Yesterday, the House passed HR 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, which would impose a series of significant new regulations on the financial services sector. Such measures have the potential to be very popular. A Time/SRBI poll in October found 59 percent of Americans favoring greater regulation of Wall Street, with 13 percent wanting less and 23 percent favoring the status quo. Previous polls on the subject -- some coming during a more acute point of the financial crisis -- revealed even more support for such initiatives. An ABC/Washington Post poll in February found 76 percent of Americans supporting stricter regulations on banks and financial services companies versus just 22 percent opposed; a Harris Poll, also conducted that month, found an even greater 87-10 majority in favor of stricter regulations.
In spite of this, the bill was rejected 175-0 among Republicans in the House, with allegedly "populist" groups like FreedomWorks strongly urging a vote against passage. The House vote would seem to undermine any Republican claims to be champions of Main Street, and potentially to form a key pivot point for Democrats as we head into next year's midterm elections.
And yet, the bill has received scant praise, and indeed very little attention, in liberal circles. Some of this is based on legitimate concerns that the bill did not go far enough -- although it does do quite a lot. Some of it is based on a not-unreasonable assumption that although the House bill is fairly adequate, it is likely to be significantly watered-down by the Senate.
Even so, there seems to be extreme reluctance among the left, and particularly the online left, to praise any economic successes achieved by the Congressional Democrats and the White House.
I do not expect Democrats, certainly, to be cheering the roughly 35 percent run-up in stock prices that has been achieved since Obama took the Oath of Office (we can pose an interesting counterfactual about whether Republicans would be touting the bull market if the roles were reversed). There have, however, been some other successes.
Last week, for example, it was revealed that the government is likely to recover all but $42 billion of the loans made under the TARP program. Of the losses, about $30 billion comes from the interventions in General Motors and Chrysler, a program which liberals largely supported. In fact, the government actually expects to render a profit on loans made to banks, although it will probably lose money overall because of the monies allocated to the auto firms and to AIG.
Third-quarter economic growth was reasonable, even after a downward revision to an annualized rate of 2.9 percent. Fourth quarter economic growth is expected to be better, with private forecasts recently having been revised upward and centering on a range of 3.5 to 4.5 percent. The manufacturing and housing numbers have generally been decent, and retail sales numbers have been moderately encouraging.
Of course, there is the 8 million job gorilla in the room: the economy is perhaps 7-8 million jobs short of what ordinarily would be considered full employment, leaving the U3 unemployment rate at 10.0 percent. Laid off workers are suffering and, in many cases, have gone the better part of a year without a paycheck. And the hemorrhaging of jobs has yet to reverse itself, although it very nearly did last month.
Even here, however, there have been some economic interventions that you'd think liberals would be inclined to cheer. The first and foremost is, of course, the $787 billion stimulus passed this winter, which according to CBO estimates has contributed between 0.6 million and 1.6 million more jobs than would otherwise exist (meaning that unemployment would be somewhere between 10.4 percent and 11.1 percent without it). Unemployment benefits were extended last month and are likely to be extended again; meanwhile, the White House has gotten on board with a $200 billion jobs program that would be paid for, directly or indirectly, out of the savings that were achieved from the better-than-expected performance of the TARP program.
To be clear, the jobs market is by any reasonable stretch of the imagination still really horrible. That the economy has regained its footing is uncertain; forecasts have been horribly wrong before, and recovery is hardly inevitable. And even if the recovery does occur, progress in jobs growth may be halting.
Moreover, this is not purely a debate over the efficacy of the efforts of the White House. Some of this, rather, is a debate about objectives and philosophy, and ultimately the "big" questions about (a) the optimal level of government intervention into the economy and (b) the optimal level of wealth (re)distribution within the country. On those questions, as long-time readers of this website will know, I am almost certainly to the right of the consensus of the liberal blogosphere, although I share the opinions that the initial stimulus effort was too small; that further jobs-creating interventions would be helpful; that tax rates ought to be re-engineered to reduce the relative burden on the middle class; that the country is wealthy enough to provide universal access to health care; that markets are prone to bouts of irrationality and, occasionally, outright failure; that an unfettered free market does not adequately price in the carbon externality, and that the substantial systemic risk in the banking system has yet to be addressed.
(Where are my substantive differences? I believe that a tax rate structure substantially steeper than that in place during the Clinton era is liable to be counter-productive; I am not persuaded that unions contribute to economic growth (although I think workers have a Constitutional right to form them); I am not inherently distrustful of markets; I am largely uninterested in one-off punitive measures toward the banks (although I recognize their political efficacy); I am not necessarily persuaded that financial institutions have to be broken up (although I am not necessarily persuaded that they shouldn't be); and I think the issue of executive compensation is best handled by changing structural imperatives rather than through direct intervention.)
But mostly, I tend to focus on achievements rather than philosophy when evaluating an Administration's economic policy -- albeit a fairly careful reading of achievements which is couched in an understanding of both the political constraints and systematic and cyclical factors which are largely outside of the White House's control. And from a results perspective, I tend to see the Democrats' performance as having been pretty good.
There are, basically, three policy imperatives that emerged from the economic crisis of last year. The first and most pressing was to put out the fire -- to prevent a complete or near-total meltdown of the financial system, which was in crisis. The second was to facilitate, to the extent possible, a recovery in the broader economy. And the third was to put adequate safeguards in place to prevent such a meltdown from occurring again.
It is important to separate out these imperatives, because they require rather different sorts of interventions, sometimes involving different institutions within the government.
Putting out the fire. On the first imperative -- that of averting a meltdown -- I would give the Democrats high marks. Not only did we avoid Armageddon, but we did so with relatively little contribution -- "only" about $42 billion -- from future taxpayers. At the time these interventions were undertaken, this would have been regarded as an exceptionally good outcome. And with the advantage of hindsight, objective evaluations of TARP tend to be similarly rosy, including that from the very liberal (and smart) economist Elizabeth Warren, who chaired a Senate panel on the subject.
The recovery. As to the second objective, we have a split between the performance of the labor market, and that of other economic indicators. Back in February, when the stimulus was passed, the Wall Street Journal forecasting panel projected 3Q GDP growth of 0.7 percent; the actual figure, after revision, was 2.9 percent. They predicted 1.9 percent growth in the 4Q; the actual figure is likely to be closer to 4.0. On the other hand, they projected December unemployment to be 8.8 percent; November's figure was 10.0 and December's is likely to come in somewhere close to that.
Certainly, I think that the stimulus package ought to have been both larger and more focused on infrastructure-type programs that would have led to more direct creation of jobs. The stimulus, however, passed the Senate with just one extra vote (the tally was 61-37), suggesting that there may have been very little additional wiggle room. I think that is actually somewhat too narrow a reading of the political conditions in place at the time; more persuasion on the part of the White House (which was very popular then) might have moved the needle some, as might have the tactical gambit of throwing out a higher number rather than counting on the Congress to do the heavy lifting. Nevertheless, there probably wasn't much room for improvement; an extra $100 or $150 billion, perhaps, which if directed toward infrastructure might have led to an unemployment rate that was 0.3 to 0.4 points lower than it is now. Moreover, some of the shortfall has been made up for with post-facto mini-stimuli like cash-for-clunkers and the unemployment benefits extension, and the forthcoming jobs bill.
In any event, such as it was, you have a stimulus that has tended to exceed expectations in terms of GDP growth. It would appear, on the other hand, to have fallen short in terms of jobs growth. But that conclusion is debatable. If the CBO's estimates are to be believed -- that the stimulus has reduced the unemployment rate by 0.4 to 1.1 percent -- that would be in line with both the White House's estimates (which had forecast an 0.7 percent improvement in unemployment through the 3Q as a result of the stimulus) and the CBO's expectations in March.
Yes, the systemic conditions in the job market have been somewhat worse than most (though not all) private forecasters anticipated, and much worse than the White House seemed to anticipate. Certainly you can fault them for failing to frame the public's expectations adequately, and also for aiming for too small a stimulus -- although, again, it's not clear that aiming higher would have substantially improved what actually came out of the Congress. But subject to those admonitions, the White House's efforts at facilitating a recovery would seem to deserve a grade of somewhere between adequate and good, on the basis of the objective evidence.
