The pace of Senate polling has slackened this month as pollsters have turned their attention to next Tuesday's elections as well as the continuing fight over health care. My attention, likewise, has been concentrated on those other areas. But for the sake of continuity, a very brief Senate rankings update is in order as the clock ticks down on October.
I am changing the status of only three races; in each case, I gauge the likelihood of an opposition-party takeover to have become somewhat higher.
The first is Delaware, where Republican Representative Mike Castle has entered, probably to face off against Beau Biden. Although this race is probably closer to a toss-up than advantage Castle, it still seems to feature the cleanest path for an opposition party takeover than any of the alternatives. With that said, the first four or five races -- and really as many as the first seven or eight -- remain hard to distinguish from one another.
Another upgrade comes in Pennsylvania, where there's been some further polling to suggest the degree of trouble that Arlen Specter is in. I continue to be of the opinion that conservative opponent Pat Toomey may have a relatively difficult time getting from the 43-45 percent of the electorate that he has now to the 50% + 1 that he'll need to take the contest. But clearly, Specter's problems can't be attributed to either short-lived dissatisfaction or an aberrant polling result here and there. On the other hand, Joe Sestak also seems to be catching up with Specter, and Sestak might be the superior option for Democrats from an electability perspective.
The final upgrade is in Florida, where Charlie Crist appears to be increasingly vulnerable to Marco Rubio, and where Rubio's momentum could pick up significantly if Doug Hoffman wins in NY-23 (or comes close enough to trigger a recount, etc.) Now, by no means is Rubio unelectable -- I think, in fact, he'd be a mild favorite against likely Democratic nominee Kendick Meek. But the nomination of Rubio would certainly put Florida back on the map as a potentially competitive race. It also might not be completely out of the question that some Democratic alternatives to Meek could be attracted back into the contest if it looks like Crist is going to lose the primary, although I certainly haven't heard anything to that effect.
This makes the top 17 races as follows:
1. Delaware (D-Open)
2. Missouri (R-Open)
3. Nevada (D-Reid)
4. Ohio (R-Open)
5. Connecticut (D-Dodd)
6. Colorado (D-Bennet)
7. New Hampshire (R-Open)
8. Kentucky (R-Open)
9. Arkansas (D-Lincoln)
10. Illinois (D-Burris)
11. Pennsylvania (D-Specter)
12. North Carolina (R-Burr)
13. Texas (R-Open?)
14. Louisiana (R-Vitter)
15. Florida (R-Open)
16. Iowa (R-Grassley)
17. North Dakota (D-Dorgan)
Positions 18-38 are unchanged from last month.
10.31.2009
Scozzafava's Supporters Like Obama, Dislike Hoffman and Owens
@ 12:24 PM
Certainly, the conventional wisdom would be that when the Republican candidate suspends her campaign and encourages her supporters to vote for someone else, it would help the Conservative candidate more than the Democrat. And that's where the betting is on Intrade, where Conservative Doug Hoffman has shot up from having a 50 percent chance of winning NY-23's special election to a 67 percent chance on the news this morning.
The reality may be more complicated.
Consider the Siena poll out this morning, which has all sorts of useful cross-tabs. Scozzafava's supporters in this poll:
-- Have a favorable view of Barack Obama by a 64-31 margin.
-- Have an unfavorable view of Hoffman 15-57.
-- Have an unfavorable view of Democrat Bill Owens, 19-50.
It's not quite so clear how Hoffman stands to benefit from this. Although a majority of Scozzafava's supporters are Republican (about 62 percent, by my reckoning), it is safe to assume that they are mostly rather moderate Republicans, because almost all the conservative Republicans had already gone over to Hoffman. To wit, two-thirds of Scozzafava's supporters say they like Barack Obama. While moderate Republicans are an endangered species elsewhere in the country, that is not true in upstate New York, where a lot of voters are registered as Republicans and vote that way in statewide races but often vote Democratic in federal races. (NY-23 supported Barack Obama 52-47 last November.)
The reality is that a lot of Scozzafava's ex-supporters, many of whom don't like either Hoffman or Owens, simply won't vote. And some of them will still wind up casting their ballots for Scozzafava undaunted, as she'll still appear on the ballot and may have made herself something of a sympathetic figure. Certainly, it would seem to help Hoffman if Scozzafava decided to endorse him -- but only 15 percent of Scozzafava's voters had a favorable view of Hoffman, so they aren't going to come over easily, if at all. (EDIT: It's not clear if Scozzafava has in fact endorsed Hoffman, as the reporting is somewhat contradictory on this -- most sources, apart from the AP, say that she's made no endorsement.)
If I had to guess, I'd think that of Scozzafava's support, one-quarter of people don't vote, one-quarter vote for Scozzafava anyway, 30 percent defect to Hoffman and 20 percent defect to Owens. Extrapolating from the morning's Siena poll, that would produce a result of Hoffman 43, Owens 42, Scozzafava 5, with 10 percent of the voters still up for grabs.
Gun to my head? Sure, I'd take Hoffman at this point. But I'd also take the short side of the 67 percent odds that he's been given at Intrade.
(EDIT: If there's been no endorsement from Scozzafava, then I'm not sure that I'd necessarily give Hoffman any more of her votes than Owens. On the other hand, as I wrote yesterday, I think the enthusiasm/turnout side of the story may have been underplayed here and that dynamic benefits Hoffman.)
UPDATE (3:30 PM). Tom Jensen at PPP reports that he had a poll in the field this morning that was showing very good numbers for Hoffman, although how much emphasis we should give to unweighted, small-sample polling conducted on Halloween morning, I don't know. I would say that if Hoffman wins, it will tend to because of factors that were already in place before Scozzafava's withdraw.
The reality may be more complicated.
Consider the Siena poll out this morning, which has all sorts of useful cross-tabs. Scozzafava's supporters in this poll:
-- Have a favorable view of Barack Obama by a 64-31 margin.
-- Have an unfavorable view of Hoffman 15-57.
-- Have an unfavorable view of Democrat Bill Owens, 19-50.
It's not quite so clear how Hoffman stands to benefit from this. Although a majority of Scozzafava's supporters are Republican (about 62 percent, by my reckoning), it is safe to assume that they are mostly rather moderate Republicans, because almost all the conservative Republicans had already gone over to Hoffman. To wit, two-thirds of Scozzafava's supporters say they like Barack Obama. While moderate Republicans are an endangered species elsewhere in the country, that is not true in upstate New York, where a lot of voters are registered as Republicans and vote that way in statewide races but often vote Democratic in federal races. (NY-23 supported Barack Obama 52-47 last November.)
The reality is that a lot of Scozzafava's ex-supporters, many of whom don't like either Hoffman or Owens, simply won't vote. And some of them will still wind up casting their ballots for Scozzafava undaunted, as she'll still appear on the ballot and may have made herself something of a sympathetic figure. Certainly, it would seem to help Hoffman if Scozzafava decided to endorse him -- but only 15 percent of Scozzafava's voters had a favorable view of Hoffman, so they aren't going to come over easily, if at all. (EDIT: It's not clear if Scozzafava has in fact endorsed Hoffman, as the reporting is somewhat contradictory on this -- most sources, apart from the AP, say that she's made no endorsement.)
If I had to guess, I'd think that of Scozzafava's support, one-quarter of people don't vote, one-quarter vote for Scozzafava anyway, 30 percent defect to Hoffman and 20 percent defect to Owens. Extrapolating from the morning's Siena poll, that would produce a result of Hoffman 43, Owens 42, Scozzafava 5, with 10 percent of the voters still up for grabs.
Gun to my head? Sure, I'd take Hoffman at this point. But I'd also take the short side of the 67 percent odds that he's been given at Intrade.
(EDIT: If there's been no endorsement from Scozzafava, then I'm not sure that I'd necessarily give Hoffman any more of her votes than Owens. On the other hand, as I wrote yesterday, I think the enthusiasm/turnout side of the story may have been underplayed here and that dynamic benefits Hoffman.)
UPDATE (3:30 PM). Tom Jensen at PPP reports that he had a poll in the field this morning that was showing very good numbers for Hoffman, although how much emphasis we should give to unweighted, small-sample polling conducted on Halloween morning, I don't know. I would say that if Hoffman wins, it will tend to because of factors that were already in place before Scozzafava's withdraw.
10.30.2009
Sarah Palin: From Winks to Winces
@ 3:31 PM
As fivethirtyeight.com readers know, Nate and I have a bet about the 2012 presidential fate and fortunes of Sarah Palin. Nate has been blogging about other issues and assures me he will be responding to that earlier post in due course.
But yesterday came word of a new development on the Palin presidential front, courtesy of Politico's Jonathan Martin:
For Palin to show up in Iowa looking for a check, rather than bearing one from SarahPAC--which brought in three-quarters of a million dollars in the first half of this year and has already drawn scrutiny from FEC--means that she is either the most dim-witted presidential aspirant ever, which I seriously doubt, or her interests clearly tilt toward cashing in on her star-power. Although one might ask for a $100,000 speaking fee from a giant corporation or trade association, requesting it from a non-profit 501(c)3 group--no less one that promotes conservative family values and is based in Iowa--is about as stupid as it gets.
Then there is the name "SarahPac." I realize Palin has reached an iconic status, like "Michael" or "Madonna," such that her first name alone is sufficient to identify her. But naming your PAC after yourself? Despite my clucking about the freedom-heavy rhetoric in the name and mission statements of both Mitt Romney's and Tim Pawlenty's PACs, at least both opted to name their PACs after a conservative ideal rather than themselves.
The point, again, is that a politician hoping to woo people to support her presidential aspirations does not engage in such behaviors or send these signals. Oh, and then there's the matter of her surprise, premature resignation of the Alaska governorship.
Palin may still run, of course. There's even a case to be made that she will run--even if she fails to win the 2012 nomination--because doing so keeps her name and face at the center of the national political conversation, which in turn is good for business, so to speak. But Sarah Palin's actions the past year, in least insofar as they pertain to a potential presidential bid, have generated more winces than winks.
But yesterday came word of a new development on the Palin presidential front, courtesy of Politico's Jonathan Martin:Iowa Republicans wince at Sarah Palin's $100K speaking feeOn the first day of American Presidential Politics 101, presidential aspirants learn that Iowans must be stroked, flattered, humored and generally told how great and important they are. (The Iowans I know are, in fact, smart and lovely people--but that's besides the point of their inordinate and unfair influence in presidential politics.)
