Just a quick observation on Thursday's cloture motion on the Big 3 Bailout. Ten Republicans voted for cloture; eight of the ten are from states that Barack Obama won, and that doesn't count Kit Bond's vote in Missouri, who is in for a tough re-election fight in a purple state.
Four Democrats voted against closure; three of the four are from states McCain won, with the only exception being Harry Reid, who voted no for procedural reasons.
Republicans Voting YEA:
Bond (MO)
Brownback (KS)
Collins (ME)
Dole (NC)
Domenici (NM)
Lugar (IN)
Snowe (ME)
Specter (PA)
Voinovich (OH)
Warner, John (VA)
Democrats voting NAY:
Baucus (MT)
Lincoln (AR)
Reid (NV)
Tester (MT)
We're liable to see a fair amount of this, I would think, once the 111th Congress officially convenes next month, where Obama's popularity in a given state matters almost as much as the little 'D' or 'R' next to a senator's surname.
For the record, there will be 10 Republicans in the 111th Congress in states that Obama won ... they are:
Burr (NC)
Collins (ME)
Ensign (NV)
Grassley (IA)
Gregg (NH)
Lugar (IN)
Martinez (FL)
Snowe (ME)
Specter (PA)
Voinovich (OH)
If Norm Coleman wins the recount in Minnesota, that will make 11. I'd guess that pretty much all of these votes will be in play at least some of the time, except perhaps for Martinez, who is retiring, and Ensign, who has a leadership position with the NRSC.
Conversley, there are 13 Democrats in states that Obama lost...
Baucus (MT)
Begich (AK)
Byrd (WV)
Conrad (ND)
Dorgan (ND)
Johnson (SD)
Landrieu (LA)
Lincoln (AR)
McCaskill (MO)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor (AR)
Rockefeller (WV)
Tester (MT)
...and most of those votes may be problematic for Obama at one time or another too, with the possible exceptions of McCaskill, Rockefeller and Begich.
12.13.2008
12.12.2008
Obama Approval Ratings Not Dented by Blagojevich Scandal
@ 4:19 PM
With Rod Blagojevich facing the triple threats of impeachment, court-ordered removal from office, and a federal indictment, the tribulations of the Illinois Governor may yet prove to have an effect on Barack Obama's approval ratings -- but the early signs are that Blago will have no tangible impact on the public's perception of the President-elect.
Indeed, with essentially three full days of interviewing having been conducted after Blagojevich's arrest on on Tuesday morning, Obama's approval ratings remain pristine. Gallup shows that 72 percent of the public has a favorable view of Obama, and 18 percent an unfavorable view. The 72 percent favorability rating matches the 72 percent score that Obama achieved on November 7th-9th for the highest since the election, whereas the 18 percent disapproval rating is Obama's lowest yet. Three days ago, before Blagojevich's arrest, those ratings were 70 percent and 21 percent, respectively.
Rasmussen, likewise, sees no change to Obama's approval ratings. 67 percent of their voters now approve of Obama's performance, and 31 percent disapprove, exactly matching Obama's ratings from three days prior, and within a percentage point of his peak totals.
Indeed, with essentially three full days of interviewing having been conducted after Blagojevich's arrest on on Tuesday morning, Obama's approval ratings remain pristine. Gallup shows that 72 percent of the public has a favorable view of Obama, and 18 percent an unfavorable view. The 72 percent favorability rating matches the 72 percent score that Obama achieved on November 7th-9th for the highest since the election, whereas the 18 percent disapproval rating is Obama's lowest yet. Three days ago, before Blagojevich's arrest, those ratings were 70 percent and 21 percent, respectively.
Rasmussen, likewise, sees no change to Obama's approval ratings. 67 percent of their voters now approve of Obama's performance, and 31 percent disapprove, exactly matching Obama's ratings from three days prior, and within a percentage point of his peak totals.
Minnesota Canvassing Board Sides with Franken on Two Key Issues, Sending Coleman to Court
@ 3:18 PM
Al Franken may be the favorite to win Minnesota's recount after all.
The state's five-person Canvassing Board today issued two key rulings, both of which represent significant boosts to Franken. In the first ruling, issued at about 10 AM local time, the Canvassing Board determined that 133 ballots from Minneapolis's 1st Precinct, 3rd Ward are in fact missing, and that therefore the results from the recount in that precinct will not be accepted. Instead, the state will revert to its original certified tally in that precinct. Had the state chosen to accept the results from the recount instead, Franken would have lost a net of 46 ballots, as the majority of the missing ballots apparently favored Franken in this highly blue area.
In the second ruling, the Canvassing Board unanimously determined to recommend to the counties that they sort through their absentee ballots to determine which might have been rejected erroneously, and then resubmit their totals to the state after counting such erroneously rejected ballots. A recommendation, it should be mentioned, stops short of a requirement, as the Canvassing Board apparently felt as though it does not have the jurisdiction to require counties to count the absentee ballots without a court order. But, the counties that want to include the absentee ballots in their tallies would be allowed to.
