned since the 2008 election is that many moderate and conservative voters in the country are skeptical of the GOP's ability to make these judgments, and many challenger candidates on the right are not willing to accept these party decisions as gospel.

Indeed, rejecting the positions of an unpopular national party's leadership only bolsters the anti-establishment and outsider credentials of a libertarian, tea-party activist or socially hard conservative candidate. Similarly, some right-leaning moderates that feel marginalized or alienated by the GOP leadership or the tea-party activists may be turned off by the lack of coherence and sit out the election.

In conclusion, while the Keenan and Barry argument has some important elements -- for example that going against the GOP leadership excludes you from a pretty hefty pot of campaign money and some inherent legitimacy -- the fact is that the Republican Party does not have the political weight that it did in the last couple of elections. If voters lash out against Democrats, it is undoubtedly because of frustration with the Obama Adminstration and congressional Democrats, rather than endorsing an exciting new programme from Republicans.

Therefore, I remain dubious about the contention that Congressional challengers on the right will be forced to run in favor of a hawkish expansion of Afghanistan war. Instead, like in the special election in NY-23, some sort of mixture between running strong on generic "national security", while either ignoring or condemning the specifics of the Afghanistan conflict, will work well for Republican challengers and some incumbents alike. For those against the war, as long as it does not undermine an otherwise "strong defense" stance, it should work well.

---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international affairs columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com

* Heather Hurlbert, Executive Director of NSN, suggested the debate; thanks to her for facilitating.

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Divorce Rates Higher in States with Gay Marriage Bans

Over the past decade or so, divorce has gradually become more uncommon in the United States. Since 2003, however, the decline in divorce rates has been largely confined to states which have not passed a state constitutional ban on gay marriage. These states saw their divorce rates decrease by an average of 8 percent between 2003 and 2008. States which had passed a same-sex marriage ban as of January 1, 2008, however, saw their divorce rates rise by about 1 percent over the same period.

The table below details the divorce rates for the 43 states that reported their divorce statistics to the CDC in both 2003 and 2008. It is calculated by taking the total number of divorces in the state that year, and dividing it by the number of married persons, as reported by the Census Bureau. The result is then multiplied by two, since each divorce involves two people. This is different than how the divorce rate is sometimes calculated, which may be as a share of the overall population rather than the number of married persons; I prefer my approach because it will not penalize a state for having a lot of marriages (and therefore more opportunities for divorce). However, there are also more complicated versions of the divorce rate calculation that account for the age of the married couples, and so forth; these are probably superior, but mine is intended to be a simple approach. The table also lists the percentage change in the divorce rate between 2003 and 2008, and the current status of gay marriage and domestic partnerships within each state.



As is somewhat visually apparent, those states which have tended to take more liberal policies toward gay marriage have tended also to have larger declines in their divorce rates. In Massachusetts, which legalized gay marriage in 2004, the divorce rate has declined by 21 percent and is the lowest in the country by some margin. It is joined at the top of the list by Rhode Island and New Mexico, which do not perform same-sex marriages but idiosyncratically also have no statute or constitutional provision expressly forbidding them, as well as Maine, whose legislature approved same-sex marriage only to have it overturned (although not banned constitutionally) by its voters.

On the other hand, the seven states at the bottom of the chart all had constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage in place throughout 2008. The state which experienced the highest increase in its divorce rate over the period (Alaska, at 17.2 percent) also happens to be the first one to have altered its constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage, in 1998.

Overall, the states which had enacted a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage as of 1/1/08 saw their divorce rates rise by 0.9 percent over the five-year interval. States which had not adopted a constitutional ban, on the other hand, experienced an 8.0 percent decline, on average, in their divorce rates. Eleven of the 24 states (46 percent) to have altered their constitutions by 1/1/08 to ban gay marriage experienced an overall decline in their divorce rates, but 13 of the 19 which hadn't did (68 percent).



The differences are highly statistically significant. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily imply causation. The decision to ban same-sex marriage does not occur randomly throughout the states, but instead is strongly correlated with other factors, such as religiosity and political ideology, which we have made no attempt to account for. Nor do we know in which way the causal arrow might point. It could be that voters who have more marital problems of their own are more inclined to deny the right of marriage to same-sex couples.