By Jonathan Martin, 10/29/09 5:06 AM EDT
A conservative Iowa group’s effort to lure Sarah Palin to its banquet next month has had an unintended effect: Rather than exciting conservatives about the prospect of a visit from the former Alaska governor, the group’s plan to raise a six-figure sum to bring her to the state has GOP activists recoiling at the thought of paying to land a politician's speaking appearance.
The Iowa Family Policy Center’s effort to cobble together $100,000 for Palin would represent a striking departure from customary practice in the first-in-the-nation state, these Republicans say, noting that a generation of White House hopefuls has paid their own way to boost their party and presidential ambitions.
For Palin to show up in Iowa looking for a check, rather than bearing one from SarahPAC--which brought in three-quarters of a million dollars in the first half of this year and has already drawn scrutiny from FEC--means that she is either the most dim-witted presidential aspirant ever, which I seriously doubt, or her interests clearly tilt toward cashing in on her star-power. Although one might ask for a $100,000 speaking fee from a giant corporation or trade association, requesting it from a non-profit 501(c)3 group--no less one that promotes conservative family values and is based in Iowa--is about as stupid as it gets.
Then there is the name "SarahPac." I realize Palin has reached an iconic status, like "Michael" or "Madonna," such that her first name alone is sufficient to identify her. But naming your PAC after yourself? Despite my clucking about the freedom-heavy rhetoric in the name and mission statements of both Mitt Romney's and Tim Pawlenty's PACs, at least both opted to name their PACs after a conservative ideal rather than themselves.
The point, again, is that a politician hoping to woo people to support her presidential aspirations does not engage in such behaviors or send these signals. Oh, and then there's the matter of her surprise, premature resignation of the Alaska governorship.
Palin may still run, of course. There's even a case to be made that she will run--even if she fails to win the 2012 nomination--because doing so keeps her name and face at the center of the national political conversation, which in turn is good for business, so to speak. But Sarah Palin's actions the past year, in least insofar as they pertain to a potential presidential bid, have generated more winces than winks.
2009 Elections Preview: NY-23 -- A Toss-Up, Indeed, Between Owens, Hoffman
@ 1:27 PM
New York 23rd Congressional District -- Special Election to replace Rep. John McHugh
The Candidates: Bill Owens, Democrat
State Assemblywoman Dede Scozzafava, Republican
Doug Hoffman, Conservative Party of New York
The Polling: There has been a relative paucity of independent polling in this race, particularly given that the dynamics have shifted quickly. What the polls agree upon is that Scozzafava, once the favorite, is slipping badly; there is some disagreement about the relative standing of Hoffman and Owens. A Research 2000 poll for Daily Kos puts Owens 1 point ahead of Hoffman; two polls for conservative interest groups which had endorsed Hoffman gave him leads of 4 and 5 points, respectively. The only truly nonpartisan group to have surveyed the race is Siena Univerisity; they gave Owens a 10-point lead over Hoffman with Scozzafava still in second place and 4 points behind, but that poll is now somewhat dated.
Earlier this week, I criticized one of the interest group polls, that issued by the Club for Growth on behalf of Basswood Research. I think people are too caught up in the specifics of the criticism and not in the general principle: the incentives of an interest group to issue a poll on behalf of a candidate or position they are actively invested in are radically different than those of an independent organization. Moreover, the numbers are often profoundly different, favoring their preferred candidate by an average of 3 points versus a non-partisan poll.
This is just a huge difference: in a two-candidate race, with relatively few undecideds, a 3-point difference in support for one candidate will usually translate into a 5-6 point difference in the margin between the candidates (obviously this gets more complicated in a multi-candidate race). Considering that the long-run difference between the better pollsters and some of the worst ones is on the order of only about 2 points worth of accuracy, a 5-6 point swing is huge. Although sometimes the swing may wind up being in the right direction, the 2003 study I linked to above found that nonindependent, partisan polls made the wrong call in the race 35-40 percent of the time, versus 16 percent for the independent polls.
Basically, between their perverse incentives and their poor track record, I think these polls provide virtually no informational value versus what an informed read of the independent polls can tell you. That is, I think you are literally best off ignoring them in most circumstances; we virtually never cite them around here and they weren't included in our Presidential or Senate race modeling in 2008 (and they likely won't be in 2010, unless I can find some reasonable way to strip out their bias.) When I see one of these polls substantially altering the media narrative, and I don't see the appropriate amount of hedging and caveating, I'm going to call it out.
By the way -- are the Research 2000 / Daily Kos polls something that we should consider independent? The bright line that we drew during the 2008 campaign was that a poll was considered to be a nonindependent, internal poll if it was conducted on behalf of a registered candidate, campaign committee, or PAC. A poll conducted by the Club For Growth, by a union, by the DNC, or by the Scozzafava campaign would qualify as nonindependent under that criterion; a poll conducted by Daily Kos or by Fox News would not. Obviously, all polls, independent or not, need to be monitored for bias (we have generally not found much of a "house effect" associated with either Daily Kos or Fox News polls, incidentally.)
With that long diatribe out of the way, let's talk about this very interesting Special Election.
Analysis: Suppose this were literally a two-candidate race between the Democrat Owens and the Conservative Party Candidate Hoffman. Who would win?
I think Owens would be favored. Although this district most recently had elected Republican John McHugh to the Congress, it also voted 52-47 for Barack Obama last November, and Obama has a 56-40 favorability rating there according to Siena. It is basically a middle-of-the-road district. And in a middle-of-a-road district, a moderate Democrat like Owens should beat a very conservative, uh, Conservative like Hoffman more often than not, according to a standard one-dimensional model.
But this isn't a two-candidate race; there's also Dede Scozzafava, although she's fading fast. Scozzafava is a Republican. But she's a moderate Republican in a district with a long history of ticket-splitting, and is probably much closer to Owens than Hoffman on the political spectrum. Arguably, she is even to his left; Kos (Markos Moulitsas) flirted with endorsing her. It's not immediately clear whether Scozzafava ought to have been taking more votes from Owens or Hoffman, and therefore, it's not immediately clear who might benefit from her collapse.
I actually think this Hoffman surge is something a little different. Undoubtedly, he has benefited from Scozzafava's problems -- although Owens should conceivably be benefiting too. But a lot of Hoffman's votes may not be coming from Scozzafava, so much as from people who were previously outside of the likely voter universe. The Daily Kos poll asked Hoffman voters who their second choice was; only 11 percent mentioned either Scozzafava or Owens, whereas 89 percent said they weren't sure or they wouldn't vote. Those are very unusual numbers and suggest that Hoffman is drawing a lot of disillusioned conservatives into the race who would otherwise sit things out. Keep in mind that special elections are low-turnout affairs. Were this 2010 or certainly 2012, and there were a number of races on the ballot and a more robust turnout, I don't think there would be enough conservatives in the district to give Hoffman much of a chance. But in the 2009 electorate, with his voters being significantly more motivated, and unspectacular alternatives being offered by the two major parties, he has quite a good chance.
Another advantage for Hoffman is that the pull on Scozzafava voters has been somewhat asymmetric. The Hoffman campaign understood early on that it needed to injure Scozzafava, whereas the Owens campaign seems to have been caught in more of a two-front war between Scozzafava and Hoffman, in part because conservative organizations in the district have been engaged in the "gadget play" (some might say "dirty trick") of misdirecting potential Owens voters to Scozzafava.
With all that said, Scozzafava's support is unlikely to collapse entirely. Being the only one of the three candidates to hold elected office, she'll have engendered some loyalty among some voters in her district, and others who aren't particularly tuned in to the national news will vote for her because she's a familiar face or will have the Republican label attached to her name.
The Odds: This is a race that Hoffman "shouldn't" win; he's too conservative for his district. But sometimes, the "wrong" candidate does win, if he runs a superior campaign, motivates stronger turnout, or is the beneficiary of unusual circumstances, all of which apply here. I wouldn't call Hoffman the favorite but it's close -- I'd give him a 45 percent chance of winning, Owens a 50 percent chance, and Scozzafava no more than a fleeting, 5 percent chance. Subject to further revision, of course, as I hope we'll get some further polling from Siena or another trustworthy source before the weekend is out.
There's also the question of just who Democrats should be rooting for, but we'll table that until later.
The Candidates: Bill Owens, Democrat
State Assemblywoman Dede Scozzafava, Republican
Doug Hoffman, Conservative Party of New York
The Polling: There has been a relative paucity of independent polling in this race, particularly given that the dynamics have shifted quickly. What the polls agree upon is that Scozzafava, once the favorite, is slipping badly; there is some disagreement about the relative standing of Hoffman and Owens. A Research 2000 poll for Daily Kos puts Owens 1 point ahead of Hoffman; two polls for conservative interest groups which had endorsed Hoffman gave him leads of 4 and 5 points, respectively. The only truly nonpartisan group to have surveyed the race is Siena Univerisity; they gave Owens a 10-point lead over Hoffman with Scozzafava still in second place and 4 points behind, but that poll is now somewhat dated.
Earlier this week, I criticized one of the interest group polls, that issued by the Club for Growth on behalf of Basswood Research. I think people are too caught up in the specifics of the criticism and not in the general principle: the incentives of an interest group to issue a poll on behalf of a candidate or position they are actively invested in are radically different than those of an independent organization. Moreover, the numbers are often profoundly different, favoring their preferred candidate by an average of 3 points versus a non-partisan poll.
This is just a huge difference: in a two-candidate race, with relatively few undecideds, a 3-point difference in support for one candidate will usually translate into a 5-6 point difference in the margin between the candidates (obviously this gets more complicated in a multi-candidate race). Considering that the long-run difference between the better pollsters and some of the worst ones is on the order of only about 2 points worth of accuracy, a 5-6 point swing is huge. Although sometimes the swing may wind up being in the right direction, the 2003 study I linked to above found that nonindependent, partisan polls made the wrong call in the race 35-40 percent of the time, versus 16 percent for the independent polls.
Basically, between their perverse incentives and their poor track record, I think these polls provide virtually no informational value versus what an informed read of the independent polls can tell you. That is, I think you are literally best off ignoring them in most circumstances; we virtually never cite them around here and they weren't included in our Presidential or Senate race modeling in 2008 (and they likely won't be in 2010, unless I can find some reasonable way to strip out their bias.) When I see one of these polls substantially altering the media narrative, and I don't see the appropriate amount of hedging and caveating, I'm going to call it out.