The Coleman campaign, however, is now asking the Minnesota Supreme Court to halt the counting of the absentee ballots until, per the Star Tribune's reporting, "the justices can rule on the campaign's request that they order counties to follow a standard procedure in identifying wrongfully rejected ballots." For the time being, the Coleman campaign merely appears to be seeking a constituent standard for the counting of the absentee ballots, rather than to preclude them from being counted in their entirety,
Indeed, with the missing ballots having been restored to Franken's total (although that ruling also may become the subject of a Coleman lawsuit), it now appears as though the absentee ballots could well tip the balance of the race in Franken's favor. Whereas the state had originally estimated that between 500 and 1,000 absentee ballots had been rejected improperly, that estimate is now up to 1,600 wrongly rejected ballots. A pre-election poll showed Franken leading by 8 percent among absentee voters, which would translate to a net gain of 128 ballots if there are indeed 1,600 such ballots to be counted. This estimate, however, is fairly crude, and nobody knows exactly how the rejected absentee ballots might break, although from my previous conversations with officials close to the Franken campaign, Franken also believes that a plurality of such ballots will be counted in his favor.
The state's five-person Canvassing Board today issued two key rulings, both of which represent significant boosts to Franken. In the first ruling, issued at about 10 AM local time, the Canvassing Board determined that 133 ballots from Minneapolis's 1st Precinct, 3rd Ward are in fact missing, and that therefore the results from the recount in that precinct will not be accepted. Instead, the state will revert to its original certified tally in that precinct. Had the state chosen to accept the results from the recount instead, Franken would have lost a net of 46 ballots, as the majority of the missing ballots apparently favored Franken in this highly blue area.
In the second ruling, the Canvassing Board unanimously determined to recommend to the counties that they sort through their absentee ballots to determine which might have been rejected erroneously, and then resubmit their totals to the state after counting such erroneously rejected ballots. A recommendation, it should be mentioned, stops short of a requirement, as the Canvassing Board apparently felt as though it does not have the jurisdiction to require counties to count the absentee ballots without a court order. But, the counties that want to include the absentee ballots in their tallies would be allowed to.
The Coleman campaign, however, is now asking the Minnesota Supreme Court to halt the counting of the absentee ballots until, per the Star Tribune's reporting, "the justices can rule on the campaign's request that they order counties to follow a standard procedure in identifying wrongfully rejected ballots." For the time being, the Coleman campaign merely appears to be seeking a constituent standard for the counting of the absentee ballots, rather than to preclude them from being counted in their entirety,
Indeed, with the missing ballots having been restored to Franken's total (although that ruling also may become the subject of a Coleman lawsuit), it now appears as though the absentee ballots could well tip the balance of the race in Franken's favor. Whereas the state had originally estimated that between 500 and 1,000 absentee ballots had been rejected improperly, that estimate is now up to 1,600 wrongly rejected ballots. A pre-election poll showed Franken leading by 8 percent among absentee voters, which would translate to a net gain of 128 ballots if there are indeed 1,600 such ballots to be counted. This estimate, however, is fairly crude, and nobody knows exactly how the rejected absentee ballots might break, although from my previous conversations with officials close to the Franken campaign, Franken also believes that a plurality of such ballots will be counted in his favor.
Minnesota State Canvassing Board Meets
@ 10:00 AM
Minnesota's State Canvassing Board meets this morning at 9:30am Central time to decide appropriate action on rejected absentee ballots.
The Uptake will begin live streaming the meeting at 9:30, and we'll be following along.
In a recount season filled with PR maneuverings on both sides aimed at claiming the high ground in the ultimate outcome, this video released by the Franken campaign is one of the more effective messages. What can seem to the general public like background noise and bickering over numbers is helped by a human, emotional face.
Here, the video cleverly begins with simple textual framing: "every vote should be counted fairly" and "they did nothing wrong/someone else's mistake." The video features compelling and genuine voters; these may (or may not) be Franken partisans, but they seem relatable and sincere, and most importantly motivated by genuine dismay at the prospect of not having their votes counted. You win a public relations move like this when you get a viewer picturing his or her own vote arbitrarily discounted, and you do that by making the viewer realize that the folks sharing their stories didn't commit bad voting behavior.
Those seeking to make sure the votes aren't counted (in this case, Norm Coleman's camp) are best served when the public perceives the rejected absentee ballots as the fault of the individual voters who made silly mistakes or in some way created their own misfortune by failing to follow easily followed procedures. Everyone remembers the way that West Palm Beach voters were mocked in Florida 2000. When the public perceives that the voters are to blame for their votes being recorded wrongly, a key messaging battle has been won for election outcome legitimacy. That is not the case here. Although Coleman would win a PR victory for somehow getting people to believe that not counting these votes is just "punishment" for bad voting behavior, his camp has been effective in pushing that message.
In part because the Franken video is so effective, Coleman's spokesperson has unsurprisingly reacted to the video by labeling it "a new low" even though not one person in the video says the words "Coleman" or "Franken." The loud dissents from the Coleman camp were to be expected in a situation where their opponents have managed to release effective messaging on this key point of dispute before the Canvassing Board today.
The Uptake will begin live streaming the meeting at 9:30, and we'll be following along.
In a recount season filled with PR maneuverings on both sides aimed at claiming the high ground in the ultimate outcome, this video released by the Franken campaign is one of the more effective messages. What can seem to the general public like background noise and bickering over numbers is helped by a human, emotional face.
Here, the video cleverly begins with simple textual framing: "every vote should be counted fairly" and "they did nothing wrong/someone else's mistake." The video features compelling and genuine voters; these may (or may not) be Franken partisans, but they seem relatable and sincere, and most importantly motivated by genuine dismay at the prospect of not having their votes counted. You win a public relations move like this when you get a viewer picturing his or her own vote arbitrarily discounted, and you do that by making the viewer realize that the folks sharing their stories didn't commit bad voting behavior.