There is, however, probably now enough data on this subject to engage in more sophisticated longitudinal studies on this subject (more sophisticated than I have engaged in here), which might produce more robust conclusions. Although only Massachusetts has affirmed gay marriage for any length of time, the difference between the states which have banned it constitutionally versus statutorily may be worth examining, as the former represents a significantly more confident assertion about the nature of state-sanctioned marriage. At the very least, I would be surprised if there were any statistical evidence that interpreting the right of marriage to apply to same-sex couples would be injurious to heterosexual couples in any material way.

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Massachusetts Chart of the Day

Here is a list of all contested (both parties fielded a candidate) open-seat races (neither candidate was an incumbent) in Massachusetts since 1980, covering Congressional, gubernatorial, and Presidential elections. Asterisks indicate special elections.



Obviously Massachusetts is a very blue state, but the notion that the Democrat always wins by a 20- or 30- point blowout is just not true. The Democrat received more than 60 percent of the vote on only 4 of 19 occasions and averaged 56.2 points to the Republican's 39.9. And although I generally disdain comparing governor's races to races for the Congress, it is worth remembering that Republicans' controlled the governors' office for 16 consecutive years from 1991 through 2007. John Kerry, for his part, had some fairly close calls after becoming Senator; although it had been a long time since Kennedy did (a 17-pointer against Mitt Romney in 1994 was the closest.)

Certainly, I'm not claiming that the race has no broader significance; in some Bayesian sense, every point closer that Brown comes (especially, duh, if he wins) is one in favor of the case that Democrats are in for a rough 2010 (as I continue to expect). But a close-ish Brown finish would not be quite as unprecedented as it has been made out to be; the state has often given the newbie a little freshman hazing and then fallen in love only later.

p.s. You can dispute the inclusion of Dukakis in 1982, since he had been governor before but was not an incumbent at the time, and Cellucci in 1998, who had been acting governor after William Weld resigned. If you pulled both races out, though, the overall average would be pretty much unchanged.

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Preventing Another Clinton-Obama Primary Fiasco

Holiday travel and the start of a rare Winter semester course have kept me away from commenting on the changes to the Democratic presidential primary rules and calendar, as proposed by the Democratic Change Commission late last month. What follows is the first of two posts on the subject, the second of which will be a published interview with Obama delegate guru and DCC member Jeff Berman I hope to publish tomorrow.

OK, first, the basics: The DCC was created last March by President Obama and his close ally, Democratic National Committee Chairman Tim Kaine. Co-chaired by Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill and South Carolina Congressman Jim Clyburn, the Commission—members of whom are listed here—was tasked with re-examining current party nominating rules and issuing proposed changes. Those proposals are done and now advance to the DNC’s Rules & Bylaws committee, which will review them and make a final, official recommendation to the DNC for its adoption. (I suppose rejection is possible--although the way these things are negotiated, and the way the Commission was assembled, likely precludes an outright rejection of all changes.)
The key recommendation is to eliminate the category of unpledged Party Leaders and Elected Officials--PLEOs, or the so-called “superdelegates”--and replace them with a new category called National Party Leaders and Elected Officials, or NPLEOs, whose votes at the convention would be determined not by their own preferences but by the results of the voting in the primary/caucus of their state. Apparently, there was discussion at some point of turning the current superdelegates into non-voting delegates, but that idea was rejected. “Openness, fairness, and accessibility are central to our ideals as Democrats, and the Commission’s recommendations to reform the delegate selection process will ensure that voters’ voices and preferences are paramount to our process of nominating a Presidential candidate," said Kaine, in a prepared statement.

Much like the 2000 election reminded the nation that the Electoral College rules do matter, the epic 2008 nomination battle between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton reminded Democrats and the rest of the country that the nomination rules matter, too. As many of you surely remember, there was a lot of buzz--grumbling among Obama supporters--that somehow Hillary Clinton would win the nomination based on her stronger showing among the 820 superdelegates. And it's true that, deep into the primary contest she maintained a lead--although, as the chart above depicts, her big early margin among superdelegates began to shrink quickly during Obama's torrid February streak of primary and caucus wins.