By the way -- are the Research 2000 / Daily Kos polls something that we should consider independent? The bright line that we drew during the 2008 campaign was that a poll was considered to be a nonindependent, internal poll if it was conducted on behalf of a registered candidate, campaign committee, or PAC. A poll conducted by the Club For Growth, by a union, by the DNC, or by the Scozzafava campaign would qualify as nonindependent under that criterion; a poll conducted by Daily Kos or by Fox News would not. Obviously, all polls, independent or not, need to be monitored for bias (we have generally not found much of a "house effect" associated with either Daily Kos or Fox News polls, incidentally.)
With that long diatribe out of the way, let's talk about this very interesting Special Election.
Analysis: Suppose this were literally a two-candidate race between the Democrat Owens and the Conservative Party Candidate Hoffman. Who would win?
I think Owens would be favored. Although this district most recently had elected Republican John McHugh to the Congress, it also voted 52-47 for Barack Obama last November, and Obama has a 56-40 favorability rating there according to Siena. It is basically a middle-of-the-road district. And in a middle-of-a-road district, a moderate Democrat like Owens should beat a very conservative, uh, Conservative like Hoffman more often than not, according to a standard one-dimensional model.
But this isn't a two-candidate race; there's also Dede Scozzafava, although she's fading fast. Scozzafava is a Republican. But she's a moderate Republican in a district with a long history of ticket-splitting, and is probably much closer to Owens than Hoffman on the political spectrum. Arguably, she is even to his left; Kos (Markos Moulitsas) flirted with endorsing her. It's not immediately clear whether Scozzafava ought to have been taking more votes from Owens or Hoffman, and therefore, it's not immediately clear who might benefit from her collapse.
I actually think this Hoffman surge is something a little different. Undoubtedly, he has benefited from Scozzafava's problems -- although Owens should conceivably be benefiting too. But a lot of Hoffman's votes may not be coming from Scozzafava, so much as from people who were previously outside of the likely voter universe. The Daily Kos poll asked Hoffman voters who their second choice was; only 11 percent mentioned either Scozzafava or Owens, whereas 89 percent said they weren't sure or they wouldn't vote. Those are very unusual numbers and suggest that Hoffman is drawing a lot of disillusioned conservatives into the race who would otherwise sit things out. Keep in mind that special elections are low-turnout affairs. Were this 2010 or certainly 2012, and there were a number of races on the ballot and a more robust turnout, I don't think there would be enough conservatives in the district to give Hoffman much of a chance. But in the 2009 electorate, with his voters being significantly more motivated, and unspectacular alternatives being offered by the two major parties, he has quite a good chance.
Another advantage for Hoffman is that the pull on Scozzafava voters has been somewhat asymmetric. The Hoffman campaign understood early on that it needed to injure Scozzafava, whereas the Owens campaign seems to have been caught in more of a two-front war between Scozzafava and Hoffman, in part because conservative organizations in the district have been engaged in the "gadget play" (some might say "dirty trick") of misdirecting potential Owens voters to Scozzafava.
With all that said, Scozzafava's support is unlikely to collapse entirely. Being the only one of the three candidates to hold elected office, she'll have engendered some loyalty among some voters in her district, and others who aren't particularly tuned in to the national news will vote for her because she's a familiar face or will have the Republican label attached to her name.
The Odds: This is a race that Hoffman "shouldn't" win; he's too conservative for his district. But sometimes, the "wrong" candidate does win, if he runs a superior campaign, motivates stronger turnout, or is the beneficiary of unusual circumstances, all of which apply here. I wouldn't call Hoffman the favorite but it's close -- I'd give him a 45 percent chance of winning, Owens a 50 percent chance, and Scozzafava no more than a fleeting, 5 percent chance. Subject to further revision, of course, as I hope we'll get some further polling from Siena or another trustworthy source before the weekend is out.
There's also the question of just who Democrats should be rooting for, but we'll table that until later.
Toward a General Theory of Democratic Disgruntlement, Part 2
@ 8:19 AM
Yesterday, I raised the question of why Democrats approve of the current Democratic-controlled Congress at lower rates than Republicans did when they controlled the Congress. This asymmetry, particularly in the short term, could merely be the byproduct of disappointment with a perceived disconnect between what Democratic voters thought they were voting for in 2006 and 2008, and what they are getting.
Taking a larger view, that asymmetry is quite possibly the function of a broader and even more enduring asymmetry, one rooted in the very foundational ideas that Democrats and Republicans take toward government--and compounded by the demographic differences between the two coalitions.
Pollster Celinda Lake spoke to first, and perhaps most crucial point in her email reply to me. "It’s easier to unify Republicans because mostly they want to stop things. It’s harder to unify people when you want to do things." (emphasis added) Therein lies the broader asymmetry: Doing nothing is a single thing, whereas doing something implies many options. And it is easier to build consensus around a “nothing” menu of 1 than it is for a more variegated menu of limitless options of “something.”
This is, I grant, not a particularly profound observation. Indeed, the idea that the status quo ante enjoys an advantaged position is a core assumption in social choice theories--especially as they apply to American politics, what with its separation of powers and supermajority rules and other constitutional and extra-constitutional rules and strictures designed to slow progress. That reality remains true regardless of the prevailing distribution of political attitudes, their intensity, and so on: It is an ineluctable fact in American politics it’s hard to do something, but even harder to reverse or undo or change course once it’s done. (Need I provide historical evidence on this point as the nation discusses a major policy initiative that has been churning through the public policy hopper for the better part of six decades now?)
Uniquely compounding this problem for Democrats is the nature of their coalition, which is of course more heterogeneous in demographic terms. Pollster Karl Agne: "The other dynamic here, of course, is the relative diversity of Democrats (age, race, region, ideology) and the relatively monolithic nature of the Republican base, as covered in our focus group report*. I think it's a factor as well, but impossible to quantify." (*That report is "The Very Separate World of Conservative Republicans," which I recommend reading.)
OK, so Democrats are tougher to please because they hold more complex and varied designs on the government, compounded by the fact that they are a more heterogeneous coalition. But what does this mean for our understanding of contemporary politics?
Well, for one thing, we ought to be careful not to overstate Democratic disgruntlement and its significance. Given the expectation that the more activist and change-oriented, as well as more demographically heterogeneous party, is therefore more difficult to keep together, it does not necessarily follow that Democrats are therefore enamored with their opponents' ideas about doing nothing. Both parties are trying to herd cats, and the Democratic herd is more prickly. But they remain two different breeds, and moving from one herd to the other is not the logical consequence of the refusal to be easily herded with your own.
And if this is true it means that core disgruntlement among Democrats, because it is artifactually higher, should not be overestimated. It should not be inferred that Democrats are headed for a colossal collapse in a way that the Republicans would if their approval of a Republican-controlled Congress were at the same levels.
Finally, Democratic support may also rebound. "I would fully expect to see Democratic approval rise again once health care reform passes and then, perhaps even more importantly, Congress begins to tackle other aspects of the Obama agenda," Agne predicts. Indeed, if you look at the more current Gallup poll numbers from 2009, as depicted above, sure enough, Democrats' support for their Democratic-controlled Congress seemed to have bounced back to around 50 percent and stabilized for most of this year--until a big dip this month. (Not sure why that drop is so sudden, and Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid ought to proceed with caution.) In any case, support has never risen to the 60-to-70 percent levels we saw for Republicans in the middle of this decade. But given the asymmetric nature of the two parties' coalitions and their demands and expectations for government action, the Democrats' cat-bounce (terrible pun, I know) since 2007-08 is not too bad.
Taking a larger view, that asymmetry is quite possibly the function of a broader and even more enduring asymmetry, one rooted in the very foundational ideas that Democrats and Republicans take toward government--and compounded by the demographic differences between the two coalitions.
Pollster Celinda Lake spoke to first, and perhaps most crucial point in her email reply to me. "It’s easier to unify Republicans because mostly they want to stop things. It’s harder to unify people when you want to do things." (emphasis added) Therein lies the broader asymmetry: Doing nothing is a single thing, whereas doing something implies many options. And it is easier to build consensus around a “nothing” menu of 1 than it is for a more variegated menu of limitless options of “something.”
This is, I grant, not a particularly profound observation. Indeed, the idea that the status quo ante enjoys an advantaged position is a core assumption in social choice theories--especially as they apply to American politics, what with its separation of powers and supermajority rules and other constitutional and extra-constitutional rules and strictures designed to slow progress. That reality remains true regardless of the prevailing distribution of political attitudes, their intensity, and so on: It is an ineluctable fact in American politics it’s hard to do something, but even harder to reverse or undo or change course once it’s done. (Need I provide historical evidence on this point as the nation discusses a major policy initiative that has been churning through the public policy hopper for the better part of six decades now?)
Uniquely compounding this problem for Democrats is the nature of their coalition, which is of course more heterogeneous in demographic terms. Pollster Karl Agne: "The other dynamic here, of course, is the relative diversity of Democrats (age, race, region, ideology) and the relatively monolithic nature of the Republican base, as covered in our focus group report*. I think it's a factor as well, but impossible to quantify." (*That report is "The Very Separate World of Conservative Republicans," which I recommend reading.)
OK, so Democrats are tougher to please because they hold more complex and varied designs on the government, compounded by the fact that they are a more heterogeneous coalition. But what does this mean for our understanding of contemporary politics?
Well, for one thing, we ought to be careful not to overstate Democratic disgruntlement and its significance. Given the expectation that the more activist and change-oriented, as well as more demographically heterogeneous party, is therefore more difficult to keep together, it does not necessarily follow that Democrats are therefore enamored with their opponents' ideas about doing nothing. Both parties are trying to herd cats, and the Democratic herd is more prickly. But they remain two different breeds, and moving from one herd to the other is not the logical consequence of the refusal to be easily herded with your own.
And if this is true it means that core disgruntlement among Democrats, because it is artifactually higher, should not be overestimated. It should not be inferred that Democrats are headed for a colossal collapse in a way that the Republicans would if their approval of a Republican-controlled Congress were at the same levels.