Financial sector reform. Here, there is no grade that can be given other than incomplete -- the Congress has yet to pass any substantial regulatory reform effort, and the systemic risk in the financial sector very much remains and could cascade at any time. Nevertheless, the bill that the House just passed has been a reasonably good start. The White House and the Senate will lay their cards on the table sometime early next year. Perhaps the most robust criticism of the White House is that it should have tackled regulatory reform before health care -- a course of action that most liberals would have been very upset about.
* * *
Perhaps, if the unemployment rate has improved by sometime next year, with the economy adding something like 300,000 or 400,000 jobs per month, then liberals will start to more vigorously defend the White House's economic policy, while the conservative critique will be somewhat mollified. But I'm not holding my breath. Liberals (and certainly conservatives) have tended to shortchange the successes that the White House has had thus far, and I would expect them to continue to do so.
This is for understandable reasons: the financial crisis was extremely traumatic; the economy is a complex system that does not lend itself well to snap judgments and punditry, and many liberals have concerns about the economy (such as the increasing inequality of wealth and income) that extend far beyond the recession of 2007-09. Nor, partly through their own doing, have the optics been especially favorable to the White House: the jobs-creating effects of the stimulus have tended to be swimming upstream relative to the underlying conditions of the labor market; there were some notable PR failures like the AIG bonus "scandal", and the White House has been strangely reluctant to embrace populist rhetoric at a time when it would square well with the political zeitgeist.
At the end of the day, however, the piling-on in liberal circles does not match the objective evidence about the economy. And if it sets any precedent, you may have a robust recovery by the middle of next year, but with neither the White House's conservative nor liberal critics willing to give them much credit for it. Voters may stay away from Democrats as a result, pushing the country toward more conservative economic policy and ensuring that liberal critics of the economy aren't lacking for greivances any time soon.
12.12.2009
12.11.2009
Countries Most Vulnerable to Climate Change Are Least Aware of Threat
@ 7:18 PM
One of the unfortunate ironies of climate change is that its greatest medium-term impacts are liable to be on precisely those countries -- especially poor countries in equatorial regions -- which are the least empowered to do anything about it. Not only that, indeed, but according to a new Gallup survey of residents across 128 countries, many of the people in these locations may be literally unaware of the threat that global warming presents.
Earlier this year, the World Bank ranked countries according to their vulnerability to five particular harms from climate change: drought, flooding, storms, sea-level rise, and agricultural impact. Some 20 nations ranked either in the top 12 in at least two categories or the top five in any one category and were included in the Gallup survey.
In those countries, on average, just 47 percent of the residents in the survey said they knew something about climate change at all. This compares to 61 percent for all countries worldwide, and 93 percent in the highly-developed G8 countries.
Importantly, it's not the people in these countries dismiss the threat. Of those people that are aware of climate change in these countries, 81 perceive it as a somewhat or very serious threat -- this compares to 72 percent in the G8 nations or 67 percent worldwide. Rather, they are literally unaware of the problem. (A notable exception are the Chinese, who are reasonably aware of climate change but doesn't seem to regard it as threatening.)
In Copenhagen, I was able to acquaint myself a little bit with the global climate NGO community. The NGO community, certainly, is keenly aware of the threat to the developing world. And some of the NGO activism originates from the developing world itself; I met with a very impressive group of youth activists who represented Kenya, for instance.
Nevertheless, on balance, the NGOs were mostly focused on cultivating changes in public opinion and public policy in the developed world. And the developing world, indeed, is where most of the political power resides for the time being. But there's a lot of untapped people power in nations like Bangladesh, Egypt, India and Indonesia, and Niger, which if catalyzed, could help to give these countries a greater voice at the negotiating table.
Earlier this year, the World Bank ranked countries according to their vulnerability to five particular harms from climate change: drought, flooding, storms, sea-level rise, and agricultural impact. Some 20 nations ranked either in the top 12 in at least two categories or the top five in any one category and were included in the Gallup survey.
In those countries, on average, just 47 percent of the residents in the survey said they knew something about climate change at all. This compares to 61 percent for all countries worldwide, and 93 percent in the highly-developed G8 countries.
Importantly, it's not the people in these countries dismiss the threat. Of those people that are aware of climate change in these countries, 81 perceive it as a somewhat or very serious threat -- this compares to 72 percent in the G8 nations or 67 percent worldwide. Rather, they are literally unaware of the problem. (A notable exception are the Chinese, who are reasonably aware of climate change but doesn't seem to regard it as threatening.)
In Copenhagen, I was able to acquaint myself a little bit with the global climate NGO community. The NGO community, certainly, is keenly aware of the threat to the developing world. And some of the NGO activism originates from the developing world itself; I met with a very impressive group of youth activists who represented Kenya, for instance.
Nevertheless, on balance, the NGOs were mostly focused on cultivating changes in public opinion and public policy in the developed world. And the developing world, indeed, is where most of the political power resides for the time being. But there's a lot of untapped people power in nations like Bangladesh, Egypt, India and Indonesia, and Niger, which if catalyzed, could help to give these countries a greater voice at the negotiating table.
Obama in Oslo
@ 12:19 PM
President Obama's Nobel prize acceptance speech is receiving ample praise back home in the states. But first, one of the key portions of the speech is this (slightly edited down) six-graph stretch:
Obama is aware of the tension. In his toasting remarks later in the day, Obama echoed the familiar refrain about the irony that the award's namesake was an inventor of dynamite and yet promoter of peace. And he also said this:
I do not bring with me today a definitive solution to the problems of war..[I]t will require us to think in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.
We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations -- acting individually or in concert -- will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.
I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak -- nothing passive -- nothing naïve -- in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.
But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.That is some pretty powerful prose. The ever-more-readable Kathleen Parker opened her Washington Post column today (just inches away from always-whiny Charles Krauthammer) with these lines:
I raise this point, I begin with this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter what the cause. And at times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world's sole military superpower.
But the world must remember that it was not simply international institutions -- not just treaties and declarations -- that brought stability to a post-World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms....We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.
After Barack Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech, anyone still questioning whether he is really a Christian, rather than a Muslim aligned with fanaticism, needs to seek therapy forthwith.Slate's Kaplan was also impressed, and situated the speech in the broader context of Reinhold Neibuhr's political philosophies:
Anyone still unconvinced that Obama is really an American committed to his nation's values, rather than an impostor who doesn't pledge allegiance to his critics' satisfaction, should probably surrender to the asylum.
Obama's speech, an artful balance of realism and idealism, was both a Judeo-Christian epistle, conceding the moral necessity of war, and a meditation on American exceptionalism. He was, in other words, the unapologetic president of the United States and not some errant global villager seeking affirmation.
The speech was a signal moment in the evolution and maturation of Obama from ambivalent aspirant to reluctant leader.
Rising to the occasion, he managed to redeem himself at a low point in his popularity by reminding Americans of what is best about themselves.Hanging like a shadow over the speech, of course, is Obama's recent decision to send an addition 34,000 troops to Afghanistan. Cynics would say Obama's Oslo address was little more than justification for the ironic juxtaposition of that decision with his choice for the award itself.
Read in its entirety, Obama's speech seems a faithful reflection of another theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who, during World War II and the Cold War that followed, sought to reconcile the principles of Christianity with the imperatives of national defense...
Obama's speech doesn't mention Niebuhr, but back in April 2007, early on in the presidential campaign, David Brooks asked Obama whether he'd ever read Niebuhr. The candidate replied, "I love him, he's one of my favorite philosophers." Asked what he took away from Niebuhr, Obama answered, "I take away the compelling idea that there's serious evil in the world"; that "we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate these things, but we shouldn't use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction"; that "we have to make these efforts knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naive idealism to bitter realism."
The Nobel lecture that Obama delivered today is a fuller elaboration of the same ideas.
Obama is aware of the tension. In his toasting remarks later in the day, Obama echoed the familiar refrain about the irony that the award's namesake was an inventor of dynamite and yet promoter of peace. And he also said this:
...I would like to thank the committee once again for the extraordinary confidence that they placed in me and this great honor that I have received tonight. As I indicated before, no one was more surprised than me. (Laughter.) And I have to say that when the chairman spoke introducing me, I told him afterwards that I thought it was an excellent speech and that I was almost convinced that I deserved it. (Laughter and applause.)Obama knows that he won the award prospectively--for the promise of what he will do, not what he has done thus far. Earning it over the long term is going to be tougher than accepting it, that's for sure. And the process of delivering on that promise begins in Afghanistan.