Those seeking to make sure the votes aren't counted (in this case, Norm Coleman's camp) are best served when the public perceives the rejected absentee ballots as the fault of the individual voters who made silly mistakes or in some way created their own misfortune by failing to follow easily followed procedures. Everyone remembers the way that West Palm Beach voters were mocked in Florida 2000. When the public perceives that the voters are to blame for their votes being recorded wrongly, a key messaging battle has been won for election outcome legitimacy. That is not the case here. Although Coleman would win a PR victory for somehow getting people to believe that not counting these votes is just "punishment" for bad voting behavior, his camp has been effective in pushing that message.
In part because the Franken video is so effective, Coleman's spokesperson has unsurprisingly reacted to the video by labeling it "a new low" even though not one person in the video says the words "Coleman" or "Franken." The loud dissents from the Coleman camp were to be expected in a situation where their opponents have managed to release effective messaging on this key point of dispute before the Canvassing Board today.
12.11.2008
Appointed Senators Rarely Win Re-Election
@ 9:08 AM
In November, two Republicans, Roger Wicker of Mississippi and John Barrasso of Wyoming, appeared on the ballot for the first time as candidates for U.S. Senate, after having been appointed to the chamber midway through the 110th Congress as replacements for Trent Lott and Craig Thomas, respectively. Both won their special elections easily, with Wicker defeating an underwhelming opponent in Ronnie Musgrove, and Barrasso hardly facing any serious challenge at all.
This, however, is rather unusual. In fact, senators appointed to fill midterm vacancies have fared rather poorly when it came time for the voters to give them a verdict. Over the past 25 Congresses, there have been, by my count, 49 senators who selected by gubernatorial appointment in midterm (this excludes cases where a senator-elect acceded to office a few days early to gain seniority on his colleagues, a once-common courtesy that is becoming less so.) Of those 49 senators, only 19 -- fewer than 40 percent -- won their subsequent special election. Meanwhile:
* 13 of the 49 (27%) ran for office, but were defeated in the general election;
* 7 of the 49 (14%) ran for office, but were defeated in the primary;
* 10 of the 49 (20%) chose not to seek a permanent term (including one who was prohibited by state law from doing so).
These numbers are far below the usual benchmarks for incumbent senators. Since 1990, about 81% of incumbent senators have sought re-election, and among those have sought it, 88% have won it. By contrast, among the 80% of gubernatorial appointees since 1956 who chose to seek re-election, only 49% survived both the primary and the general election.
A list of the 49 gubernatorial appointees since 1956 follows below:
[DISCLAIMER] We don't have this information centralized in any way, so there may be some errors and omissions.
The gubernatorial appointment process, certainly, has identified some distinguished senators, including Walter Mondale, Robert Stafford, and George Mitchell. But other appointments have been more questionable. Upon winning the Presidency, JFK got his college roommate, Benjamin Smith, appointed to the Senate, keeping the seat warm for his younger brother Ted. In four cases, the spouse of a deceased senator was appointed; none won re-election (although Jean Carnahan deserves partial credit as she was the de facto candidate for Mel Carnahan, who won posthumously). This does not count Edwin Edwards, the infamous former governor of Louisana, who appointed his wife to fill Allen Ellender's seat in the 92nd Congress. In three cases, a senator's son or daughter was appointed; all three won re-election, although all had previous electoral experience. In five cases, a governor appointed himself; all five of these greedy governors ran for re-election, and all five lost. In 11 of 49 cases (22%), the incoming senator was of a different party than the one he replaced.
By contrast, appointees who had significant recent experience as legislators performed fairly well. In 7 of the 49 cases, the appointee was a sitting member of the House of Representatives; 6 of the 7 won re-election. Seven others were sitting members of their State Legislatures at the time of their appointment; 5 of those 7 won re-election.
The process, in other words, works just fine when it isn't abused -- but too often it is abused, with the governor appointing himself, his spouse, or his friends, or a spouse or friend of the vacating senator. That such a low percentage of gubernatorial appointees have succeed in winning re-election suggests that such appointments are often counter to the public will, and quite possibly the public good. Rod Blagojevich, certainly, has abused his powers in unprecedented ways, but he is also taking advantage of a flawed system.
Fixing this process could occur in one of two ways. The more sweeping is a Constitutional Amendment, which would revise the Seventeenth Amendment to require special elections in the case of vacancies from the Senate. Alternatively, states can move to solve the problem themselves by passing a "fast" special elections law, as states like Oregon, Wisconsin and Massachusetts now have (and Illinois soon will). Other states have evolved other checks and balances; Utah and Wyoming require that the candidate be selected from among a list prepared by the state party apparatus, while Alaska, Hawaii and Arizona require appointees to be from the same party as the departing senator. Arkansas provides for gubernatorial appointments, but does not allow the appointee to run for re-election.
Whatever the details, more states ought to consider reforms like these. A Senate seat is a [bleeping] valuable thing -- too valuable to allow a governor to bypass the voters.
This, however, is rather unusual. In fact, senators appointed to fill midterm vacancies have fared rather poorly when it came time for the voters to give them a verdict. Over the past 25 Congresses, there have been, by my count, 49 senators who selected by gubernatorial appointment in midterm (this excludes cases where a senator-elect acceded to office a few days early to gain seniority on his colleagues, a once-common courtesy that is becoming less so.) Of those 49 senators, only 19 -- fewer than 40 percent -- won their subsequent special election. Meanwhile:
* 13 of the 49 (27%) ran for office, but were defeated in the general election;
* 7 of the 49 (14%) ran for office, but were defeated in the primary;
* 10 of the 49 (20%) chose not to seek a permanent term (including one who was prohibited by state law from doing so).