Finally, Democratic support may also rebound. "I would fully expect to see Democratic approval rise again once health care reform passes and then, perhaps even more importantly, Congress begins to tackle other aspects of the Obama agenda," Agne predicts. Indeed, if you look at the more current Gallup poll numbers from 2009, as depicted above, sure enough, Democrats' support for their Democratic-controlled Congress seemed to have bounced back to around 50 percent and stabilized for most of this year--until a big dip this month. (Not sure why that drop is so sudden, and Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid ought to proceed with caution.) In any case, support has never risen to the 60-to-70 percent levels we saw for Republicans in the middle of this decade. But given the asymmetric nature of the two parties' coalitions and their demands and expectations for government action, the Democrats' cat-bounce (terrible pun, I know) since 2007-08 is not too bad.
For European Integration, Movement and Money Counts
@ 6:30 AM
When Switzerland entered the "Schengen Area," that is, the group of twenty five continental European countries who allow passport-free movement of people among themselves, it was after decades of strong Euro-skepticism. After referenda strongly rejected the accession of the country to the European Economic Area (the precursor to the 1993 establishment of the EU) and subsequent ballot initiatives to re-open negotiations to join the EU failed with more than 75 percent of voters against, it seemed quite unlikely that the free movement of people would ever come to pass.
So, when I flew back to Geneva in March by way of Paris, after a short visit to the US, I was shocked to find myself walking straight through to customs, with my entry stamp from Charles-de-Gaulle good enough for the Swiss authorities.
At this point, freedom of movement is the leading edge of integration with the European system for the Swiss, with their high importation tariffs and controls, a strong committment to the Swiss Franc as the national currency, strenuous immigration requirements, opaque banking system, and neutrality-focused foreign policy. Indeed, in 2006, the Swiss Federal Council changed the official Swiss position regarding EU membership from "a strategic goal," to "an option."
For the rest of Europe, however, it is the impending passage of the Lisbon Treaty that defines the cutting edge of European integration. Signed in December 2007, the treaty has undergone more than 73 legislative, executive, royal, and judicial activities in the 27 EU countries. These have ranged from the official permission from the Duke of Luxembourg, no less than 10 separate regional legislatures, language community committees and special Brussels authorities in Beligum, along with the the ill-fated first 2008 referendum in Ireland that was the only failing vote on the treaty (and was overturned just a few weeks ago).
The Treaty of Lisbon is intended to improve coherance and streamline decision-making in the EU, and establish an appointed President of the European Council (the EU member states), who will serve a 2 1/2 year appoint term, instead of the current 6 month rotating Presidency. Approved by all the requisite parliaments, royal leaders, and the like, the treaty requires only the pro-forma approval of conservative, euro-skeptic Czech President Vaclav Klaus.
Klaus has decided to use this opportunity for a political stand against European integration, and insists that legal actions questioning the constitutionality of the treaty brought by conservative parliamentarians must be allowed to come to completion before he signs. The Czech constitutional court is set to review the case early next week.
Whether these efforts are meaningful, in practical terms, is up for debate. While there has been a great deal of heartburn about Lisbon from conservatives around the continent, it turns out that few issues that treaty addresses are meaningful to regular Europeans.
Eurobarometer polling published in September, which admitedly covers just the twenty seven EU countries, indentified ranks two issues far above the others in terms of the EU's role for its citizens. The two main practical impacts of European integration, common currency and common market, in terms of the movement of people travel) and the movement of workers and students (permanent work and study) are understandably the two key things that EU represents to Europeans. Speak to any regular person, be it Berlin, Athens or Ljubljana, you will find this to be true.
To measure these two issues (splitting travel and work, as the treaty system does), we can have a look at major European countries in terms of their participation in the common-currency Eurozone, the passport-free movement Schengen Area, and the European Economic Area, which encompasses free trade, common customs, and the freedom to work and study.
Regardless of the Lisbon Treaty, integration will continue, with eight countries on track to join the Eurozone in the next five years, and several others considering doing so. Liechtenstein and Cyprus are expected to join the Schengen Area in 2010 or 2011, while the new EU states of Bulgaria and Romania are on track to become part soon after, leaving just the UK and Switzerland outside of the "two or more" group.
Indeed, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy criticized President Klaus for his hold-up on the Lisbon Treaty, he suggested that the U.K.'s refusal to adopt the Euro would be a major stumbling block for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair becoming the inagural President of the European Council. Though Sarkozy intially introduced Blair's name into the process, he was not sure if he is the right choice. "Personally I believe in a Europe that is politically strong and embodied by a person. But the fact that Great Britain is not in the euro remains a problem," he explained.
So though the current Czech leadership, strong Euro-skeptic parties (such as those in Austria and the Netherlands), and other naysayers dominate the public dialogue right now, the real question will how the countries on the bottom end of the chart, namely the U.K., Switzerland, and to a lesser degree Norway, will change in the coming decade. Does the perception of inevitibility come into play at a certain point, or do national priorities dominate enough that this image does not come through?
The issue has been discussed and debated a hundred times since the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, which established the EU, in the early 1990s. But with a new generation of ERASMUS-educated civil servants and political leaders and a likely common foreign policy, the option for countries to "opt-out" begins to seem more permanent than temporary.
While we are watching for the results of the Constitutional court in the Czech Republic, we can also look forward to next spring's UK General Election. After twelve years in power and facing a surging opposition, the ruling pro-Europe Labour Party looks ripe for a toss-out. And with the Conservative Party's shift to the euro-skeptic European Conservatives and Reformists political group, it seems quite possible that EU integration may be an important card on the table.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
So, when I flew back to Geneva in March by way of Paris, after a short visit to the US, I was shocked to find myself walking straight through to customs, with my entry stamp from Charles-de-Gaulle good enough for the Swiss authorities.
At this point, freedom of movement is the leading edge of integration with the European system for the Swiss, with their high importation tariffs and controls, a strong committment to the Swiss Franc as the national currency, strenuous immigration requirements, opaque banking system, and neutrality-focused foreign policy. Indeed, in 2006, the Swiss Federal Council changed the official Swiss position regarding EU membership from "a strategic goal," to "an option."
For the rest of Europe, however, it is the impending passage of the Lisbon Treaty that defines the cutting edge of European integration. Signed in December 2007, the treaty has undergone more than 73 legislative, executive, royal, and judicial activities in the 27 EU countries. These have ranged from the official permission from the Duke of Luxembourg, no less than 10 separate regional legislatures, language community committees and special Brussels authorities in Beligum, along with the the ill-fated first 2008 referendum in Ireland that was the only failing vote on the treaty (and was overturned just a few weeks ago).
The Treaty of Lisbon is intended to improve coherance and streamline decision-making in the EU, and establish an appointed President of the European Council (the EU member states), who will serve a 2 1/2 year appoint term, instead of the current 6 month rotating Presidency. Approved by all the requisite parliaments, royal leaders, and the like, the treaty requires only the pro-forma approval of conservative, euro-skeptic Czech President Vaclav Klaus.
Klaus has decided to use this opportunity for a political stand against European integration, and insists that legal actions questioning the constitutionality of the treaty brought by conservative parliamentarians must be allowed to come to completion before he signs. The Czech constitutional court is set to review the case early next week.
Whether these efforts are meaningful, in practical terms, is up for debate. While there has been a great deal of heartburn about Lisbon from conservatives around the continent, it turns out that few issues that treaty addresses are meaningful to regular Europeans.
Eurobarometer polling published in September, which admitedly covers just the twenty seven EU countries, indentified ranks two issues far above the others in terms of the EU's role for its citizens. The two main practical impacts of European integration, common currency and common market, in terms of the movement of people travel) and the movement of workers and students (permanent work and study) are understandably the two key things that EU represents to Europeans. Speak to any regular person, be it Berlin, Athens or Ljubljana, you will find this to be true.
To measure these two issues (splitting travel and work, as the treaty system does), we can have a look at major European countries in terms of their participation in the common-currency Eurozone, the passport-free movement Schengen Area, and the European Economic Area, which encompasses free trade, common customs, and the freedom to work and study.
Regardless of the Lisbon Treaty, integration will continue, with eight countries on track to join the Eurozone in the next five years, and several others considering doing so. Liechtenstein and Cyprus are expected to join the Schengen Area in 2010 or 2011, while the new EU states of Bulgaria and Romania are on track to become part soon after, leaving just the UK and Switzerland outside of the "two or more" group.Indeed, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy criticized President Klaus for his hold-up on the Lisbon Treaty, he suggested that the U.K.'s refusal to adopt the Euro would be a major stumbling block for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair becoming the inagural President of the European Council. Though Sarkozy intially introduced Blair's name into the process, he was not sure if he is the right choice. "Personally I believe in a Europe that is politically strong and embodied by a person. But the fact that Great Britain is not in the euro remains a problem," he explained.
So though the current Czech leadership, strong Euro-skeptic parties (such as those in Austria and the Netherlands), and other naysayers dominate the public dialogue right now, the real question will how the countries on the bottom end of the chart, namely the U.K., Switzerland, and to a lesser degree Norway, will change in the coming decade. Does the perception of inevitibility come into play at a certain point, or do national priorities dominate enough that this image does not come through?
The issue has been discussed and debated a hundred times since the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, which established the EU, in the early 1990s. But with a new generation of ERASMUS-educated civil servants and political leaders and a likely common foreign policy, the option for countries to "opt-out" begins to seem more permanent than temporary.
While we are watching for the results of the Constitutional court in the Czech Republic, we can also look forward to next spring's UK General Election. After twelve years in power and facing a surging opposition, the ruling pro-Europe Labour Party looks ripe for a toss-out. And with the Conservative Party's shift to the euro-skeptic European Conservatives and Reformists political group, it seems quite possible that EU integration may be an important card on the table.
---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international columnist and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com
10.29.2009
Man vs. Machine in New Jersey
@ 6:17 PM
There's a rather strange split in the polls in New Jersey's gubernatorial race: those conducted by live interviewers have Jon Corzine leading by an average of 4.2 points, but those conducted via IVR (automated scripts or "robopolls") have Chris Christie leading by an average of 3.0 points. The difference is statistically significant with probability t=3.26, i.e. about a 98 percent chance that it isn't the result of chance alone.
This is probably not a phenomenon local to New Jersey; PPP and Rasmussen have generally shown pessimistic numbers for Democratic numbers in other states thus far this cycle. An automated poll tends to be associated with lower response rates, since an automated script can't do as much a human to coax someone into an interview, and therefore sometimes tends to reach a more enthusiastic set of respondents (in effect, it may serve some of the same functions as a very tight likely voter screen).