12.10.2009
Craziness With a Touch of Nutmeg
@ 3:18 PM
Has anyone else noticed how crazy things are getting in the Connecticut Senate race? To be honest, I wasn't following it that closely, but it seemed like every time I turned my head there was a new story coming out of the Nutmeg State. Let me summarize some of what's going on in this race, which as you can see to the left Nate currently ranks as the fifth most competitive Senate race and second most competitive non-open seat race.
We should start with the Democratic incumbent Chris Dodd. His poll numbers continue to confirm serious vulnerability for the longtime incumbent. The latest Rasmussen poll shows Dodd trailing all three remaining GOP contenders: Rob Simmons, Linda McMahon and Peter Schiff.
I say "remaining three" because last week former Ambassador to Ireland Tom Foley suddenly dropped out of the race so he could instead enter the GOP primary for the state's open-seat governor's contest.
Oh, but it gets better. Just when I thought I would never again have to conjure the blast-from-the-past name or image of Bruno Sammartino, Politico runs a story this week about the growing number of wrestling industry detractors speaking up in opposition to Linda McMahon's GOP candidacy. McMahon is wife of WWE entrepreneur Vince McMahon and former WWE CEO, but apparently she is far from beloved by many familiar with her and her business practices. Politico's Erika Lovley quotes Sammartino and several other former WWE stars poor-mouthing Mrs. McMahon's leadership. This twist comes a month after Connecticut Democrats filed what seems like a frivolous, but headline-grabbing FEC complaint against McMahon and the WWE for removing some offensive videos from YouTube.
Best I can tell, Quinnipiac conducted the most recent poll of likely Republican primary voters, and the results showed Simmons leading. Given Simmons' wider margins over Dodd, and the fact that he is the kind of virtually-extinct Republican that can actually win statewide in New England, Connecticut Republicans would be wise to nominate him--and Dodd should be worried if they do.
We should start with the Democratic incumbent Chris Dodd. His poll numbers continue to confirm serious vulnerability for the longtime incumbent. The latest Rasmussen poll shows Dodd trailing all three remaining GOP contenders: Rob Simmons, Linda McMahon and Peter Schiff.
I say "remaining three" because last week former Ambassador to Ireland Tom Foley suddenly dropped out of the race so he could instead enter the GOP primary for the state's open-seat governor's contest.
Oh, but it gets better. Just when I thought I would never again have to conjure the blast-from-the-past name or image of Bruno Sammartino, Politico runs a story this week about the growing number of wrestling industry detractors speaking up in opposition to Linda McMahon's GOP candidacy. McMahon is wife of WWE entrepreneur Vince McMahon and former WWE CEO, but apparently she is far from beloved by many familiar with her and her business practices. Politico's Erika Lovley quotes Sammartino and several other former WWE stars poor-mouthing Mrs. McMahon's leadership. This twist comes a month after Connecticut Democrats filed what seems like a frivolous, but headline-grabbing FEC complaint against McMahon and the WWE for removing some offensive videos from YouTube.
Best I can tell, Quinnipiac conducted the most recent poll of likely Republican primary voters, and the results showed Simmons leading. Given Simmons' wider margins over Dodd, and the fact that he is the kind of virtually-extinct Republican that can actually win statewide in New England, Connecticut Republicans would be wise to nominate him--and Dodd should be worried if they do.
My Last Words on the Public Option
@ 11:55 AM
We've been a little light on health care coverage this week. But to be honest, it's probably not a bad thing that I've been out of the country. Any time I write about the public option -- which appears have been sacrificed in pursuit of a health care deal -- I generally wind up pissing people off.
But here, for the record, is what I think -- and I think I've been pretty consistent in this thinking:
1) The energy by progressive activists on behalf of the public option has done more good than harm, and by a wide margin.
2a) Nevertheless, the public option is/was a relatively minor part of the health care bill, at least once it became clear that it (i) wouldn't be pegged to Medicare rates, and (ii) would only be available to a small fraction of the population.
2b) To claim that a health care bill without a public option is anything other than a huge achievement for progressives is, frankly, bullshit.
3) Because of the symbolic importance attached to the public option on both sides of the debate, I'd tend to assume that it could be traded off for other policy goals at a relatively favorable exchange rate. That is, whoever "wins" the public option debate is likely to have traded some utilitarian benefits for some psychic income and/or longer-term tactical gains.
4) More specifically, in terms of the present compromise on the table, it seems to be quite clearly better than a bill without the Medicaid/Medicare expansion, the Franken Amendment, etc., but with a weak public option.
5) However, it's not clear exactly what is really being traded for what. Perhaps the public option was never going to pass in the first place, and so all these new things are basically freebies for Democrats. On the other hand, perhaps if they had dug in their heels, the Democrats could have gotten both the public option and these other things. Also, the compromise itself will probably wind up being compromised, which makes it even harder to keep score.
6) The case that the White House failed to achieve a public option because it was inept is much stronger than the case that it failed to achieve one because it wasn't progressive enough.
7) Liberals have tended to underestimate what a significant political achievement it would be for Democrats to pass such a major bill that has become rather unpopular with the public. It would be going too far to characterize the Democrats as courageous for passing health care reform (if they do), because at the end of the day, the political case for passing health care reform is probably stronger than the case for failing to do so. Moreover, the handling of public option debate is not completely exogenous from the bill's popularity or lack thereof. Nevertheless, Democrats have been negotiating into a stiff political headwind for months now, and have been rather resilient in the face of it.
__
p.s. The headline should probably not be taken literally.
But here, for the record, is what I think -- and I think I've been pretty consistent in this thinking:
1) The energy by progressive activists on behalf of the public option has done more good than harm, and by a wide margin.
2a) Nevertheless, the public option is/was a relatively minor part of the health care bill, at least once it became clear that it (i) wouldn't be pegged to Medicare rates, and (ii) would only be available to a small fraction of the population.
2b) To claim that a health care bill without a public option is anything other than a huge achievement for progressives is, frankly, bullshit.
3) Because of the symbolic importance attached to the public option on both sides of the debate, I'd tend to assume that it could be traded off for other policy goals at a relatively favorable exchange rate. That is, whoever "wins" the public option debate is likely to have traded some utilitarian benefits for some psychic income and/or longer-term tactical gains.
4) More specifically, in terms of the present compromise on the table, it seems to be quite clearly better than a bill without the Medicaid/Medicare expansion, the Franken Amendment, etc., but with a weak public option.
5) However, it's not clear exactly what is really being traded for what. Perhaps the public option was never going to pass in the first place, and so all these new things are basically freebies for Democrats. On the other hand, perhaps if they had dug in their heels, the Democrats could have gotten both the public option and these other things. Also, the compromise itself will probably wind up being compromised, which makes it even harder to keep score.
6) The case that the White House failed to achieve a public option because it was inept is much stronger than the case that it failed to achieve one because it wasn't progressive enough.
7) Liberals have tended to underestimate what a significant political achievement it would be for Democrats to pass such a major bill that has become rather unpopular with the public. It would be going too far to characterize the Democrats as courageous for passing health care reform (if they do), because at the end of the day, the political case for passing health care reform is probably stronger than the case for failing to do so. Moreover, the handling of public option debate is not completely exogenous from the bill's popularity or lack thereof. Nevertheless, Democrats have been negotiating into a stiff political headwind for months now, and have been rather resilient in the face of it.
__
p.s. The headline should probably not be taken literally.
12.09.2009
Despite Protests, Some Reason for Optimism in Copenhagen
@ 1:53 PM
COPENHAGEN, Denmark -- On the surface, things here at the COP15 conference in Copenhagen haven't gone terribly well. Yesterday, there was an "action" -- a vocal protest in the convention hall itself -- organized by a loosely-knit coalition of African states, youth groups, and NGOs. The protest was centered around the idea that a carbon target which permits the earth's temperature to rise by 2 degrees Celsius -- the figure that the developed nations are expected to converge upon -- would be insufficient to meet Africa's concerns. Today, there was a similar action oriented around the tiny, low-lying island nation of Tuvalu, whose very survival may depend on more ambitious temperature targets. Further actions and protests, particularly as organized by youth groups, are planned for days ahead -- and others will follow spontaneously.
Although these actions are not especially large by the standards of, say, a Washington D.C. protest march -- they'll involve, perhaps, a group of 80-100 people -- in the context of a buttoned-down United Nations convention, they are considered rather impressive. They involve credentialed participants at the convention: some of the thousands of accredited NGO "observers" who pass through tight security at the Bella Center each morning, and to some indeterminate extent are sanctioned by members of the negotiating delegations themselves.