These numbers are far below the usual benchmarks for incumbent senators. Since 1990, about 81% of incumbent senators have sought re-election, and among those have sought it, 88% have won it. By contrast, among the 80% of gubernatorial appointees since 1956 who chose to seek re-election, only 49% survived both the primary and the general election.
A list of the 49 gubernatorial appointees since 1956 follows below:
[DISCLAIMER] We don't have this information centralized in any way, so there may be some errors and omissions.
The gubernatorial appointment process, certainly, has identified some distinguished senators, including Walter Mondale, Robert Stafford, and George Mitchell. But other appointments have been more questionable. Upon winning the Presidency, JFK got his college roommate, Benjamin Smith, appointed to the Senate, keeping the seat warm for his younger brother Ted. In four cases, the spouse of a deceased senator was appointed; none won re-election (although Jean Carnahan deserves partial credit as she was the de facto candidate for Mel Carnahan, who won posthumously). This does not count Edwin Edwards, the infamous former governor of Louisana, who appointed his wife to fill Allen Ellender's seat in the 92nd Congress. In three cases, a senator's son or daughter was appointed; all three won re-election, although all had previous electoral experience. In five cases, a governor appointed himself; all five of these greedy governors ran for re-election, and all five lost. In 11 of 49 cases (22%), the incoming senator was of a different party than the one he replaced.
By contrast, appointees who had significant recent experience as legislators performed fairly well. In 7 of the 49 cases, the appointee was a sitting member of the House of Representatives; 6 of the 7 won re-election. Seven others were sitting members of their State Legislatures at the time of their appointment; 5 of those 7 won re-election.
The process, in other words, works just fine when it isn't abused -- but too often it is abused, with the governor appointing himself, his spouse, or his friends, or a spouse or friend of the vacating senator. That such a low percentage of gubernatorial appointees have succeed in winning re-election suggests that such appointments are often counter to the public will, and quite possibly the public good. Rod Blagojevich, certainly, has abused his powers in unprecedented ways, but he is also taking advantage of a flawed system.
Fixing this process could occur in one of two ways. The more sweeping is a Constitutional Amendment, which would revise the Seventeenth Amendment to require special elections in the case of vacancies from the Senate. Alternatively, states can move to solve the problem themselves by passing a "fast" special elections law, as states like Oregon, Wisconsin and Massachusetts now have (and Illinois soon will). Other states have evolved other checks and balances; Utah and Wyoming require that the candidate be selected from among a list prepared by the state party apparatus, while Alaska, Hawaii and Arizona require appointees to be from the same party as the departing senator. Arkansas provides for gubernatorial appointments, but does not allow the appointee to run for re-election.
Whatever the details, more states ought to consider reforms like these. A Senate seat is a [bleeping] valuable thing -- too valuable to allow a governor to bypass the voters.
12.10.2008
What Does Harry Reid Want?
@ 11:52 PM
Chris Cillizza's characterization is that Harry Reid does not want a special election in Illinois, instead preferring that Rod Blagojevich vacate office so that his successor, Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn, is free to appoint a Democrat to the Senate. That is certainly one reasonable way to read Reid's letter, which I've reproduced below:
Still, I don't necessarily read this letter as Reid being opposed to a special election (although Cillizza may have additional information above and beyond the context the letter provides). True, Reid says he considers it "imperative that a new senator be seated as soon as possible". But Blagojevich's continuing presence not only threatens the Democrats' ability to make an appointment -- it also impairs the special election, because Illinois has to pass a new law to get one, and Blago could sit on that bill for 60 days before the state's pocket veto provision kicks in. That would take us to at least mid-February before the state could start to make provisions for a special election. Also, an appointment and a special election are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Illinois could pass a fast special elections law, but provide for a gubernatorial appointment in the meantime.
Reid also says that he wants a "Senator to be chosen and seated in a manner that would earn the confidence of the people of Illinois and all Americans". Now, from my vantage point, a special election would create far more confidence in the new Senator than any gubernatorial appointment could. (And by the way, while there are obviously special circumstances pertaining to this Illinois seat, I think the whole idea of gubernatorial appointments to the Senate is something that should be done away with.)
Perhaps Reid's vantage point differs. But if so, he's guilty of playing smallball. Presently, Obama is very popular; even if the Democrats have only 57 seats, Obama's going to get the Snowes and the Collinses and the Specters and the Voinoviches to line up with him more often than not for the next few months. When Obama is going to need those extra votes is more in the 6-18 month window, when the era of good feelings may abate as the public realizes the recession isn't likely to be a short one. But by that point, Illinois will have long since had its special election.
Of course, the Democrats might lose that special election; Republican Mark Kirk, who just won re-election in a D+4 seat, now says he'll run in the special, and will make for a reasonable opponent. But even if Kirk were to win -- and he's perhaps the only Illinois Republican who could -- the consequences are hardly so terrible for Democrats, as the seat will be up for election again in 2010, and as Kirk has been among the most moderate Republicans in the House. You think he's going to have the wherewithal to filibuster key pieces of legislation from an überpopular President from his home state? I certainly don't -- not if Kirk values his political future. Whenever Obama gets a Snowe or a Specter to line up with his legislation -- and he'll need at least one or two of those votes to get his agenda passed in the first place -- he'll in all likelihood be able to count on Kirk's support as well. Kirk might even campaign on promising to support the President on key pieces of his agenda.