Since Republicans tend to be more enthusiastic right now, that may be what's causing the automated polls to be more favorable to them. But since none of us yet know how the enthusiasm gap is going to play out in practice, it would be premature to come to any conclusion about whether the voter universe that Rasmussen and PPP are coming up with is "too tight" or "just right". For that matter, I'm not yet ready to make a forecast for New Jersey; I certainly don't see it as self-evident that Jon Corzine ought to be as much as a 2:1 favorite, which is where Intrade has him now.
This is probably not a phenomenon local to New Jersey; PPP and Rasmussen have generally shown pessimistic numbers for Democratic numbers in other states thus far this cycle. An automated poll tends to be associated with lower response rates, since an automated script can't do as much a human to coax someone into an interview, and therefore sometimes tends to reach a more enthusiastic set of respondents (in effect, it may serve some of the same functions as a very tight likely voter screen).
Since Republicans tend to be more enthusiastic right now, that may be what's causing the automated polls to be more favorable to them. But since none of us yet know how the enthusiasm gap is going to play out in practice, it would be premature to come to any conclusion about whether the voter universe that Rasmussen and PPP are coming up with is "too tight" or "just right". For that matter, I'm not yet ready to make a forecast for New Jersey; I certainly don't see it as self-evident that Jon Corzine ought to be as much as a 2:1 favorite, which is where Intrade has him now.
Toward a General Theory of Democratic Disgruntlement, Part I
@ 11:16 AM
How come Democrats don't like a Democratically-controlled Congress as much as Republicans do when they control Congress? I hadn't realized this was even a phenomenon, nor whether it matters. But then, while doing some other research, I stumbled upon this little graph of results from Gallup:
If you look at the trend lines, the Congress was more popular when the Republicans were the majority in the first six years of this decade. That might seem surprising enough. But if you look closer, it's clear that Republican support prior to 2007 was higher than Democratic support after the takeover. What's going on here? To wit, a few possible theories to consider:
1. It's the economy, stupid. It could just be that the state of the economy and Americans' anxieties about their economic situation is dragging down the Democratic numbers. But that explanation fails to account for two things. First, the Republicans historically tend to receive lower approval numbers in the "whom do you trust to handle the economy?" polling questions. A year into control of Congress, with George Bush still president, Democrats were more trusted to handle the economy, according to Gallup. But now, at least according to Rasmussen, and since this past summer, Republicans are. And second, and relatedly, it would be one thing if Congressional numbers tanked post-black September (2008), but the Democratic-controlled 110th Congress didn't have much better numbers prior to that.
2. It's the pan-ideological populist revolt. You know, if the social issue divide between working-class conservatives and working-class liberals in this country is ever healed, the business and political elites had better watch out. The anger and disappointment that greeted the Bush Administration's bailout, followed by the Obama Administration's giant stimulus package, is palpable. And because both those decisions were approved, respectively, by the 110th and 111th Democratic Congresses, Democrats are suffering accordingly.
3. Democrats didn't get the Congress they thought they voted for. I checked in with several pollsters to solicit their explanations for this phenomenon. Republican pollster Neil Newhouse's answer seems plausible enough: "It's clear that since Democrats took back Congress a few years ago, their partisans have been anxious for their newfound majority to flex its muscles and exert their will. But, reality has set in. And, that's clearly frustrated the Democratic rank-and-file across the country. Current data showing strong disapproval of the Democratic-led Congress by rank-and-file Democrats could be given voice as follows: I realize that when Democrats first took control of Congress, Bush was still President, and Congress, even though dominated by Democratic partisans, had their hands tied. But now, with Obama as president and increased majorities in Congress, you're still not getting stuff done that I care about? And, when are you guys (expletive deleted) gonna focus on what we need most—jobs! You wanted complete control, and that's what you finally have. And this is what we get?!
Democratic pollster Karl Agne echoed this sentiment. "During the first years of the GOP Congress, Republicans were primarily motivated by opposition to Clinton, which the GOP Congress delivered consistently. Then, during the (almost uninterrupted) six years of a Bush White House and GOP Congress, you could count on one hand the instances of dissonance between them. The GOP Congress marched in lockstep and gave Bush (and the GOP base) pretty much everything asked of them. It was DeLay's classic 'majority of the majority' approach, executed very efficiently," he wrote to me by email. "Democrats, on the other hand, have yet to see much of the change they voted for in '06 and '08. Opposition to Bush got Democratic support up some, but the complete sense of paralysis in '07 and '08 and attitudes about the direction of the country limited how high their support would go."
The Newhouse-Agne take is a solid situational explanation for the asymmetry in partisan support by Republicans and Democrats for their respective majorities over the past decade or so. But is there something more systematic at work here?
I'll tackle that question in a follow-up post.
If you look at the trend lines, the Congress was more popular when the Republicans were the majority in the first six years of this decade. That might seem surprising enough. But if you look closer, it's clear that Republican support prior to 2007 was higher than Democratic support after the takeover. What's going on here? To wit, a few possible theories to consider:
1. It's the economy, stupid. It could just be that the state of the economy and Americans' anxieties about their economic situation is dragging down the Democratic numbers. But that explanation fails to account for two things. First, the Republicans historically tend to receive lower approval numbers in the "whom do you trust to handle the economy?" polling questions. A year into control of Congress, with George Bush still president, Democrats were more trusted to handle the economy, according to Gallup. But now, at least according to Rasmussen, and since this past summer, Republicans are. And second, and relatedly, it would be one thing if Congressional numbers tanked post-black September (2008), but the Democratic-controlled 110th Congress didn't have much better numbers prior to that.
2. It's the pan-ideological populist revolt. You know, if the social issue divide between working-class conservatives and working-class liberals in this country is ever healed, the business and political elites had better watch out. The anger and disappointment that greeted the Bush Administration's bailout, followed by the Obama Administration's giant stimulus package, is palpable. And because both those decisions were approved, respectively, by the 110th and 111th Democratic Congresses, Democrats are suffering accordingly.
3. Democrats didn't get the Congress they thought they voted for. I checked in with several pollsters to solicit their explanations for this phenomenon. Republican pollster Neil Newhouse's answer seems plausible enough: "It's clear that since Democrats took back Congress a few years ago, their partisans have been anxious for their newfound majority to flex its muscles and exert their will. But, reality has set in. And, that's clearly frustrated the Democratic rank-and-file across the country. Current data showing strong disapproval of the Democratic-led Congress by rank-and-file Democrats could be given voice as follows: I realize that when Democrats first took control of Congress, Bush was still President, and Congress, even though dominated by Democratic partisans, had their hands tied. But now, with Obama as president and increased majorities in Congress, you're still not getting stuff done that I care about? And, when are you guys (expletive deleted) gonna focus on what we need most—jobs! You wanted complete control, and that's what you finally have. And this is what we get?!
Democratic pollster Karl Agne echoed this sentiment. "During the first years of the GOP Congress, Republicans were primarily motivated by opposition to Clinton, which the GOP Congress delivered consistently. Then, during the (almost uninterrupted) six years of a Bush White House and GOP Congress, you could count on one hand the instances of dissonance between them. The GOP Congress marched in lockstep and gave Bush (and the GOP base) pretty much everything asked of them. It was DeLay's classic 'majority of the majority' approach, executed very efficiently," he wrote to me by email. "Democrats, on the other hand, have yet to see much of the change they voted for in '06 and '08. Opposition to Bush got Democratic support up some, but the complete sense of paralysis in '07 and '08 and attitudes about the direction of the country limited how high their support would go."
The Newhouse-Agne take is a solid situational explanation for the asymmetry in partisan support by Republicans and Democrats for their respective majorities over the past decade or so. But is there something more systematic at work here?
I'll tackle that question in a follow-up post.
10.28.2009
2009 Elections Preview: Virginia Governor
@ 9:27 AM
Part two of a five-part series.
Virginia -- Governor
The Candidates: Attorney General Bob McDonnell, Republican
State Senator Creigh Deeds, Democrat
The Polling: McDonnell leads by 10.9 points in the Pollster.com average and by margins ranging from 8 to 17 points in individual polls. The magnitude of his advantage has generally been expanding over the course of the past six weeks.
Analysis: Deeds has virtually no chance. Did he ever have a chance? That's perhaps the better question.
After a short-lived bounce in June following his come-from-behind win over Terry McAuliffe and Brian Moran in the Democratic primaries, pollsters started getting a better look at the electorate, and what they saw was bad news for Deeds and for Democrats. Consider, for instance, the Washington Post poll that has McDonnell up 11 points. The registered voter pool in the state favors Democrats 48-42 (counting "leaners"), according to the poll. But the likely voter universe favors Republicans (again counting leaners) 49-43. That's just a huge difference. And it's not an isolated result; PPP and SurveyUSA have shown pretty much the same thing, and have been doing so for some time now. If you had a 2008-type electorate turning out, this race would be reasonably competitive; McDonnell might be leading by a point or three, but it would be worth watching. With this type of electorate, the Democrat is pretty much helpless against a reasoanbly well-organized Republican opponent.
Of course, the composition of the electorate isn't a completely exogenous factor; the quality of the candidates and their campaigns can have some effect. Democrats seemed quite pleased when Deeds became their nominee in June, figuring he'd do well with working-class and rural voters. But the the working-class, rural vote isn't where the swing vote is in Virginia, one of the wealthiest states in the country. Instead, it's the more well-off folks in the suburbs. And it tends to be those well-off folks, by the way, who are most likely to have changed their opinion on Barack Obama, as the perception has set in (to an extent) that he's a tax-and-spend liberal.
Meanwhile, Deeds hasn't done much to motivate African-American turnout, which projects to make up only about 15 percent of the electorate as compared with 20 percent in 2008 -- although the number is not so atypical for a non-Presidential contest in the state.
Since people are going to want to assign blame here, I'd attribute it about 3:1 to the national environment as opposed to anything in particular that Deeds has done. Keep in mind that the pollsters were projecting these turnout problems for the Democrats as early as July, long before the Deeds campaign had much chance to influence the result. Furthermore, McDonnell himself is a fairly strong and charismatic candidate, somebody who might get talked up in a couple of years as having national ambitions; polls have also shown him defeating incumbent governor Tim Kaine in a hypothetical matchup between the two, and Kaine is fairly popular.
With that said, Deeds can probably be blamed for his failure to find a good affirmative message, as voters perceive him 2:1 as having run a negative campaign. And -- let's face it -- he's not the most commanding presence on the stump. Mean works when your John Corzine; it doesn't work when you're supposed to be the nice guy.