"Ambitious" -- meaning a target of a 1.0 or 1.5 degree temperature rise and no higher -- is one of the key adjectives being bandied about the so-called least developed nations. The other adjective is "binding"; these countries want something as close as possible to the framework for a legally binding agreement -- and not just a back-of-the-envelope, framework-of-a-framework rough drafts. On each of these points, they are likely to be disappointed. It would be wrong to describe Copenhagen as the first stage in the process -- a process which after all has been going on since 1992 -- but even under somewhat best-case scenarios, the delegates are unlikely to return with any sort of "signature-ready" treaty back to their home countries. And the significantly steeper curve in emissions reductions that would be required to stabilize the planet's temperatures at +1 or +1.5 degrees C are something the developed nations are unlikely to agree to.
Nevertheless, there is quite a lot at stake here. And the protests -- and the serious, somewhat anxious mood that permeates the Bella Center -- may in some sense be taken as a good sign.
The reasons that nations like Tuvalu are figuratively and literally making so much noise are varied -- but fundamentally, it stems from their sense that a deal (if not a binding one) may indeed be close, and that this may be their last chance to substantively influence its parameters. One particular concern among some of the smaller members of the so-called Group of 77 (a group of developing countries which, confusingly, is in fact 130 members strong) is that some of the larger and more developed countries in the group -- like China, India and Brazil -- will somewhat shortchange their interests in order to strike a deal with the West. The drafts that some of these nations have been circulating through backchannels -- not the so-called Danish draft that has caused its own controversy -- are, I was told, considered reasonably favorable for Western nations, and in particular the United States.
Of course, there is a pecking order here, and the United States sits on top of it. Diverse as the participants are here at the Bella Center, perhaps 30-40 percent of the attendees are English-speaking Americans.
In the context of a climate deal, the United States in some senses best viewed a rogue state that cannot be trusted to act rationally. Its political system, not without justification, is considered fickle and unpredictable; the other nations of the world are therefore very eager to negotiate a deal that can be substantially brought into being while President Obama is in office (lest they wait too long and wind up with, say, Sarah Palin instead). Ironically, this gives the United States a lot of leverage; you have to be careful when negotiating with someone who may not only walk out of the room but who may not return to hear your counter-offer.
But because of President Obama, who still commands the respect of the overwhelming majority of the participants here, the United States is also considered capable of agreeing to a deal that the rest of the world can (barely) live with. Although people are worried about the United States' ability to commit to greenhouse gas reductions through its Congress (as one American participant remarked to me today, referring to the Senate: "There are 100 human beings standing behind us and a global commitment") there is a very credible Plan B in the form of regulations mandated through the EPA, which recently declared greenhouse gases a danger to public health. Indeed, it would be hard to overstate the importance of the EPA ruling. Domestically, it could swing business groups behind a cap-and-trade system, which they consider a lesser evil, and Internationally, it gives us credibility -- a tangible sign that we're starting to "get it".
It appears to me, then, that there may indeed be an overlap between what the United States wants and what the rest of the world is willing to give. That does not mean that we'd be splitting the difference with the rest of the world; the emissions targets we'd receive would almost certainly be fairly lax by the standards of the EU. But the rest of the world, somewhat mollified by the perceived humility of President Obama, have perhaps resigned themselves to the fact that the United States doesn't have to play fair and will take what they can get.
For some nations, however, like Tuvalu, what they can get might still not be good enough. The effects of global warming are neither linear nor uniform, and if Tuvalu sinks, then it's sunk, regardless of how pleased the rest of the world is feeling with itself. Would these underdeveloped countries indeed walk away from the negotiating table, undermining a deal that the developing and developed world were willing to broker with one another?
That's certainly one of ways that Copenhagen could end; although such a move would arguably be irrational, rationality does not always prevail in 190-party negotiations. But if it does end that way, I'd be skeptical that there was a deal to be had in the first place. Although Tuvalu might not be saved by a "bad" climate deal, it's not clear, with temperatures and sea levels rising every year, that they can afford to hold out for a better one.
Although these actions are not especially large by the standards of, say, a Washington D.C. protest march -- they'll involve, perhaps, a group of 80-100 people -- in the context of a buttoned-down United Nations convention, they are considered rather impressive. They involve credentialed participants at the convention: some of the thousands of accredited NGO "observers" who pass through tight security at the Bella Center each morning, and to some indeterminate extent are sanctioned by members of the negotiating delegations themselves.
"Ambitious" -- meaning a target of a 1.0 or 1.5 degree temperature rise and no higher -- is one of the key adjectives being bandied about the so-called least developed nations. The other adjective is "binding"; these countries want something as close as possible to the framework for a legally binding agreement -- and not just a back-of-the-envelope, framework-of-a-framework rough drafts. On each of these points, they are likely to be disappointed. It would be wrong to describe Copenhagen as the first stage in the process -- a process which after all has been going on since 1992 -- but even under somewhat best-case scenarios, the delegates are unlikely to return with any sort of "signature-ready" treaty back to their home countries. And the significantly steeper curve in emissions reductions that would be required to stabilize the planet's temperatures at +1 or +1.5 degrees C are something the developed nations are unlikely to agree to.
Nevertheless, there is quite a lot at stake here. And the protests -- and the serious, somewhat anxious mood that permeates the Bella Center -- may in some sense be taken as a good sign.
The reasons that nations like Tuvalu are figuratively and literally making so much noise are varied -- but fundamentally, it stems from their sense that a deal (if not a binding one) may indeed be close, and that this may be their last chance to substantively influence its parameters. One particular concern among some of the smaller members of the so-called Group of 77 (a group of developing countries which, confusingly, is in fact 130 members strong) is that some of the larger and more developed countries in the group -- like China, India and Brazil -- will somewhat shortchange their interests in order to strike a deal with the West. The drafts that some of these nations have been circulating through backchannels -- not the so-called Danish draft that has caused its own controversy -- are, I was told, considered reasonably favorable for Western nations, and in particular the United States.
Of course, there is a pecking order here, and the United States sits on top of it. Diverse as the participants are here at the Bella Center, perhaps 30-40 percent of the attendees are English-speaking Americans.
In the context of a climate deal, the United States in some senses best viewed a rogue state that cannot be trusted to act rationally. Its political system, not without justification, is considered fickle and unpredictable; the other nations of the world are therefore very eager to negotiate a deal that can be substantially brought into being while President Obama is in office (lest they wait too long and wind up with, say, Sarah Palin instead). Ironically, this gives the United States a lot of leverage; you have to be careful when negotiating with someone who may not only walk out of the room but who may not return to hear your counter-offer.
But because of President Obama, who still commands the respect of the overwhelming majority of the participants here, the United States is also considered capable of agreeing to a deal that the rest of the world can (barely) live with. Although people are worried about the United States' ability to commit to greenhouse gas reductions through its Congress (as one American participant remarked to me today, referring to the Senate: "There are 100 human beings standing behind us and a global commitment") there is a very credible Plan B in the form of regulations mandated through the EPA, which recently declared greenhouse gases a danger to public health. Indeed, it would be hard to overstate the importance of the EPA ruling. Domestically, it could swing business groups behind a cap-and-trade system, which they consider a lesser evil, and Internationally, it gives us credibility -- a tangible sign that we're starting to "get it".
It appears to me, then, that there may indeed be an overlap between what the United States wants and what the rest of the world is willing to give. That does not mean that we'd be splitting the difference with the rest of the world; the emissions targets we'd receive would almost certainly be fairly lax by the standards of the EU. But the rest of the world, somewhat mollified by the perceived humility of President Obama, have perhaps resigned themselves to the fact that the United States doesn't have to play fair and will take what they can get.
For some nations, however, like Tuvalu, what they can get might still not be good enough. The effects of global warming are neither linear nor uniform, and if Tuvalu sinks, then it's sunk, regardless of how pleased the rest of the world is feeling with itself. Would these underdeveloped countries indeed walk away from the negotiating table, undermining a deal that the developing and developed world were willing to broker with one another?
That's certainly one of ways that Copenhagen could end; although such a move would arguably be irrational, rationality does not always prevail in 190-party negotiations. But if it does end that way, I'd be skeptical that there was a deal to be had in the first place. Although Tuvalu might not be saved by a "bad" climate deal, it's not clear, with temperatures and sea levels rising every year, that they can afford to hold out for a better one.