By contrast, if the Illinois Democrats decided to backtrack on the special election, they'd risk losing to someone like Kirk in the six-year term that begins in 2010. They might also improve the Republicans' chances of winning the Illinois governorship, which is also up for renewal that year. Finally, they might do some damage to the Democrats at the national level.
Whatever his intentions with the Blagojevich letter, I don't think Reid should be spending one moment of his time lobbying against a special election. It's what the democracy needs -- and perhaps what the Democrats do too.
Dear Governor Blagojevich:Clearly, it does Democrats absolutely no good to have Blagojevich remain in office. If Blagojevich tries to appoint a senator, the Democrats have a public relations and legal mess on their hands. If he doesn't try and appoint a senator, the Democrats are temporarily out a Senate seat, and one additional vote short of the majority they'd need to break a filibuster, which would remain at 60 votes. (Exception: if Minnesota also can't seat a senator because of the recount, the cloture threshold goes down to 59 votes). Meanwhile, the Illinois legislature will presumably try and impeach Blagojevich, which will be ... well, a lot of fun to watch, but not the kind of distraction the Democrats want. The double-dip of the impeachment proceedings and the federal indictment could give Blago more face time than any crook since O.J. Simpson.
We write to insist that you step down as Governor of Illinois and under no circumstance make an appointment to fill the vacant Illinois Senate seat. In light of your arrest yesterday on alleged federal corruption charges related to that Senate seat, any appointment by you would raise serious questions.
It is within the authority of the Illinois legislature to remove your power to make this appointment by providing for a special election. But a decision by you to resign or to step aside under Article V of the Illinois Constitution would be the most expeditious way for a new Senator to be chosen and seated in a manner that would earn the confidence of the people of Illinois and all Americans. We consider it imperative that a new senator be seated as soon as possible so that Illinois is fully represented in the Senate as the important work of the 111th Congress moves forward.
Please understand that should you decide to ignore the request of the Senate Democratic Caucus and make an appointment we would be forced to exercise our Constitutional authority under Article I, Section 5, to determine whether such a person should be seated.
We do not prejudge the outcome of the criminal charges against you or question your constitutional right to contest those charges. But for the good of the Senate and our nation, we implore you refrain from making an appointment to the Senate.
Sincerely,
Harry Reid
Still, I don't necessarily read this letter as Reid being opposed to a special election (although Cillizza may have additional information above and beyond the context the letter provides). True, Reid says he considers it "imperative that a new senator be seated as soon as possible". But Blagojevich's continuing presence not only threatens the Democrats' ability to make an appointment -- it also impairs the special election, because Illinois has to pass a new law to get one, and Blago could sit on that bill for 60 days before the state's pocket veto provision kicks in. That would take us to at least mid-February before the state could start to make provisions for a special election. Also, an appointment and a special election are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Illinois could pass a fast special elections law, but provide for a gubernatorial appointment in the meantime.
Reid also says that he wants a "Senator to be chosen and seated in a manner that would earn the confidence of the people of Illinois and all Americans". Now, from my vantage point, a special election would create far more confidence in the new Senator than any gubernatorial appointment could. (And by the way, while there are obviously special circumstances pertaining to this Illinois seat, I think the whole idea of gubernatorial appointments to the Senate is something that should be done away with.)
Perhaps Reid's vantage point differs. But if so, he's guilty of playing smallball. Presently, Obama is very popular; even if the Democrats have only 57 seats, Obama's going to get the Snowes and the Collinses and the Specters and the Voinoviches to line up with him more often than not for the next few months. When Obama is going to need those extra votes is more in the 6-18 month window, when the era of good feelings may abate as the public realizes the recession isn't likely to be a short one. But by that point, Illinois will have long since had its special election.
Of course, the Democrats might lose that special election; Republican Mark Kirk, who just won re-election in a D+4 seat, now says he'll run in the special, and will make for a reasonable opponent. But even if Kirk were to win -- and he's perhaps the only Illinois Republican who could -- the consequences are hardly so terrible for Democrats, as the seat will be up for election again in 2010, and as Kirk has been among the most moderate Republicans in the House. You think he's going to have the wherewithal to filibuster key pieces of legislation from an überpopular President from his home state? I certainly don't -- not if Kirk values his political future. Whenever Obama gets a Snowe or a Specter to line up with his legislation -- and he'll need at least one or two of those votes to get his agenda passed in the first place -- he'll in all likelihood be able to count on Kirk's support as well. Kirk might even campaign on promising to support the President on key pieces of his agenda.
By contrast, if the Illinois Democrats decided to backtrack on the special election, they'd risk losing to someone like Kirk in the six-year term that begins in 2010. They might also improve the Republicans' chances of winning the Illinois governorship, which is also up for renewal that year. Finally, they might do some damage to the Democrats at the national level.
Whatever his intentions with the Blagojevich letter, I don't think Reid should be spending one moment of his time lobbying against a special election. It's what the democracy needs -- and perhaps what the Democrats do too.
Dems' Generic Ballot Advantage Dwindling
@ 6:24 PM
Post-election polling from Rasmussen Reports shows an erosion of support for Democrats on the Generic Congressional Ballot, although they remain preferred to Republicans.
In weekly polling conducted by Rasmussen since the General Election on November 4th, an average of 42.8 percent of likely voters have pledged their support to Democratic candidates, and 39.2 percent to Republicans, a gap of 3.6 percent. By comparison, across all Rasmussen polling conducted in 2008, the gap was 45.7 to 37.0, or 8.7 percent, although the margin was slightly smaller in the months immediately preceding the election.