The Odds: Deeds has got to be about a 60-1 underdog at this stage. We'd be looking at an upset of Hillary-in-New Hampshire proportions.
Virginia -- Governor
The Candidates: Attorney General Bob McDonnell, Republican
State Senator Creigh Deeds, Democrat
The Polling: McDonnell leads by 10.9 points in the Pollster.com average and by margins ranging from 8 to 17 points in individual polls. The magnitude of his advantage has generally been expanding over the course of the past six weeks.
Analysis: Deeds has virtually no chance. Did he ever have a chance? That's perhaps the better question.
After a short-lived bounce in June following his come-from-behind win over Terry McAuliffe and Brian Moran in the Democratic primaries, pollsters started getting a better look at the electorate, and what they saw was bad news for Deeds and for Democrats. Consider, for instance, the Washington Post poll that has McDonnell up 11 points. The registered voter pool in the state favors Democrats 48-42 (counting "leaners"), according to the poll. But the likely voter universe favors Republicans (again counting leaners) 49-43. That's just a huge difference. And it's not an isolated result; PPP and SurveyUSA have shown pretty much the same thing, and have been doing so for some time now. If you had a 2008-type electorate turning out, this race would be reasonably competitive; McDonnell might be leading by a point or three, but it would be worth watching. With this type of electorate, the Democrat is pretty much helpless against a reasoanbly well-organized Republican opponent.
Of course, the composition of the electorate isn't a completely exogenous factor; the quality of the candidates and their campaigns can have some effect. Democrats seemed quite pleased when Deeds became their nominee in June, figuring he'd do well with working-class and rural voters. But the the working-class, rural vote isn't where the swing vote is in Virginia, one of the wealthiest states in the country. Instead, it's the more well-off folks in the suburbs. And it tends to be those well-off folks, by the way, who are most likely to have changed their opinion on Barack Obama, as the perception has set in (to an extent) that he's a tax-and-spend liberal.
Meanwhile, Deeds hasn't done much to motivate African-American turnout, which projects to make up only about 15 percent of the electorate as compared with 20 percent in 2008 -- although the number is not so atypical for a non-Presidential contest in the state.
Since people are going to want to assign blame here, I'd attribute it about 3:1 to the national environment as opposed to anything in particular that Deeds has done. Keep in mind that the pollsters were projecting these turnout problems for the Democrats as early as July, long before the Deeds campaign had much chance to influence the result. Furthermore, McDonnell himself is a fairly strong and charismatic candidate, somebody who might get talked up in a couple of years as having national ambitions; polls have also shown him defeating incumbent governor Tim Kaine in a hypothetical matchup between the two, and Kaine is fairly popular.
With that said, Deeds can probably be blamed for his failure to find a good affirmative message, as voters perceive him 2:1 as having run a negative campaign. And -- let's face it -- he's not the most commanding presence on the stump. Mean works when your John Corzine; it doesn't work when you're supposed to be the nice guy.
The Odds: Deeds has got to be about a 60-1 underdog at this stage. We'd be looking at an upset of Hillary-in-New Hampshire proportions.
10.27.2009
Zogby Again Polls on Misleading Question, This Time with Racial Tinge
@ 9:25 PM
As reported by FAIR, a new poll issued by Zogby Interactive on behalf of the conservative website The O'Leary Report poses the following question:
In November, Zogby polled on a series of misleading statements about Barack Obama and Joe Biden on behalf of conservative media personality John Ziegler. In the face of criticism at FiveThirtyEight and other websites, Zogby issued a partial apology, implying that their quality control process had broken down, and declined to do further polling for the client.
It seems clear, however, in light of this new poll, that Zogby has made a decision to become the bottom-feeders of the polling marketplace, a one-stop-shop for wingnuts of all stripes, who will make no particular distinction between fact and innuendo in the questions they poll. To be clear about the issue at hand, there is a distinction between a merely leading question -- merely couching a statement of fact in favorable terminology -- and a misleading one -- reporting a highly questionable statement as fact to the respondent. To imply from Lloyd's statements that the FCC is considering pursing a policy of forced resignation for white broadcast personalities seems pretty far over the line. That the question as posed is highly racially charged is somewhat tangential to the ethical issue at hand, although it arguably raises the stakes and may certainly further indict John Zogby's judgement.
Federal Communications Commission Chief Diversity Czar Mark Lloyd wants the FCC to force good white people in positions of power in the broadcast industry to step down to make room for more African-Americans and gays to fill those positions. Do you agree or disagree that this presents a threat to free speech?The question, obviously, is somewhat self-evidently incendiary, although it doesn't come completely out of the blue. Rather, the question refers to a set of remarks made in 2005 by Lloyd, the FEC's Chief Diversity Officer:
"There's nothing more difficult than this because we have really truly, good, white people in important positions, and the fact of the matter is that there are a limited number of those positions," he said.I'm not going to do anyone a favor by linking to their write-up of Lloyd's remarks, since none of the publications that refer to them make an honest effort to provide the full context, such as the question to which Lloyd was responding. But obviously, even based on these clipped remarks, there is a large gap between Lloyd's somewhat amorphous response and Zogby's uncritical and unattributed statement of fact that "Lloyd wants the FCC to force good white people in positions of power in the broadcast industry to step down to make room for more African-Americans and gays to fill those positions."
"And unless we are conscious of the need to have more people of color, gays, other people in those positions, we will not change the problem. But we're in a position where you have to say who is going to step down so someone else can have power."
In November, Zogby polled on a series of misleading statements about Barack Obama and Joe Biden on behalf of conservative media personality John Ziegler. In the face of criticism at FiveThirtyEight and other websites, Zogby issued a partial apology, implying that their quality control process had broken down, and declined to do further polling for the client.
It seems clear, however, in light of this new poll, that Zogby has made a decision to become the bottom-feeders of the polling marketplace, a one-stop-shop for wingnuts of all stripes, who will make no particular distinction between fact and innuendo in the questions they poll. To be clear about the issue at hand, there is a distinction between a merely leading question -- merely couching a statement of fact in favorable terminology -- and a misleading one -- reporting a highly questionable statement as fact to the respondent. To imply from Lloyd's statements that the FCC is considering pursing a policy of forced resignation for white broadcast personalities seems pretty far over the line. That the question as posed is highly racially charged is somewhat tangential to the ethical issue at hand, although it arguably raises the stakes and may certainly further indict John Zogby's judgement.
Somebody Buy Joe Lieberman a Puppy
@ 4:01 PM
The reason this is a little scary for Democrats is because the usual things that serve to motivate a Congressman don't seem to motivate Joe Lieberman.
Would voting to filibuster the Democrats' health care bill (if it contains a decent public option) endear Lieberman to his constituents? No; Connecticutians favor the public option 64-31.
Would it make his path to re-election easier? No, because it would virtually assure that Lieberman faces a vigorous and well-funded challenge from a credible, capital-D Democrat, and polls show him losing such a match-up badly.
Would it buy him more power in the Senate? No, because Democrats would have every reason to strip him of his chairmanship of the Homeland Security Committee.
Is Lieberman's stance intended to placate the special interests in his state? Perhaps this is part of it -- there are a lot of insurance companies in Connecticut -- but Lieberman is generally not one of the more sold-out Senators, ranking 75th out of the 100-member chamber in the percentage of his fundraising that comes from corporate PACs.
Are there any particular compromises or concessions he wants in the bill? He hasn't stipulated any, at least not publicly.
Might he have a legitimate policy objection to the public option? Certainly there are some legitimate objections -- whether or not you agree with them. But Lieberman's objections don't make any sense. He says he's worried about blunting "the economic recovery we’re in" even though the public option provisions wouldn't kick in until 2013. He says he's worried about debt-reduction when the public option would make the bill more deficit-neutral. And he campaigned on a public-option type alternative called "MediChoice" in 2006.
What Joe Lieberman wants, in all probability, is attention. He wants Harry Reid to have to stand up and say things like : "I don't have anyone that I've worked harder with, have more respect for, in the Senate than Joe Lieberman." He wants face time on Meet the Press. He wants to make liberals feel some pain -- especially those who tried to get Ned Lamont elected in his place. He wants everyone to know how maverick-y he is.
But even if Lieberman will probably cave, this creates real problems for Democrats. For one thing, Lieberman has said he won't oppose the motion to proceed with the health care bill. Instead, he'll filibuster the end result, if he doesn't like the outcome. This is actually very devious. If Harry Reid determines that he doesn't have 60 votes on the motion to proceed on a bill with a public option, then he doesn't have to bring it to the floor. Progressives will be apoplectic, Reid will lose some face, pundits will talk about Democrats having lost momentum -- but the prospects for health care reform will probably not have seriously been damaged. The opt-out will get replaced by an opt-in or maybe a trigger or co-ops or whatever and Olympia Snowe will be very happy and the debate will proceed.
But if, on the other hand, Lieberman filibusters the vote for final passage, that will have come after weeks of floor debate, amendments, and compromising on all sorts of issues. This would be a very, very serious blow to health care reform. And it makes this a much more expensive bluff to call.
The other way that this is damaging to Democrats, of course, is that it may embolden an Evan Bayh or a Blanche Lincoln or a Ben Nelson to adopt Lieberman's stance. None of these guys want to be the lone Democratic member to filibuster -- but it's much easier to defray individual responsibility on a procedural vote against your party when you have someone else joining you.
But while a Nelson or a Lincoln is liable to have a fairly rational set of concerns -- basically, they want to ensure they get re-elected -- it's tough to bargain with people like Lieberman who are a little crazy. In certain ways, he resembles nothing so much as one of those rogue, third-bit Middle Eastern dictators that he's so often carping about, capable of creating great anxiety with relatively little expenditure of resources, and taking equal pleasure in watching his friends and enemies sweat.
Would voting to filibuster the Democrats' health care bill (if it contains a decent public option) endear Lieberman to his constituents? No; Connecticutians favor the public option 64-31.
Would it make his path to re-election easier? No, because it would virtually assure that Lieberman faces a vigorous and well-funded challenge from a credible, capital-D Democrat, and polls show him losing such a match-up badly.
Would it buy him more power in the Senate? No, because Democrats would have every reason to strip him of his chairmanship of the Homeland Security Committee.
Is Lieberman's stance intended to placate the special interests in his state? Perhaps this is part of it -- there are a lot of insurance companies in Connecticut -- but Lieberman is generally not one of the more sold-out Senators, ranking 75th out of the 100-member chamber in the percentage of his fundraising that comes from corporate PACs.