ERASMUS in America (Cultural Integration)
@ 11:15 AM
Heard of a guy called Desiderius Erasmus? He was a 16th century scholar from the Netherlands (Rotterdam) who, among other things, defended the concept of free will and the ability of people to learn and adapt through broadened influences and experiences.
In modern times, old Desiderius is better known through the all-caps version of his surname -- specifically, the ERASMUS student exchange programme that has taught nearly two million European students since its inception in 1987.
The basic concept is this -- take young university students from more than 30 European countries (including the still non-EU states of Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, etc.) and plop them down in a school in another European country for three or six months or a year. In the host countries and institutions, all the students in the programme live and learn together. They work to learn the local language, culture, and educational system together, while at the same time getting to know people and cultures from several dozen other places.
The project was launched in 1987 by the European Commission, in the run-up to the establishment of the finalized European Union in the early 1990s. After several years of pilot student exchanges, the EC and EU member states found the concept highly successful, with the next generation of European citizens better integrated and informed, and supportive of diversity in language and culture. The programme has grown from about 3,200 students in 1987/88 to nearly 160,000 students in 2006/07, with more expansion on the way. The new "lifelong learning" portion of ERASMUS will give students and former students a change to do it all again, in another place, sometimes in a partial teaching role.
Graduates from the programme report feeling highly satisfied with the experience, saying that they leave feeling more "European," "integrated," and more culturally aware. A French friend of mine summarized the programme this way: "Most people have a great experience, keep life-long friends, and it looks great on the C.V.; I would highly recommend it."
Of course, ERASMUS is not without out its critics. Opponents call it "a waste of money and time," that is better known for alcohol and sex-fueled parties and students that never grasp the local language or culture. They argue that the programme should be more academically rigorous, and less focused on getting kids from far-flung parts of the continent to learn about each other socially.
Assuming that the reality lies somewhere in between, the U.S. can learn something important from ERASMUS. Indeed, we should think about implementing something similar, perhaps as part of the Obama education package that fits within the stimulus.
In a country with rapidly changing demographics, a highly polarized electorate, an emerging clash of language and still many people that still never venture beyond state lines, this type of student exchange -- perhaps at the end of high school or early college -- is just what the 21st century U.S. needs.
Currently, most exchanges that U.S. students undergo are one of two major types. First is the traditional "study-abroad" where college (or in some cases high-school) students go off to another continent for a semester, usually with a group of other American students. Second, there are "service" type trips and programmes, where students go to so-called disadvantaged areas to help out, often through teaching or building stuff.
Unfortunately, these continue to miss the more fundamental success that we have learned from ERASMUS in the EU -- cultural integration within a politically diverse body.
Why don't we in the U.S. enact an adapted, scalable programme that sends people to learn in parts of the country that are really different from their own? Kids from the city, it's off to rural areas; students from the mixed-language South-West, it's off to the Rust Belt. And throughout, students from different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds will arrive together in a brand new environment.
The idea of service should still play a prominant role, with the idea of the transplanted students giving back to their host communities in some way, such as doing projects that the local group of students and their hosts work together to decide on during the course of their stay.
As a leading early theorist, inventor, advocate for cultural learning and driving force behind two important early American univerisities, perhaps Benjamin Franklin is the right person for an American ERASMUS. And following his love of European language and culture, a FRANKLIN student exchange programme might be a nice tip of the hat to the European Commission's good thinking on the original.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
In modern times, old Desiderius is better known through the all-caps version of his surname -- specifically, the ERASMUS student exchange programme that has taught nearly two million European students since its inception in 1987.
The basic concept is this -- take young university students from more than 30 European countries (including the still non-EU states of Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, etc.) and plop them down in a school in another European country for three or six months or a year. In the host countries and institutions, all the students in the programme live and learn together. They work to learn the local language, culture, and educational system together, while at the same time getting to know people and cultures from several dozen other places.
The project was launched in 1987 by the European Commission, in the run-up to the establishment of the finalized European Union in the early 1990s. After several years of pilot student exchanges, the EC and EU member states found the concept highly successful, with the next generation of European citizens better integrated and informed, and supportive of diversity in language and culture. The programme has grown from about 3,200 students in 1987/88 to nearly 160,000 students in 2006/07, with more expansion on the way. The new "lifelong learning" portion of ERASMUS will give students and former students a change to do it all again, in another place, sometimes in a partial teaching role.
Graduates from the programme report feeling highly satisfied with the experience, saying that they leave feeling more "European," "integrated," and more culturally aware. A French friend of mine summarized the programme this way: "Most people have a great experience, keep life-long friends, and it looks great on the C.V.; I would highly recommend it."
Of course, ERASMUS is not without out its critics. Opponents call it "a waste of money and time," that is better known for alcohol and sex-fueled parties and students that never grasp the local language or culture. They argue that the programme should be more academically rigorous, and less focused on getting kids from far-flung parts of the continent to learn about each other socially.
Assuming that the reality lies somewhere in between, the U.S. can learn something important from ERASMUS. Indeed, we should think about implementing something similar, perhaps as part of the Obama education package that fits within the stimulus.
In a country with rapidly changing demographics, a highly polarized electorate, an emerging clash of language and still many people that still never venture beyond state lines, this type of student exchange -- perhaps at the end of high school or early college -- is just what the 21st century U.S. needs.
Currently, most exchanges that U.S. students undergo are one of two major types. First is the traditional "study-abroad" where college (or in some cases high-school) students go off to another continent for a semester, usually with a group of other American students. Second, there are "service" type trips and programmes, where students go to so-called disadvantaged areas to help out, often through teaching or building stuff.
Unfortunately, these continue to miss the more fundamental success that we have learned from ERASMUS in the EU -- cultural integration within a politically diverse body.
Why don't we in the U.S. enact an adapted, scalable programme that sends people to learn in parts of the country that are really different from their own? Kids from the city, it's off to rural areas; students from the mixed-language South-West, it's off to the Rust Belt. And throughout, students from different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds will arrive together in a brand new environment.
The idea of service should still play a prominant role, with the idea of the transplanted students giving back to their host communities in some way, such as doing projects that the local group of students and their hosts work together to decide on during the course of their stay.
As a leading early theorist, inventor, advocate for cultural learning and driving force behind two important early American univerisities, perhaps Benjamin Franklin is the right person for an American ERASMUS. And following his love of European language and culture, a FRANKLIN student exchange programme might be a nice tip of the hat to the European Commission's good thinking on the original.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
12.08.2009
No Surprises in the Bay State
@ 10:50 PM
The Massachusetts Board of Elections has not posted anything official yet, but the Associated Press has called both the Republican and Democratic special election primaries to fill the seat vacated by the death this summer of Ted Kennedy and currently occupied for the moment by Paul Kirk--and there are no surprises.
On the Democratic side, attorney general Martha Coakley won a four-way race with a projected 47 percent of the vote; with 78 percent of the vote, state senator Scott Brown defeated Jack Robinson for the Republican nomination. Though nobody can fill Kennedy's shoes metaphorically, Coakley and Brown square off in just six weeks to determine who will take the late senator's seat for the remainder of the current term. (The seat will be on the ballot next for a full six-year term in 2012.)
In this solidly Democratic seat, Coakley is the clear favorite. But turnout was low today and presumably will be for the January 19 special election. It will be interesting to see if Republicans try to, well, make the general election interesting--a narrow Democratic win, coupled with the party's defeats in the gubernatorial races last month in New Jersey and Virginia, would fuel the storyline that the Democrats are headed for bigger losses in the 2010 midterms. And if Coakley somehow lost to the conservative Brown? Now that would send a shock through the political system.
The only other race on the ballot tonight of which I'm aware was the special election in Kentucky's 14th senate district, which Republican Jimmy Higdon won over Democrat Joy Haydon. (Weird how similar their names are.) The Republican State Leadership Committee notes that Higdon's win is the 33rd state special election the GOP has won nationwide since November 2008.
On the Democratic side, attorney general Martha Coakley won a four-way race with a projected 47 percent of the vote; with 78 percent of the vote, state senator Scott Brown defeated Jack Robinson for the Republican nomination. Though nobody can fill Kennedy's shoes metaphorically, Coakley and Brown square off in just six weeks to determine who will take the late senator's seat for the remainder of the current term. (The seat will be on the ballot next for a full six-year term in 2012.)