It may also be noteworthy that the Democrats' numbers have decreased more than the Republicans' have increased, with more voters moving into the undecided category. There will probably be some resistance to the Republican brand for some time to come; on the other hand, Democrats may no longer be able to count on winning by default in races where they've nominated marginal candidates (see for instance the recent races in Georgia and Louisiana). In the event that things go poorly for the Democrats but that the Republican brand has not yet recovered -- or is tarnished by party infighting -- 2010-2012 could also be an interesting cycle for third-party candidates.
Barack Obama, however, remains quite popular, with a 71% approval rating from Gallup and a 67% approval rating from Rasmussen, and may well enter the White House with the highest approval ratings of any elected president since Kennedy. In both surveys, Obama is at essentially his high-water marks; there was no immediate impact from the Blagogate scandal visible in today's set of numbers.
In weekly polling conducted by Rasmussen since the General Election on November 4th, an average of 42.8 percent of likely voters have pledged their support to Democratic candidates, and 39.2 percent to Republicans, a gap of 3.6 percent. By comparison, across all Rasmussen polling conducted in 2008, the gap was 45.7 to 37.0, or 8.7 percent, although the margin was slightly smaller in the months immediately preceding the election.
Rasmussen Generic Congressional Ballot
Period DEM GOP NET
2007 46.6% 35.6% D +11.0%
2008 (Pre-Election) 45.7% 37.0% D + 8.7%
__1Q 2008 43.7% 39.3% D + 4.4%
__2Q 2008 46.4% 36.3% D +10.1%
__3Q 2008 46.0% 35.6% D +10.4%
__4Q 2008 (Pre-Election) 45.6% 38.3% D + 7.3%
2008 -- Post-Election 42.8% 39.2% D + 3.6%
It's possible that this is a blip of some kind, or even that there's some sort of seasonality in these numbers -- the Dems' generic ballot advantage was smaller in early 2008, for instance, before subsequently recovering to the 7-10 point range. The Occam's Razor conclusion, however, is that Bush Fatigue was a significant part of the Republicans' problems, and that with the election of Senator Obama, that problem is now largely behind them. Democrats no longer get to play the underdog, which is usually an enviable position in American politics.It may also be noteworthy that the Democrats' numbers have decreased more than the Republicans' have increased, with more voters moving into the undecided category. There will probably be some resistance to the Republican brand for some time to come; on the other hand, Democrats may no longer be able to count on winning by default in races where they've nominated marginal candidates (see for instance the recent races in Georgia and Louisiana). In the event that things go poorly for the Democrats but that the Republican brand has not yet recovered -- or is tarnished by party infighting -- 2010-2012 could also be an interesting cycle for third-party candidates.
Barack Obama, however, remains quite popular, with a 71% approval rating from Gallup and a 67% approval rating from Rasmussen, and may well enter the White House with the highest approval ratings of any elected president since Kennedy. In both surveys, Obama is at essentially his high-water marks; there was no immediate impact from the Blagogate scandal visible in today's set of numbers.
The Mountain West: America's New Swing Region
@ 9:32 AM
As the Republican Party regroups and reassesses its electoral strategy, it's important to understand what happened in the Mountain West. Electorally, the emergence of the Mountain West as a true swing region puts backbreaking pressure on the Republican Party to nominate presidential candidates who appeal to moderates and independents.
Let's take a look at what happened in the eight Mountain West states, including John McCain's home state of Arizona. What was one election cycle ago a whitewash region for Republicans has morphed into a true swing region. Consider that heading into the 2004 elections, Republicans held 33 of 44 Congressional seats and swept all 44 electoral votes. After 2008, Republicans hold 20 of 44 seats in Congress and essentially split the Mountain West, winning 25-19 in the electoral vote tally.
John McCain essentially repeated the Bush vote in the Mountain West. Overall, McCain won 99.14% of Bush's total, dropping less than one percent.
So what happened? While those who argue that the excitement of the first black candidate on a national ticket inspired millions of new voters in places like North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida, that's not an easy answer in the Mountain West, which is mostly rural and has few African-Americans.
Barack Obama created nearly 900,000 new voters, through both a strong message and pounding shoe leather of his vast and talented organizing force. These organizers held single-minded focus on voter registration. Voter registration in huge leaps like we saw in Nevada, Pennsylvania and Virginia doesn't happen on its own.
(While ACORN became a bitter complaint down the home stretch of the campaign, nobody who can be taken seriously believes this was an issue or in any way relates to this voter registration surge. If I work for ACORN and choose to defraud that employer so that they pay me an extra five bucks for registering "Mickey Mouse," I haven't cryogenically created Mickey Mouse in a lab somewhere who then goes and votes. I do it because I want the extra ACORN cash. ACORN, in turn, is legally obligated to turn in all voter registration forms it collects, even ones it segregates out as highly suspect.)
On the Republican side of the coin, during our trip across America in the final eight weeks of the campaign to chronicle each campaign's field program, we routinely encountered an attitude from Republicans that made us think: cruise control. They simply didn't believe -- and told us directly -- that Obama would create the new voters needed.
The machine Republicans have built up over the years, integrated with what was once a strong technological edge that has now evaporated, essentially worked in the Mountain West. While Republicans probably didn't hit their vote goals in the Mountain West (vote goals are generally set ambitiously high), the story in the region is how the West was won by Obama and the Democratic candidates, not lost by McCain and Republican candidates.
This conclusion, at least regionally, comes at a time when "the now-established consensus is that Obama did very well in getting out his vote; but his 7 point margin of victory was largely accomplished by former Republican voters staying home."