Are there any particular compromises or concessions he wants in the bill? He hasn't stipulated any, at least not publicly.
Might he have a legitimate policy objection to the public option? Certainly there are some legitimate objections -- whether or not you agree with them. But Lieberman's objections don't make any sense. He says he's worried about blunting "the economic recovery we’re in" even though the public option provisions wouldn't kick in until 2013. He says he's worried about debt-reduction when the public option would make the bill more deficit-neutral. And he campaigned on a public-option type alternative called "MediChoice" in 2006.
What Joe Lieberman wants, in all probability, is attention. He wants Harry Reid to have to stand up and say things like : "I don't have anyone that I've worked harder with, have more respect for, in the Senate than Joe Lieberman." He wants face time on Meet the Press. He wants to make liberals feel some pain -- especially those who tried to get Ned Lamont elected in his place. He wants everyone to know how maverick-y he is.
But even if Lieberman will probably cave, this creates real problems for Democrats. For one thing, Lieberman has said he won't oppose the motion to proceed with the health care bill. Instead, he'll filibuster the end result, if he doesn't like the outcome. This is actually very devious. If Harry Reid determines that he doesn't have 60 votes on the motion to proceed on a bill with a public option, then he doesn't have to bring it to the floor. Progressives will be apoplectic, Reid will lose some face, pundits will talk about Democrats having lost momentum -- but the prospects for health care reform will probably not have seriously been damaged. The opt-out will get replaced by an opt-in or maybe a trigger or co-ops or whatever and Olympia Snowe will be very happy and the debate will proceed.
But if, on the other hand, Lieberman filibusters the vote for final passage, that will have come after weeks of floor debate, amendments, and compromising on all sorts of issues. This would be a very, very serious blow to health care reform. And it makes this a much more expensive bluff to call.
The other way that this is damaging to Democrats, of course, is that it may embolden an Evan Bayh or a Blanche Lincoln or a Ben Nelson to adopt Lieberman's stance. None of these guys want to be the lone Democratic member to filibuster -- but it's much easier to defray individual responsibility on a procedural vote against your party when you have someone else joining you.
But while a Nelson or a Lincoln is liable to have a fairly rational set of concerns -- basically, they want to ensure they get re-elected -- it's tough to bargain with people like Lieberman who are a little crazy. In certain ways, he resembles nothing so much as one of those rogue, third-bit Middle Eastern dictators that he's so often carping about, capable of creating great anxiety with relatively little expenditure of resources, and taking equal pleasure in watching his friends and enemies sweat.
On Being Wrong About the Public Option
@ 6:24 AM
I made two predictions this summer that look like they're not going to turn out very well. One was saying that the unemployment rate wouldn't hit 10 percent (it hasn't yet, although it probably will) and the other was saying that the public option was "probably" dead.
That latter prediction, formally speaking, isn't wrong yet either. Although Harry Reid is endeavoring to insert a public option into the bill that the Senate will vote upon, that bill hasn't gone to the floor yet, nor has it been approved. Neither of these things are guaranteed: it looks like Reid still needs to round up a couple of Democratic votes to get to 60 on a motion to proceed with the bill, and that may not be easy (if Reid can't get them, you should expect him to pull the public option off the table, rather than losing face with a floor vote).
In addition, the public option that Reid hopes the Senate will vote upon is compromised in three distinct ways from the original vision of it. Firstly, states will have the right to "opt out" of it (not that big a deal, IMO). Secondly, it will be limited to negotiating its rates in the market, rather than charging Medicare rates (a very big deal). Thirdly, it will be open only to the relatively small handful of people who are eligible for the health insurance exchanges, rather than the whole country (ditto). The consensus -- and I agree with this -- is that Reid's version is still in its essence a "public option", but it's not the robust public option that progressives envisioned. For better or for worse, it really is a compromise, and a substantial compromise.
Nevertheless, we try to be accountable here, and it looks like this prediction will turn out to be wrong. So where did I -- and many other "pundits" -- miscalculate?
Last week, we discussed 10 ways in which the environment had become more favorable to the public option. But some of those -- like the favorable CBO score that the public option will get -- were foreseeable ahead of time. What, then, were the real surprises?
The first surprise is that Reid is showing some backbone. I don't think this move is quite as risky as it looks, because Reid has some wiggle room before he passes the point of no return. But Harry Reid does not generally have a reputation as a risk-taker, even in small doses. A nontrivial factor is that he's literally gone overnight from being a goat to a hero in the progressive blogger/activist community, something that could pay dividends when he's seeking cash and volunteers for what will be a very tough re-election campaign. Save perhaps for Alex Rodriguez, nobody has done more in the last month to resuscitate their image with their fan base.
The second surprise is that this happened without much explicit support from the White House.
The third surprise is the way that Democrats regrouped after the turmoil of August. The President's speech on September 9th was a major and -- in my opinion -- still somewhat underrated factor in this. But also: the tea party/town hall movement that dominated the headlines in August is at this stage somewhat immature, with a lot of sound and fury but not so much focus -- sort of where liberals were at in 2002/03 before the failures of the Bush administration became more manifest. Whereas liberal activists have been focused on a laser like the public option, conservative activists have been distracted by ACORN, Van Jones, the NFL's conspiracy against Rush Limbaugh, and who-knows-what. Usually it's liberals who have amorphous, omnibus critiques of the government, and conservatives who bear down on specific policies; the polarity seems somewhat to have reversed.
The fourth surprise, less important than the first three, is that the usually very footsure insurance lobby undermined its credibility by putting out the wrong study at the wrong time, giving a gift to Democrats by making it easier for centrist Senators to distance themselves from them.
The fifth surprise is that the usually very prepared Olympia Snowe didn't do her homework on triggers, failing to flesh out the proposal to the point where it was ready for a floor vote, much less had gained credibility with the Democratic caucus. If Snowe had done more legwork on the trigger -- at least theoretically, there are manifestations of it that ought to have been relatively acceptable to progressives -- then we'd almost certainly be talking about a "hard" trigger versus a "soft" trigger, instead of opt-ins versus opt-outs.
With all that said, again, it is not yet time for progressives to be breaking out the champagne. The momentum for the public option could unravel, and could conceivably even take the whole project of health care reform with it. And the public option, particularly in its compromised form, is less of a game-changer than either wing seems to think.
But none of this would have been possible without the yeoman effort of a relatively small number of bloggers and activists -- they know who they are -- who were tired of taking "no" for an answer. They wanted this fight because of the paradigm-shifting implications it could have for how business gets done in the Democratic Party. And, somewhat to my surprise, they're having it.
That latter prediction, formally speaking, isn't wrong yet either. Although Harry Reid is endeavoring to insert a public option into the bill that the Senate will vote upon, that bill hasn't gone to the floor yet, nor has it been approved. Neither of these things are guaranteed: it looks like Reid still needs to round up a couple of Democratic votes to get to 60 on a motion to proceed with the bill, and that may not be easy (if Reid can't get them, you should expect him to pull the public option off the table, rather than losing face with a floor vote).
In addition, the public option that Reid hopes the Senate will vote upon is compromised in three distinct ways from the original vision of it. Firstly, states will have the right to "opt out" of it (not that big a deal, IMO). Secondly, it will be limited to negotiating its rates in the market, rather than charging Medicare rates (a very big deal). Thirdly, it will be open only to the relatively small handful of people who are eligible for the health insurance exchanges, rather than the whole country (ditto). The consensus -- and I agree with this -- is that Reid's version is still in its essence a "public option", but it's not the robust public option that progressives envisioned. For better or for worse, it really is a compromise, and a substantial compromise.
Nevertheless, we try to be accountable here, and it looks like this prediction will turn out to be wrong. So where did I -- and many other "pundits" -- miscalculate?
Last week, we discussed 10 ways in which the environment had become more favorable to the public option. But some of those -- like the favorable CBO score that the public option will get -- were foreseeable ahead of time. What, then, were the real surprises?
The first surprise is that Reid is showing some backbone. I don't think this move is quite as risky as it looks, because Reid has some wiggle room before he passes the point of no return. But Harry Reid does not generally have a reputation as a risk-taker, even in small doses. A nontrivial factor is that he's literally gone overnight from being a goat to a hero in the progressive blogger/activist community, something that could pay dividends when he's seeking cash and volunteers for what will be a very tough re-election campaign. Save perhaps for Alex Rodriguez, nobody has done more in the last month to resuscitate their image with their fan base.
The second surprise is that this happened without much explicit support from the White House.
The third surprise is the way that Democrats regrouped after the turmoil of August. The President's speech on September 9th was a major and -- in my opinion -- still somewhat underrated factor in this. But also: the tea party/town hall movement that dominated the headlines in August is at this stage somewhat immature, with a lot of sound and fury but not so much focus -- sort of where liberals were at in 2002/03 before the failures of the Bush administration became more manifest. Whereas liberal activists have been focused on a laser like the public option, conservative activists have been distracted by ACORN, Van Jones, the NFL's conspiracy against Rush Limbaugh, and who-knows-what. Usually it's liberals who have amorphous, omnibus critiques of the government, and conservatives who bear down on specific policies; the polarity seems somewhat to have reversed.
The fourth surprise, less important than the first three, is that the usually very footsure insurance lobby undermined its credibility by putting out the wrong study at the wrong time, giving a gift to Democrats by making it easier for centrist Senators to distance themselves from them.
The fifth surprise is that the usually very prepared Olympia Snowe didn't do her homework on triggers, failing to flesh out the proposal to the point where it was ready for a floor vote, much less had gained credibility with the Democratic caucus. If Snowe had done more legwork on the trigger -- at least theoretically, there are manifestations of it that ought to have been relatively acceptable to progressives -- then we'd almost certainly be talking about a "hard" trigger versus a "soft" trigger, instead of opt-ins versus opt-outs.
With all that said, again, it is not yet time for progressives to be breaking out the champagne. The momentum for the public option could unravel, and could conceivably even take the whole project of health care reform with it. And the public option, particularly in its compromised form, is less of a game-changer than either wing seems to think.
But none of this would have been possible without the yeoman effort of a relatively small number of bloggers and activists -- they know who they are -- who were tired of taking "no" for an answer. They wanted this fight because of the paradigm-shifting implications it could have for how business gets done in the Democratic Party. And, somewhat to my surprise, they're having it.