In this solidly Democratic seat, Coakley is the clear favorite. But turnout was low today and presumably will be for the January 19 special election. It will be interesting to see if Republicans try to, well, make the general election interesting--a narrow Democratic win, coupled with the party's defeats in the gubernatorial races last month in New Jersey and Virginia, would fuel the storyline that the Democrats are headed for bigger losses in the 2010 midterms. And if Coakley somehow lost to the conservative Brown? Now that would send a shock through the political system.
The only other race on the ballot tonight of which I'm aware was the special election in Kentucky's 14th senate district, which Republican Jimmy Higdon won over Democrat Joy Haydon. (Weird how similar their names are.) The Republican State Leadership Committee notes that Higdon's win is the 33rd state special election the GOP has won nationwide since November 2008.
The New Identity Politics Party
@ 5:48 PM
When the modern Democratic Party reached its nadir—by either the late 1980s and early 1990s or at some point earlier this decade, take your pick—one of the major criticisms leveled by Republicans, conservatives and self-critical centrist Democrats was that the party was held hostage by its own identity politics.
The argument against identity politics is that a party’s policy and platform choices are made with mostly electoral inputs in mind, even if said policies are not only detrimental to the country as a whole but often to the very identity groups whose votes are generated by such positions. The party is captured, paralyzed. So, for example, conservatives crowed for years (some still do) that affirmative action is a naked ploy to attract and keep minority votes, even if it creates perverse incentives and rewards mediocrity; George W. Bush’s “soft bigotry of low expectations” epitomized this critique.
Watch CBS News Videos Online
Although the GOP's coalition is still the more monochromatic of the two parties, is it possible that they, rather than the Democrats, are now the party paralyzed by identity politics? A recent 60 Minutes segment about the costs of end-of-life care suggests that maybe they are. I would encourage people to read/watch the report in full, but if you don’t have time let me explain what I mean.
The segment is about the needless financial costs of end-of-life care. The US government spends about $50B each year on patients at the very end of their lives, much of it to little or no health or quality-of-life benefit. Because a lot of the procedures and medicines are authorized by doctors and hospitals worried about possible liability—pay attention now, tort-reform advocates—a lot of this money is being spent in medically-needless ways and thus ineffective because the treatments are unnecessary. Worse, because a lot of these procedures and medicines are administered by hospitals, where costs are higher--as NPR’s fantastic Planet Money team recently explained--these ineffective actions are also procured inefficiently. In short, it's wasteful, which is bad enough, but expensively wasteful to boot. But because Medicare is there to pick up the tab, the disincentives against ordering irrelevant, expensive treatments are few.
Now, given that conservatives keep complaining about tort reform as if that were some miracle cure to our health care costs; given that they are also up in arms about rising government socialism (“one-sixth of the economy!”); and given their broader worries about government growth and spending more generally, we might reasonably conclude that Medicare—one the largest and fastest-growing programs in the entire budget—would sit atop their target list. Instead, Republicans point at Democrats in Congress and the White House and charge that they and they health care reform plans must be stopped because (a) they are going to cut seniors’ Medicare; and (b) they are going to institute “death panels” to pull the plug on seniors.
In other words, although the end-of-life use of Medicare is a government problem that violates almost every philosophy they espouse about the proper role of government—public sector over private; easily exploited by, rather than protected from, trial lawyers; a moral hazard, consequence-free billing system as opposed to rational, need-based spending; a program with rising outlays as opposed to slow or zero growth outlays—Medicare is instead the very program they are rallying behind.
And why? For votes—specifically the votes of those angry, mostly-white seniors upon whom they are betting their electoral fortunes in 2010 and beyond. In short, the GOP has now become so wedded to its dying, white majority that it is willing to sacrifice not only good public policy and smart long-term budgeting, but its very own core principles. Their politically-motivated, 180-degree defense of Medicare and their inflammatory rhetoric about death panels proves that the GOP is now the party paralyzed by identity politics.
The argument against identity politics is that a party’s policy and platform choices are made with mostly electoral inputs in mind, even if said policies are not only detrimental to the country as a whole but often to the very identity groups whose votes are generated by such positions. The party is captured, paralyzed. So, for example, conservatives crowed for years (some still do) that affirmative action is a naked ploy to attract and keep minority votes, even if it creates perverse incentives and rewards mediocrity; George W. Bush’s “soft bigotry of low expectations” epitomized this critique.
Watch CBS News Videos Online
Although the GOP's coalition is still the more monochromatic of the two parties, is it possible that they, rather than the Democrats, are now the party paralyzed by identity politics? A recent 60 Minutes segment about the costs of end-of-life care suggests that maybe they are. I would encourage people to read/watch the report in full, but if you don’t have time let me explain what I mean.
The segment is about the needless financial costs of end-of-life care. The US government spends about $50B each year on patients at the very end of their lives, much of it to little or no health or quality-of-life benefit. Because a lot of the procedures and medicines are authorized by doctors and hospitals worried about possible liability—pay attention now, tort-reform advocates—a lot of this money is being spent in medically-needless ways and thus ineffective because the treatments are unnecessary. Worse, because a lot of these procedures and medicines are administered by hospitals, where costs are higher--as NPR’s fantastic Planet Money team recently explained--these ineffective actions are also procured inefficiently. In short, it's wasteful, which is bad enough, but expensively wasteful to boot. But because Medicare is there to pick up the tab, the disincentives against ordering irrelevant, expensive treatments are few.
Now, given that conservatives keep complaining about tort reform as if that were some miracle cure to our health care costs; given that they are also up in arms about rising government socialism (“one-sixth of the economy!”); and given their broader worries about government growth and spending more generally, we might reasonably conclude that Medicare—one the largest and fastest-growing programs in the entire budget—would sit atop their target list. Instead, Republicans point at Democrats in Congress and the White House and charge that they and they health care reform plans must be stopped because (a) they are going to cut seniors’ Medicare; and (b) they are going to institute “death panels” to pull the plug on seniors.
In other words, although the end-of-life use of Medicare is a government problem that violates almost every philosophy they espouse about the proper role of government—public sector over private; easily exploited by, rather than protected from, trial lawyers; a moral hazard, consequence-free billing system as opposed to rational, need-based spending; a program with rising outlays as opposed to slow or zero growth outlays—Medicare is instead the very program they are rallying behind.
And why? For votes—specifically the votes of those angry, mostly-white seniors upon whom they are betting their electoral fortunes in 2010 and beyond. In short, the GOP has now become so wedded to its dying, white majority that it is willing to sacrifice not only good public policy and smart long-term budgeting, but its very own core principles. Their politically-motivated, 180-degree defense of Medicare and their inflammatory rhetoric about death panels proves that the GOP is now the party paralyzed by identity politics.
Copenhagen Dispatch
@ 8:29 AM
Hello from the Bella Center in Copenhagen, Denmark, where the beer is cheaper than the Coca-Cola.
Unfortunately, I don't have too much of substance to report to you yet. It's been a long 20 hours or so in various sorts of planes, trains and lines. I'm used to keeping a relatively, uh, abstract schedule, but the overnight flight left a little bit too early for me to be tired, and then by the time I was getting tired, it was light out, and now -- even though it's just 2:30 PM here -- it's already about to get dark again.
The conference, at this point, feels more like a trade show than a political event, but it's cool to be surrounded by so many people from all over the world -- imagine the international terminal at JFK, but with even worse food and people walking by in giant tree costumes.
I did have a good conversation with a couple of Brits while waiting in line for my NGO badge. They were very bright and keyed in -- they run a green taxi company in London -- but I was surprised at how confusing they found American politics to be. How can the Senate require 60 percent to pass something? How can Delaware have as many senators as New York? What's up with the whole electoral college thing? How can Obama go from 70 percent popularity to 50 percent in a half a year? Could Sarah Palin really become President someday? The Guardian, among others, has some very good Washington coverage, but I think there's an opportunity for one of the UK dailies to provide a Washington column that's specifically geared toward a British or European audience: we tend to take for granted how freakin' weird our politics can be to the rest of the world.
Unfortunately, I don't have too much of substance to report to you yet. It's been a long 20 hours or so in various sorts of planes, trains and lines. I'm used to keeping a relatively, uh, abstract schedule, but the overnight flight left a little bit too early for me to be tired, and then by the time I was getting tired, it was light out, and now -- even though it's just 2:30 PM here -- it's already about to get dark again.