In the end, the superdelegates ratified, not reversed, Obama's lead among delegates earned in state contests. But there was a period of worry in 2008 that began almost immediately after Obama's historical Iowa caucus victory on January 3.

So, the next time there is a particularly competitive Democratic primary--and that may be a while, at the very least 2016--what would the proposed changes, if adopted, mean?

In broad, historical terms, the change would continue a process, dating back to the end of the so-called “King Caucus” era in the history of presidential nominations, of shifting control of the nomination process, sometimes gradually and at other times more swiftly, away from party elites and to party rank-and-file voters and caucus-goers. The overall political effect will be to reduce the power of party elites. In terms of nomination campaign calculus, the change will make it more important to actually win primaries and caucuses, because candidates will need to win states or perform well in state contests in order to earn the added votes of the NPLEOs, bound as they will be to their respective state’s outcome.

That will leave a lot of party prima donnas with their noses bent out of shape. The great joy of being a superdelegate in 2008 was having the candidates court you for your support. That meant personal calls from the candidates, invites to campaign events and, in general, a lot of ego-stroking. Many people get in politics got, at least partly, with precisely this motivation. So, that allure will be gone for the new NPLEOs because their vote will be anchored to an election result, not a function of their personal predilections. However, as superdelegates they will presumably retain the coveted hard pass for the convention, along with all the invites to the parties, the goodie bags, and the rest of fun experiences of convention week. The allure of these benefits probably explain the significant pushback against the idea of eliminating superdelegates altogether.

The other major proposed change has to do with the calendar. Specifically, the date before which most of the states not specifically designated by the DNC to conduct their primaries/caucuses early—Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina last time around—will be pushed back. The obvious effect of this will be to reverse the trend over the past four decades, depicted above, toward both an earlier start date and a condensing of scheduled state primaries/caucuses closer to that start date. It will also have the effect of attempting to provide clear rules that will deter states from trying to do what Florida and Michigan did last time, to the consternation of Democrats in the other 48 states and territories—not to mention, eventually, the Clinton campaign.

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As Spotlight Shines on Reid, Re-Election Prospects Dim

On the heels of last week's retirement announcements by Senators Chris Dodd and Bryon Dorgan, and Colorado Governor Bill Ritter, it's natural to wonder which other Democrats might follow them into the Great Cloak Room in the Sky. And few Democrats are more vulnerable than Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid.

It appeared for a while as though Reid, although his approval ratings have been challenging for some time, might avoid having to face a serious Republican opponent. And indeed, the candidates whom the Republicans have mustered up aren't much: a former state senator on the one hand (Sue Lowden), and son of a famous basketball coach (Danny Tarkanian) on the other, who has never held elected office. Nevertheless, Reid has trailed both Lowden and Tarkanian in every poll, although almost always by single-digit margins.

The weakness of the Republican candidates, along with more than $8 million in the bank, an extremely unpopular Republican incumbent governor, and control of the machine in a machine state, are what might allow Reid to keep the race competitive. But increasingly it seems as though his chances of a victory might hinge upon a significant gaffe or scandal on the part of Lowden or Tarkanian. There is a nontrivial chance of something like this happening; Lowden and Tarkanian are inexperienced campaigners, Nevada is a state where more politicians than not have skeletons in the closet, and $8 million pays for a lot of opposition research.

However, after revelations surfaced this weekend that Reid made impolitic remarks in 2008 concerning Barack Obama's skin tone, Reid's position has become more tenuous. Although Republicans may yet manage to minimize the cost of the gaffe through tone-deaf remarks of their own, the fact remains that Reid cannot withstand any erosion of support within the African-American community, which constitutes 10 percent of the electorate in Nevada and heretofore had been of his few remaining reservoirs of support. A September poll for Daily Kos by Research 2000, for example, showed Reid leading Tarkanian 74-5 among black voters, even while trailing him 40-45 overall. If, hypothetically, 10 percent of the black voters in that poll switched from Reid to Tarkanian as a result of his remarks, and another 20 percent decided not to vote, that would expand Tarkanian's lead to 47-38, a 9-point margin.