As a result of the Mountain West swing, the region-wide Bush-Kerry gap of 14.82% and 1,177,675 votes dropped to 263,062 votes and only 2.98% between McCain and Obama. The closest state that matches this gap is Montana, which McCain won by 2.26%.
Even in McCain's home state of Arizona, Obama gained nearly 16% on John Kerry's total. The Obama-McCain margin there (McCain by 8.52%) was lower than the Bush-Kerry margin (Bush by 10.47%) by nearly two percent. Even where McCain improved on Bush in the Mountain West, Obama improved more.
To take comfort in the theory that "you can only vote to elect the first black president once," as one of the great hacks would prefer to hope, such wishful thinking doesn't work in the Mountain West, where Obama's success cannot be attributed to high black turnout. John McCain won more voters in Colorado and Nevada than John Kerry, but McCain wasn't even close against Obama in those states.
In Nevada and New Mexico, new voter registration numbers were 5-7 times the losing 2004 presidential margins of 21,500 and 5,988 respectively. Obama won in Nevada by a hair under 120,000 votes and over 12%, and New Mexico by over 125,000 and over 15%. With the new voter registrations, those states can be considered blue until further notice.
Those ten electoral votes are roughly balanced by the twelve from Wyoming, Utah and Idaho that Republicans have on lockdown. Montana is the closest state, which Obama lost by 2.26%. Colorado (Obama +8.95%) and Arizona (McCain +8.52%) are mirrors of each other, though without McCain on the ballot it seems clear that state would have been much, much closer.
How can we be sure of that? There are 281 counties in the Mountain West, and 266 outside of Arizona. Although Obama only improved on the Kerry-Bush margin in 7 of 15 counties in Arizona, still quite an accomplishment in his opponent's home turf, he improved on the Kerry-Bush margin in a staggering 265 of 266 counties in the other seven states. The only county that regressed? Wyoming's second smallest county, Hot Springs, where McCain improved on Bush's margin by a minuscule 0.22%. This is a tiny oil and gas county that produced 2,480 votes in 2004 and only 2,546 in 2008.
Obama improved the D:R margin in all 64 Colorado counties, all 56 Montana counties, all 44 Idaho counties, all 33 New Mexico counties, all 29 Utah counties, all 17 Nevada counties, and 22 of 23 Wyoming counties.
In the two Mountain West states we can safely say are now structurally Democratic given voter registration totals (Nevada and New Mexico), Obama improved by double digits in 43 of those states' 50 counties. Half of those 50 counties drew 10,000 votes and above, and Obama improved by double digits in 23 of 25 of those.
(One of those two outliers was Nye County, Nevada, where we encountered one of the few obvious Republican organizer readers of FiveThirtyEight, and Obama only failed to improve on the Kerry-Bush margin by double digits because McCain improved on Bush by 12.35%, McCain's best county improvement outside of Arizona aside from tiny Sublette County, Wyoming).
Moreover, Obama won 66 counties outright, an improvement by 25 counties over Kerry. Stunningly, Obama won Salt Lake County, Utah by 296 votes. He also flipped Summit and Grand counties in 2004's all-red Beehive State. Obama flipped Washoe and Carson City in Nevada. Obama flipped Albany County, Wyoming and two counties in Idaho, Latah and Teton. In Colorado, while McCain held Garfield County (Glenwood Springs) by two votes and Chaffee County (Salida) by 13 votes, Obama flipped Denver's suburban Broomfield County, as well as Alamosa and Huerfano counties in south central Colorado, and Ouray County on the Western Slope.
In New Mexico, Obama flipped Sandoval and Valencia counties to the north and south of Albuquerque, as well as adjoining Los Alamos County. He flipped Colfax County in the northeast and Luna and Hidalgo counties in the southwest of New Mexico. Finally, Obama flipped seven Montana counties, including Gallatin (Bozeman), Cascade (Great Falls), and Lewis and Clark (Helena). Obama also flipped Lake, Hill, Rosebud and Blaine counties, in no small part because Native voters turned out.
Though Obama didn't win Montana, that state has clearly shifted back from an all-red enclave. Given the success of Brian Schweitzer, Jon Tester, and Obama's dramatic gap-closing vote gains in Montana, it's clear that the Democratic Party brand as a whole has made dramatic gains in what is now the swing region's swing state.
Given all the foregoing, it's time to bring around the point we made at the outset, about how the Mountain West shift breaks the back of Republican base presidential candidacies.
Consider the electoral advantages Democrats hold elsewhere. Democrats have strong holds on the following: 77 EVs on the Pacific Coast (CA, OR, WA, HI), 117 EVs in the Northeast (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, DE, PA, MD, DC) and 65 EVs in the Upper Midwest (MI, WI, MN, IA, IL), accounting for 259 electoral votes.
It's hard to quibble with states on that list, as far as being susceptible to a Republican running for the presidency who doesn't strongly appeal to moderates and at least some Democrats. Maybe Iowa, where Bush won in 2004, but that state has seen a shift to Democratic voting in 2006 and 2008. Though Pennsylvania has been considered a swing state in recent cycles, that can be put to rest with this election, which saw a blowout win by Obama and a structural edge of 52% registration. The other Upper Midwest states proved easy Democratic wins.
Given that Democrats have broken through and are in clear control along partisan registration lines in Nevada and New Mexico, those ten electoral votes put the Democratic candidate at a minimum tie, with one more EV needed for a clear win. Republicans could even regain Florida, Ohio, Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Colorado and Omaha, Nebraska and still lose the presidency.