The conference, at this point, feels more like a trade show than a political event, but it's cool to be surrounded by so many people from all over the world -- imagine the international terminal at JFK, but with even worse food and people walking by in giant tree costumes.
I did have a good conversation with a couple of Brits while waiting in line for my NGO badge. They were very bright and keyed in -- they run a green taxi company in London -- but I was surprised at how confusing they found American politics to be. How can the Senate require 60 percent to pass something? How can Delaware have as many senators as New York? What's up with the whole electoral college thing? How can Obama go from 70 percent popularity to 50 percent in a half a year? Could Sarah Palin really become President someday? The Guardian, among others, has some very good Washington coverage, but I think there's an opportunity for one of the UK dailies to provide a Washington column that's specifically geared toward a British or European audience: we tend to take for granted how freakin' weird our politics can be to the rest of the world.
12.07.2009
In Polls, Much Opposition to Health Care Plan Is From Left
@ 8:09 AM
Don't know why I didn't catch this earlier, but it strikes me as fairly important.
Ipsos/McClatchy put out a health care poll two weeks ago. The topline results were nothing special: 34 percent favored "the health care reform proposals presently being discussed", versus 46 percent opposed, and 20 percent undecided. The negative-12 net score is roughly in line with the average of other polls, although the Ipsos poll shows a higher number of undecideds than most others.
Ipsos, however, did something that no other pollster has done. They asked the people who opposed the bill why they opposed it: because they are opposed to health care reform and thought the bill went too far? Or because they support health care reform but thought the bill didn't go far enough?
It turns out that a significant minority of about 25 percent of the people who opposed the plan -- or about 12 of the overall sample -- did so from the left; they thought the plan didn't go far enough.
Ipsos also asked a parallel question of people who supported the plan: did any of them support the plan because they oppose health care reform and thought that the plan was sufficiently watered-down so as to "keep health care reform from happening"? A small number of people picked this response: about 10 percent of those in favor of the plan, or 3 percent of the entire sample.
Combining these numbers together, we get the following:
One way to look at this: 43 percent of people favor health care reform, whereas 38 percent oppose it (20 percent are undecided). But the actual plan under consideration gets numbers that are more or less the reverse of that -- 34 percent in favor, 46 percent opposed -- because a significant number of people think the plan doesn't go far enough.
Now, a lot of polls have shown that people favor the concept of health care reform, even if they don't support the actual plan under consideration. So that finding, taken unto itself, is not that noteworthy. But the conventional wisdom -- and certainly my assumption -- has been that people oppose the plan because it's too liberal. In fact, some of the opposition seems to stem from the fact that the plan is not liberal enough. This would help to explain, for example, why polls show majorities (sometimes fairly sizable ones) in favor of the public option, but also pluralities or majorities opposed to the overall plan.
Some caveats, certainly, are necessarily. Ipsos' question wording is somewhat ambiguous. For example, among those opposed to the plan, they didn't provide a clear way to distinguish those who support health care reform but think the plan goes too far, from those who are opposed to health care reform in general. So it doesn't necessarily follow that the plan would have better numbers if it were more liberal (by containing a robust public option, etc.)
What's less ambiguous, however, is that a significant fraction of the opposition to the health care bill comes from the left, and that opposition is almost certainly holding its polling numbers down overall.
One interesting question, certainly, is what would happen to that 12 percent of the electorate that opposes the bill from the left if the Democrats in fact manage to get a bill passed (but one that "compromises" on the public option and other issues). What would liberal thought leaders -- Howard Dean, Jay Rockefeller, Raul Grijalva, Jane Hamsher, Rachel Maddow, et. al. -- say about the bill once it received the President's signature? And would Obama tip his hat to the left, rather than the right, at the signing ceremony? My guess is that some of that 12 percent would peel off fairly easily -- although, to be clear, my perspective on this is as someone who thinks the bill is pretty decent as is.
With that said, I also think the White House's positioning on this the public option has been questionable. There's a middle ground between a world in which the White House would have insisted that the inclusion of a public option was a non-negotiable part of health care reform, and their actual positioning, which has been transparently indifferent toward it. In other words, run the bluff -- and make the left happy -- and then if you have to give up on the bluff at some point to get a bill passed, do some play-acting and look really unhappy about it. Give a big speech, say your hand was forced by the necessity to get such an important bill passed and your desire to reach common ground, blah, blah, blah. Some on the left, certainly, would look upon you cynically if you did this -- but probably fewer than if you hadn't seemed to care about the public option in the first place (i.e. what has happened in the the status quo). Meanwhile, you might have picked up a few points with independents for your apparent willingness to compromise.
Ipsos/McClatchy put out a health care poll two weeks ago. The topline results were nothing special: 34 percent favored "the health care reform proposals presently being discussed", versus 46 percent opposed, and 20 percent undecided. The negative-12 net score is roughly in line with the average of other polls, although the Ipsos poll shows a higher number of undecideds than most others.
Ipsos, however, did something that no other pollster has done. They asked the people who opposed the bill why they opposed it: because they are opposed to health care reform and thought the bill went too far? Or because they support health care reform but thought the bill didn't go far enough?
It turns out that a significant minority of about 25 percent of the people who opposed the plan -- or about 12 of the overall sample -- did so from the left; they thought the plan didn't go far enough.
Ipsos also asked a parallel question of people who supported the plan: did any of them support the plan because they oppose health care reform and thought that the plan was sufficiently watered-down so as to "keep health care reform from happening"? A small number of people picked this response: about 10 percent of those in favor of the plan, or 3 percent of the entire sample.
Combining these numbers together, we get the following:
One way to look at this: 43 percent of people favor health care reform, whereas 38 percent oppose it (20 percent are undecided). But the actual plan under consideration gets numbers that are more or less the reverse of that -- 34 percent in favor, 46 percent opposed -- because a significant number of people think the plan doesn't go far enough.
Now, a lot of polls have shown that people favor the concept of health care reform, even if they don't support the actual plan under consideration. So that finding, taken unto itself, is not that noteworthy. But the conventional wisdom -- and certainly my assumption -- has been that people oppose the plan because it's too liberal. In fact, some of the opposition seems to stem from the fact that the plan is not liberal enough. This would help to explain, for example, why polls show majorities (sometimes fairly sizable ones) in favor of the public option, but also pluralities or majorities opposed to the overall plan.
Some caveats, certainly, are necessarily. Ipsos' question wording is somewhat ambiguous. For example, among those opposed to the plan, they didn't provide a clear way to distinguish those who support health care reform but think the plan goes too far, from those who are opposed to health care reform in general. So it doesn't necessarily follow that the plan would have better numbers if it were more liberal (by containing a robust public option, etc.)
What's less ambiguous, however, is that a significant fraction of the opposition to the health care bill comes from the left, and that opposition is almost certainly holding its polling numbers down overall.
One interesting question, certainly, is what would happen to that 12 percent of the electorate that opposes the bill from the left if the Democrats in fact manage to get a bill passed (but one that "compromises" on the public option and other issues). What would liberal thought leaders -- Howard Dean, Jay Rockefeller, Raul Grijalva, Jane Hamsher, Rachel Maddow, et. al. -- say about the bill once it received the President's signature? And would Obama tip his hat to the left, rather than the right, at the signing ceremony? My guess is that some of that 12 percent would peel off fairly easily -- although, to be clear, my perspective on this is as someone who thinks the bill is pretty decent as is.
With that said, I also think the White House's positioning on this the public option has been questionable. There's a middle ground between a world in which the White House would have insisted that the inclusion of a public option was a non-negotiable part of health care reform, and their actual positioning, which has been transparently indifferent toward it. In other words, run the bluff -- and make the left happy -- and then if you have to give up on the bluff at some point to get a bill passed, do some play-acting and look really unhappy about it. Give a big speech, say your hand was forced by the necessity to get such an important bill passed and your desire to reach common ground, blah, blah, blah. Some on the left, certainly, would look upon you cynically if you did this -- but probably fewer than if you hadn't seemed to care about the public option in the first place (i.e. what has happened in the the status quo). Meanwhile, you might have picked up a few points with independents for your apparent willingness to compromise.
12.06.2009
538 --> Copenhagen
@ 8:56 PM
Tomorrow afternoon, I'll be flying off for three nights to chilly Copenhagen, Denmark, where I'll be getting the lay of the land at the COP15 UN climate change conference.