Are those pessimistic assumptions? I have no way in particular to know. But Reid's remarks have received a generally unsympathetic reaction among black political bloggers, even at the same time that black political leaders have been tripping over themselves to defend him. And as someone whose best-case scenario probably involved cobbling together 51-53 percent of the electorate, turning off even a small fraction of black voters could be highly injurious.

Reid's problems, however, predated his remarks about "Negro dialect", as well as the increasing unpopularity of the Democratic agenda over the past months. Las Vegas Review-Journal polling, in fact, found that the turnaround came at least two years ago:



The causality here seems to be fairly clear. Reid's favorables dipped from 50/25 to about 45/40 after he took over as Senate Minority Leader in 2004. They then dropped further -- about to their present position of 35/50 -- after the Democrats took over the majority in 2006. The decline in Reid's numbers, ironically, came at a time when most other Democrats were on the ascendancy and Team Blue was winning almost every competitive election.

But being a majority leader, of late, has been hazardous to one's political health. Reid's predecessor, Bill Frist of Tennessee, retired rather than seek re-election in 2006; although Frist had pledged to serve only two terms, his approval ratings at the time of his retirement were in the 40s, and his re-election would have been highly uncertain. Preceding Frist was Tom Daschle of South Dakota, who famously lost to Republican John Thune, then Trent Lott of Mississippi, who stepped down from his leadership position after racial remarks of his own (although Lott did win re-election to the Senate, in 2006). Before Lott was Bob Dole of Kansas, who abandoned the position to concentrate on his losing Presidential bid; before Dole was George Mitchell of Maine, who quit politics at the relatively young age of 62 after being unable to produce legislative victories for Bill Clinton in 1993-94.

Whatever Reid's qualifications as a legislative point guard -- from my vantage point, much of the criticism has been deserved but much has not been -- it has been damaging to his electoral position in at least two ways. Firstly, Reid is not a naturally charismatic politician. Ordinarily, this is less fatal than you might think: meet a Congressman, and you'd be surprised at how often he fails to stand out from the crowd, instead surviving based a combination of organizational skills, constituent services, and a reputation for trustworthiness -- all of which Reid has in spades. But the party leadership position draws more attention to Reid's weaknesses, particularly in the Internet/cable era where it's harder to hide from the cameras.

Secondly Reid, who once was once regarded as something of a conservative and had National Journal ratings in the 60s, has been unable to publicly oppose elements of the Democratic agenda which he might find electorally disadvantageous. Although Nevada may have become bluer, its unorthodox demographics -- highly unionized and relatively nonwhite, but also somewhat libertarian and with a sizable Mormon minority -- do not lend themselves to a doctrinaire liberal (or conservative) position.

Indeed, some elements of the Democratic agenda, particularly health care, are not wearing well on Nevadans, and so a different Democratic candidate would hardly have a free pass. Nevertheless, considering the unimpressive Republican opposition, and that Democrats have developed a sizeable registration advantage in the state, we would probably characterize the contest as "Lean Democrat" if Reid were to be replaced by another candidate like NV-1 Representative Shelly Berkley or State Senate President Steven Horsford.

It's no business of ours whether Reid retires. Because he is the Majority Leader, there are a whole host of political considerations that come into play in addition to electoral ones, as well as the prospective impact on the news cycle. He does have some reasonable prospect of winning and he does have some advantages, notably his money and his polished, professional staff. And it would almost certainly be a terrible idea to announce a retirement within the next 45 days, while the fallout from his remarks to Mark Halperin lingers, and while Republicans could claim another scalp.

Nevertheless, this is a conversation that Democrats need to be having, if they aren't already. Reid's favorability ratings are quite similar to those of former New Jersey governor Jon Corzine, who like Reid had an enormous monetary advantage, a good turnout operation, and a somewhat underwhelming Republican opponent, but ultimately gathered no more than 45 percent of the vote.