10.26.2009
Reality Check: NY-23 Poll May Seek to Alter, Not Reflect, Reality
@ 4:29 PM
There's a lot of buzz in the conservative blogosphere today about a new poll put out by the Club For Growth which shows Conservative Party candidate Doug Hoffman leading both Democrat Bill Owens and Republican Dede Scozzafava in the special Congressional election in New York's 23rd Congressional District. The poll shows Hoffman at 31 percent, Owens at 27 percent, Scozzafava at 20 percent, and 22 percent undecided.
It's a bit disturbing how credulously the conservative blogs, most of whom are rooting for Hoffman, are taking this poll. Here are few of the concerns that a more critical observer might ask about it:
-- The Club for Growth endorsed Hoffman and just last week threw $300,000 into the race on his behalf.
-- The sample size is tiny (300 people).
-- The pollster that Club for Growth is using, Basswood Research -- I'm sure does perfectly good work for its clients -- but is not that well known** and is therefore not taking too much reputational risk with this poll. (** I'm told that Basswood does in fact do a decent amount of work for Republican candidates like Tom Coburn and Mark Sanford.)
-- The number of undecideds in the poll -- 22 percent -- is unusual for a poll just eight days out from an election and is higher than what the public polls show.
-- The poll was conducted entirely over the weekend. Although Sunday is a fairly good polling day, Saturdays are not.
-- The narrative that Club for Growth constructs around the poll is that Hoffman is taking votes from Scozzafava, but the poll also shows the Democrat Owens polling quite a bit lower than he does in the public polls. It seems unlikely that Owens voters are defecting to Hoffman. Rather, if Scozzafava's support is indeed collapsing, I'd expect Owens to be picking up some of that support in addition to Hoffman.
-- The poll was released at a time when the NRCC, which has endorsed Scozzafava, is defending its position by citing the polling evidence, and so the incentive to put out some contrary evidence to alter the inflection of the media narrative is quite high.
-- The poll shows that 59 percent of so-called likely voters have no opinion (or haven't heard of) Owens, 48 percent have no opinion of Scozzafava, and 56 percent have no opinion of Hoffman.
-- Only 14 percent of the likely voters in this poll are age 40 or under, as compared with about 40 percent in the Research 2000 poll.
-- Previous polls put out by Basswood Research and the Club for Growth in this race featured highly leading question wording, although that does not appear to be the case here.
Are any of these red flags, unto themselves? No, just a lot of yellow. To be clear, this is very probably not a case, a la Strategic Vision, where the numbers were simply fabricated. But there's an awful lot that a pollster can do short of making up numbers -- asking leading questions, applying implausible likely voter models or demographic weightings, selecting an unorthodox sample frame, etc. -- to produce a result that fits its desired narrative.
It would also not be totally shocking if Hoffman won this race (although I think he'll need to get to at least 37-38 percent of the vote, which is about the minimum that I'd expect Owens to get). But this poll would not give me particularly more confidence in that outcome -- except to the extent that it alters rather than reflects reality. Likewise, those blogs that report on this poll without addressing some of its shortcomings are more interested in advocacy than reporting.
Note: I originally was not aware that the questionnaire were in fact available for this poll, which I've subsequently been alerted to; they answer some questions while raising some fresh ones.
It's a bit disturbing how credulously the conservative blogs, most of whom are rooting for Hoffman, are taking this poll. Here are few of the concerns that a more critical observer might ask about it:
-- The Club for Growth endorsed Hoffman and just last week threw $300,000 into the race on his behalf.
-- The sample size is tiny (300 people).
-- The pollster that Club for Growth is using, Basswood Research -- I'm sure does perfectly good work for its clients -- but is not that well known** and is therefore not taking too much reputational risk with this poll. (** I'm told that Basswood does in fact do a decent amount of work for Republican candidates like Tom Coburn and Mark Sanford.)
-- The number of undecideds in the poll -- 22 percent -- is unusual for a poll just eight days out from an election and is higher than what the public polls show.
-- The poll was conducted entirely over the weekend. Although Sunday is a fairly good polling day, Saturdays are not.
-- The narrative that Club for Growth constructs around the poll is that Hoffman is taking votes from Scozzafava, but the poll also shows the Democrat Owens polling quite a bit lower than he does in the public polls. It seems unlikely that Owens voters are defecting to Hoffman. Rather, if Scozzafava's support is indeed collapsing, I'd expect Owens to be picking up some of that support in addition to Hoffman.
-- The poll was released at a time when the NRCC, which has endorsed Scozzafava, is defending its position by citing the polling evidence, and so the incentive to put out some contrary evidence to alter the inflection of the media narrative is quite high.
-- The poll shows that 59 percent of so-called likely voters have no opinion (or haven't heard of) Owens, 48 percent have no opinion of Scozzafava, and 56 percent have no opinion of Hoffman.
-- Only 14 percent of the likely voters in this poll are age 40 or under, as compared with about 40 percent in the Research 2000 poll.
-- Previous polls put out by Basswood Research and the Club for Growth in this race featured highly leading question wording, although that does not appear to be the case here.
Are any of these red flags, unto themselves? No, just a lot of yellow. To be clear, this is very probably not a case, a la Strategic Vision, where the numbers were simply fabricated. But there's an awful lot that a pollster can do short of making up numbers -- asking leading questions, applying implausible likely voter models or demographic weightings, selecting an unorthodox sample frame, etc. -- to produce a result that fits its desired narrative.
It would also not be totally shocking if Hoffman won this race (although I think he'll need to get to at least 37-38 percent of the vote, which is about the minimum that I'd expect Owens to get). But this poll would not give me particularly more confidence in that outcome -- except to the extent that it alters rather than reflects reality. Likewise, those blogs that report on this poll without addressing some of its shortcomings are more interested in advocacy than reporting.
Note: I originally was not aware that the questionnaire were in fact available for this poll, which I've subsequently been alerted to; they answer some questions while raising some fresh ones.
2009 Elections Preview: NYC Mayor
@ 6:00 AM
Over the course of this week, I'll be running previews of the five highest-profile elections that will take place next Tuesday, November 3rd. These are the gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey, the special Congressional election in New York's 23rd Congressional District, and Maine's Question 1, which seeks to ban gay marriage in the state. But we'll start things off this morning right here in New York City, where citizens will be electing their new mayor.
New York City -- Mayor
The Candidates: Mayor Michael Bloomberg (incumbent), independent
City Comptroller Bill Thompson, Democrat
The Polling: Bloomberg leads by 12 and 16 points, respectively, in two recent polls of likely voters from SurveyUSA and Marist, respectively, with little discernible momentum in the numbers.
Analysis: Bloomberg has approval ratings in the low 60s, a position that would not ordinarily render an incumbent vulnerable -- especially one who has an essentially unlimited budget and who has been running ads promoting his leadership for the better part of a year. However, Bloomberg risked stirring some discontent among swing voters by persuading New York's City Council to extend the city's mayoral term limits from two to three terms, allowing him to run again. In addition, he's an independent -- who until recently was a Republican and will in fact be listed as both an independent and a Republican under New York's electoral fusion rules -- in an overwhelmingly Democratic city. Thompson has been endorsed by President Obama, albeit tentatively.
All of this, however, is liable to merely bend rather than break Bloomberg, as the two candidates are likely to roughly split the city's Democratic vote (about 70 percent of the electorate) while Bloomberg cleans up with Republicans and independents. The Marist poll shows Thompson polling more competitively if the electorate is expanded to include registered rather than likely voters, but the massive turnout that might be required to make things "interesting" seems unlikely -- there is relatively little buzz about the race here in New York City, as most people simply assume that Bloomberg will win, and while there are pockets of annoyance with his mayorship, they tend not to be especially impassioned. Unusually for New York, there are also a series of highly competitive statewide races on the docket in 2010 -- governor, Kirsten Gillibrand's Senate seat, and the closely-divided and chaotic State Assembly -- which may have distracted attention away from the Mayoral race. As a further distraction, the Yankees are playing in the World Series, which may extend past Election Day and will give Bloomberg some additional face time with his constituents.
The Odds: Although Thompson has run a relatively vigorous campaign, neither the polling nor the intangibles point to much possibility for a major upset; he should win The Bronx while losing the other four boroughs. I'd probably rate him as something like a 35:1 underdog, mostly on the chance of some late-breaking and heretofore unforeseen developments.
New York City -- Mayor
The Candidates: Mayor Michael Bloomberg (incumbent), independent
City Comptroller Bill Thompson, Democrat
The Polling: Bloomberg leads by 12 and 16 points, respectively, in two recent polls of likely voters from SurveyUSA and Marist, respectively, with little discernible momentum in the numbers.
Analysis: Bloomberg has approval ratings in the low 60s, a position that would not ordinarily render an incumbent vulnerable -- especially one who has an essentially unlimited budget and who has been running ads promoting his leadership for the better part of a year. However, Bloomberg risked stirring some discontent among swing voters by persuading New York's City Council to extend the city's mayoral term limits from two to three terms, allowing him to run again. In addition, he's an independent -- who until recently was a Republican and will in fact be listed as both an independent and a Republican under New York's electoral fusion rules -- in an overwhelmingly Democratic city. Thompson has been endorsed by President Obama, albeit tentatively.
All of this, however, is liable to merely bend rather than break Bloomberg, as the two candidates are likely to roughly split the city's Democratic vote (about 70 percent of the electorate) while Bloomberg cleans up with Republicans and independents. The Marist poll shows Thompson polling more competitively if the electorate is expanded to include registered rather than likely voters, but the massive turnout that might be required to make things "interesting" seems unlikely -- there is relatively little buzz about the race here in New York City, as most people simply assume that Bloomberg will win, and while there are pockets of annoyance with his mayorship, they tend not to be especially impassioned. Unusually for New York, there are also a series of highly competitive statewide races on the docket in 2010 -- governor, Kirsten Gillibrand's Senate seat, and the closely-divided and chaotic State Assembly -- which may have distracted attention away from the Mayoral race. As a further distraction, the Yankees are playing in the World Series, which may extend past Election Day and will give Bloomberg some additional face time with his constituents.
The Odds: Although Thompson has run a relatively vigorous campaign, neither the polling nor the intangibles point to much possibility for a major upset; he should win The Bronx while losing the other four boroughs. I'd probably rate him as something like a 35:1 underdog, mostly on the chance of some late-breaking and heretofore unforeseen developments.
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