The trip is dual purpose: I'm hoping to get a more tangible sense of the intersections between domestic and international politics on the climate change issue for purposes of this blog, and I'm also hoping to knock out a few interviews for my book, which will include extensive material on climate change forecasting.
Apart from that -- I figure it will mostly be a lot of watching and listening. And I've never been to Denmark or anywhere else in Scandinavia before, so sampling some of the local beer/food/etc. is also on the agenda.
Posting times will be a bit irregular for the next week. If you need to reach me, however, I should be online rather frequently, subject to the time zone difference. I do still have some interview slots free, so if you have suggestions on people at your organization I ought to speak with -- or are yourself someone I ought to speak with -- please don't hesitate to contact me.
The trip is dual purpose: I'm hoping to get a more tangible sense of the intersections between domestic and international politics on the climate change issue for purposes of this blog, and I'm also hoping to knock out a few interviews for my book, which will include extensive material on climate change forecasting.
Apart from that -- I figure it will mostly be a lot of watching and listening. And I've never been to Denmark or anywhere else in Scandinavia before, so sampling some of the local beer/food/etc. is also on the agenda.
Posting times will be a bit irregular for the next week. If you need to reach me, however, I should be online rather frequently, subject to the time zone difference. I do still have some interview slots free, so if you have suggestions on people at your organization I ought to speak with -- or are yourself someone I ought to speak with -- please don't hesitate to contact me.
Some Key Nuggets of the Afghanistan Strategy Speech
@ 5:30 AM
Much of the commentary about President Obama's speech on Afghanistan and the ensuing deployment of US troops has been focused on either the politics of the decision (troop bump up, then phased withdrawal) or the feasibility of the "COIN" strategy to make progress against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
However, there are a few points -- a bit more buried -- that are perhaps quite important.
1. Public support for the creation of the "Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan": Buried at the end of a sentence at the end of the speech, Obama discusses the creation of a new working group of sorts with several regional powers. The biggest departure from past practice is the public inclusion of Iran in this group, who have been marginalized generally, for reasons of US general policy and accusations of selling weapons to the Taliban. While little has changed in the former, the latter has cooled a bit; Shia Iran has many axes to grind with the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban. In fact, Iran nearly invaded Afghanistan in the late 1990s for various reasons, including the killing of several Iranian diplomats.
The "contact group" concept is not new -- the Germans came up with it a while back, with the support of top US military personnel -- but it has received little support from the wider US foreign policy and political communities.
2. "But this is not simply an American problem": Previous incarnations of the US President rallying behind a war strategy have often cast issues in terms of US interests, moral requirement and the spread of American ideals. Indeed, the main thrust of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been directly against the operators -- those who the US considered to be security threats.
Spending diplomatic and economic capital to re-couch the Afghanistan threat in global terms, a la climate change or poverty, is an important strategic decision. Al Qaeda et al. are funded from various sources, recruit from various places, and carry out activities in still other places. If the US intention is to weaken the whole network, Obama is saying publicly, the effort must be integrated rather than treated discretely.
This was attempted by George W. Bush by way of the "Global War on Terror" and "coalition of the willing" rhetoric, but it was always an obviously American-led show.
All the same, two key issues that remain unanswered and unresolved:
1. What happens, in practical terms, after the new US/NATO/UN strategy succeeds or fails?
Afghanistan has had many instances of foreign occupation, exit and power vacuum in the last hundred years, and particularly in the last thirty-five. Let's briefly have a look:
Bottom line, when the power vacuum emerges following the eventual departure of the US and its allies, who will fill it? In fact, the higher military power of the occupation that will be there when (projected) withdrawal occurs in 2011 could amplify the differential. In the past, inter- and intra- ethnic and party fighting has followed the exit of major foreign influence in the country. Even with a stronger central government, it is likely to happen again. The US and allies had better come up with a good plan.
2. The US reputation of militarism and occupation:
The fact is, even with the election of a more globally popular President, the US continues to have a reputation abroad of taking unilateral, hegemonical and militaristic decisions, with myopic and/or selfish thinking to drive them. Regardless of the veracity of the charge, this image is well embedded.
This problem of reputation, along with major problems of global poverty, backlash against globalization and the Anglo-American liberalization model that has dominated since the Uraguay round of trade talks (GATT and WTO) and the ability of militant ideas and money to fund them to move rapidly in today's information age, has left the US between a rock and hard place.
Military action against those marked "enemy" has only further embedded the ideas that drove these individuals towards violence to begin with. Even if the American/European strategy of eliminating violent enemies with global connections in Afghanistan and Pakistan succeed, these more entrenched problems will remain unresolved.
The Obama administration has done a credible attempt to thread this needle, with a mix of reaching out to Iran, adding additional military firepower, putting diplomatic pressure on the Afghan government and setting time limits for the US engagement. However, if the transition is to be successful, reaching out in a significant way to the traditionalist Pashtos from whom the Taliban rose will be necessary (including the Taliban themselves). In addition, combating the overarching problem of globalized distrust of the US in sensitive areas, including the aforementioned growing skepticism of the US-exported liberal economic model, will have to play a small but vital role.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
However, there are a few points -- a bit more buried -- that are perhaps quite important.
1. Public support for the creation of the "Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan": Buried at the end of a sentence at the end of the speech, Obama discusses the creation of a new working group of sorts with several regional powers. The biggest departure from past practice is the public inclusion of Iran in this group, who have been marginalized generally, for reasons of US general policy and accusations of selling weapons to the Taliban. While little has changed in the former, the latter has cooled a bit; Shia Iran has many axes to grind with the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban. In fact, Iran nearly invaded Afghanistan in the late 1990s for various reasons, including the killing of several Iranian diplomats.
The "contact group" concept is not new -- the Germans came up with it a while back, with the support of top US military personnel -- but it has received little support from the wider US foreign policy and political communities.
2. "But this is not simply an American problem": Previous incarnations of the US President rallying behind a war strategy have often cast issues in terms of US interests, moral requirement and the spread of American ideals. Indeed, the main thrust of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been directly against the operators -- those who the US considered to be security threats.
Spending diplomatic and economic capital to re-couch the Afghanistan threat in global terms, a la climate change or poverty, is an important strategic decision. Al Qaeda et al. are funded from various sources, recruit from various places, and carry out activities in still other places. If the US intention is to weaken the whole network, Obama is saying publicly, the effort must be integrated rather than treated discretely.
This was attempted by George W. Bush by way of the "Global War on Terror" and "coalition of the willing" rhetoric, but it was always an obviously American-led show.
All the same, two key issues that remain unanswered and unresolved:
1. What happens, in practical terms, after the new US/NATO/UN strategy succeeds or fails?
Afghanistan has had many instances of foreign occupation, exit and power vacuum in the last hundred years, and particularly in the last thirty-five. Let's briefly have a look:
Bottom line, when the power vacuum emerges following the eventual departure of the US and its allies, who will fill it? In fact, the higher military power of the occupation that will be there when (projected) withdrawal occurs in 2011 could amplify the differential. In the past, inter- and intra- ethnic and party fighting has followed the exit of major foreign influence in the country. Even with a stronger central government, it is likely to happen again. The US and allies had better come up with a good plan.
2. The US reputation of militarism and occupation:
The fact is, even with the election of a more globally popular President, the US continues to have a reputation abroad of taking unilateral, hegemonical and militaristic decisions, with myopic and/or selfish thinking to drive them. Regardless of the veracity of the charge, this image is well embedded.
This problem of reputation, along with major problems of global poverty, backlash against globalization and the Anglo-American liberalization model that has dominated since the Uraguay round of trade talks (GATT and WTO) and the ability of militant ideas and money to fund them to move rapidly in today's information age, has left the US between a rock and hard place.
Military action against those marked "enemy" has only further embedded the ideas that drove these individuals towards violence to begin with. Even if the American/European strategy of eliminating violent enemies with global connections in Afghanistan and Pakistan succeed, these more entrenched problems will remain unresolved.
The Obama administration has done a credible attempt to thread this needle, with a mix of reaching out to Iran, adding additional military firepower, putting diplomatic pressure on the Afghan government and setting time limits for the US engagement. However, if the transition is to be successful, reaching out in a significant way to the traditionalist Pashtos from whom the Taliban rose will be necessary (including the Taliban themselves). In addition, combating the overarching problem of globalized distrust of the US in sensitive areas, including the aforementioned growing skepticism of the US-exported liberal economic model, will have to play a small but vital role.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
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