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Battle of the Massachusetts Polls

So, whom to believe?

The special election to replace Ted Kennedy in Massachusetts has become quite intriguing. And three pollsters with surveys out this week all have rather different takes on the race.

The Rasmussen poll shows the Democrat, Martha Coakley, up by 9 points. The Boston Globe poll, conducted by the University of New Hampshire survey center, has her up by 15. But the PPP poll actually has Scott Brown up, by 1 point. All three polls are of likely voters.

In addition to these, there's also a rumor of a Boston Herald poll that shows Coakley up by just 1, a supposed leaked Republican internal poll that had Coakley up by 11, and some older polling (including one of likely voters) that showed Coakley up by margins ranging from 26 to 31 points. But we've already got our hands full with Globe, PPP, and Rasmussen, so let's focus on those for now.

All three polling firms in question have above-average track records. PPP and UNH have a history of the occasional big miss, although they usually get things right. Rasmussen tends to be a bit more consistent, although their polling has been a bit "different" since the 2010 cycle began -- they may turn out to be dead-on about 2010, but until we know for sure, I might apply a bit more skepticism to their results than I would ordinarily.

The PPP is more recent than the other two, although only by about 48 hours. Recency is nice, but unless there's a specific major event that drives changes in public opinion (not just general "momentum"), I tend to think it's a bit overstated. Plus, there's a downside to recency; half the PPP sample was conducted on Friday, a day that some pollsters like to avoid.

The PPP poll has a bit larger sample size than the other two; 774 respondents versus 554 and 500, respectively.

Rasmussen's partisan ID breakdown is a bit less plausible than the other two, although as the Globe poll makes clear, there's a big difference in Massachusetts between partisan registration and partisan identification, which makes this somewhat ambiguous.

The Globe poll explicitly mentions the name of the third-party candidate, the libertarian Joe Kennedy, and gives him 5 percent of the vote. The Rasmussen poll does not mention him by name, but provides a choice for "some other candidate", who gets 1 percent. And PPP does not provide for a third party option at all. You can make a case either way here; although Kennedy is participating in the debates and getting a bit more attention than usual, there's also some history of polls overstating the margins that third-party candidates receive on Election Day.

Globe/UNH is the local pollster, whereas Rasmussen and PPP are national ones. Rasmussen has nevertheless polled Massachusetts rather frequently before, although PPP hasn't.

Rasmussen and PPP use the IVR method -- a.k.a. "robopolls" -- whereas Globe/UNH uses live interviewers. But there's not really convincing evidence about whether IVR polls are inferior to regular ones. And in some recent elections, in fact, they've tended to outperform them. They do get lower response rates, however, which can at least potentially raise questions about response and self-selection bias.

* * *

Are you seeing a consistent pattern here? I'm not. All of the polls have positives and negatives. And any of them could be right.

The average of the three polls shows Coakley up by 8 points. As I've written before, I would probably take "over" on that 8 percent number. Fundamentally, this is still Massachusetts, and unless the Democratic candidate has some sort of fatal flaw (Coakley is a bit boring, but that's hardly an unpardonable sin), it's just going to be a really heavy lift for the turnout to be lopsided enough to allow the Republican to prevail.

At the same time, while I'm taking the "over" on that 8 percent, I'm also taking the over on variance. Special elections are notoriously hard to predict. And we also seem to be at some weird sort of inflection point in the electoral cycle. You can point toward some evidence to make the case that the bottom is really falling out from Democrats, and you can point toward other evidence which suggests that the whole tea-party backlash, while not unimportant, is really just operating at the margins. So, I acknowledge that there is a fairly tangible shot of Brown winning -- higher than the 3-5 percent I assigned to him after seeing the Rasmussen poll, but lower than the 15-25 percent chance I gave him before seeing the Boston Globe result.

This probably won't be a very satisfying answer to those of you who come to me looking for some kind of certitude. But part of being a good forecaster is knowing when to make a bold forecast and knowing when to proceed with more caution; the Massachusetts race calls for a heavy dose of the latter.

Edit: See also Mark Blumenthal, who has a similarly balanced take.

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