If Republicans want to draw some kind of conclusion that they're on the rebound given Louisiana House seats and Georgia's expected victory, which we put at 88% likelihood before November 4, it may delay the urgency to revamp the party so that it can compete nationally in places like Colorado and Michigan. That denial is unequivocally good for Democrats. The Chambliss victory in Georgia disguises the fact that nationally, at the presidential level, the Republican base is too small and generates too few electoral votes. Republican lockup of the Plains, Deep South and Appalachia just isn't enough. Republicans can't simply point fingers at the media and insist it was all Obama favoritism and ACORN, a refrain we heard from Republican phonebankers -- where they existed -- coast to coast.
It's uncomfortable to play the concern troll role of declaring what Republicans need to do to fix their party. That's for the party and its members to decide. But we can point out that Obama won 283 electoral votes by 9 points or more, and 263 by double digits. As the Mountain West shows, coming to the conclusion that Obama 2008 was a perfect storm that will pass ignores the reality of the massive voter registration edges that storm leaves behind in places like Pennsylvania and Nevada.
Moreover, Republicans are on the losing end of the age and racial demographic shifts. Young voters and Latinos went overwhelmingly for Democrats. First time voters tend to brand themselves to one party, and that's nothing but good news for Democrats. Folks like Michael Barone will continue to write pieces about how the kids won't show up in the future, and Democrats should encourage that kind of straw-grasping. Democrats have caught up in the field program technology that gave Republicans a kind of false comfort in at least a several-point field turnout cushion.
The attitude was, "until you knock us out, the champ is the champ." Well, consider 2008 a knockout.
Let's take a look at what happened in the eight Mountain West states, including John McCain's home state of Arizona. What was one election cycle ago a whitewash region for Republicans has morphed into a true swing region. Consider that heading into the 2004 elections, Republicans held 33 of 44 Congressional seats and swept all 44 electoral votes. After 2008, Republicans hold 20 of 44 seats in Congress and essentially split the Mountain West, winning 25-19 in the electoral vote tally.
John McCain essentially repeated the Bush vote in the Mountain West. Overall, McCain won 99.14% of Bush's total, dropping less than one percent.
So what happened? While those who argue that the excitement of the first black candidate on a national ticket inspired millions of new voters in places like North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida, that's not an easy answer in the Mountain West, which is mostly rural and has few African-Americans.
Barack Obama created nearly 900,000 new voters, through both a strong message and pounding shoe leather of his vast and talented organizing force. These organizers held single-minded focus on voter registration. Voter registration in huge leaps like we saw in Nevada, Pennsylvania and Virginia doesn't happen on its own.
(While ACORN became a bitter complaint down the home stretch of the campaign, nobody who can be taken seriously believes this was an issue or in any way relates to this voter registration surge. If I work for ACORN and choose to defraud that employer so that they pay me an extra five bucks for registering "Mickey Mouse," I haven't cryogenically created Mickey Mouse in a lab somewhere who then goes and votes. I do it because I want the extra ACORN cash. ACORN, in turn, is legally obligated to turn in all voter registration forms it collects, even ones it segregates out as highly suspect.)
On the Republican side of the coin, during our trip across America in the final eight weeks of the campaign to chronicle each campaign's field program, we routinely encountered an attitude from Republicans that made us think: cruise control. They simply didn't believe -- and told us directly -- that Obama would create the new voters needed.
The machine Republicans have built up over the years, integrated with what was once a strong technological edge that has now evaporated, essentially worked in the Mountain West. While Republicans probably didn't hit their vote goals in the Mountain West (vote goals are generally set ambitiously high), the story in the region is how the West was won by Obama and the Democratic candidates, not lost by McCain and Republican candidates.
This conclusion, at least regionally, comes at a time when "the now-established consensus is that Obama did very well in getting out his vote; but his 7 point margin of victory was largely accomplished by former Republican voters staying home."
As a result of the Mountain West swing, the region-wide Bush-Kerry gap of 14.82% and 1,177,675 votes dropped to 263,062 votes and only 2.98% between McCain and Obama. The closest state that matches this gap is Montana, which McCain won by 2.26%.
Even in McCain's home state of Arizona, Obama gained nearly 16% on John Kerry's total. The Obama-McCain margin there (McCain by 8.52%) was lower than the Bush-Kerry margin (Bush by 10.47%) by nearly two percent. Even where McCain improved on Bush in the Mountain West, Obama improved more.
To take comfort in the theory that "you can only vote to elect the first black president once," as one of the great hacks would prefer to hope, such wishful thinking doesn't work in the Mountain West, where Obama's success cannot be attributed to high black turnout. John McCain won more voters in Colorado and Nevada than John Kerry, but McCain wasn't even close against Obama in those states.
In Nevada and New Mexico, new voter registration numbers were 5-7 times the losing 2004 presidential margins of 21,500 and 5,988 respectively. Obama won in Nevada by a hair under 120,000 votes and over 12%, and New Mexico by over 125,000 and over 15%. With the new voter registrations, those states can be considered blue until further notice.
Those ten electoral votes are roughly balanced by the twelve from Wyoming, Utah and Idaho that Republicans have on lockdown. Montana is the closest state, which Obama lost by 2.26%. Colorado (Obama +8.95%) and Arizona (McCain +8.52%) are mirrors of each other, though without McCain on the ballot it seems clear that state would have been much, much closer.
How can we be sure of that? There are 281 counties in the Mountain West, and 266 outside of Arizona. Although Obama only improved on the Kerry-Bush margin in 7 of 15 counties in Arizona, still quite an accomplishment in his opponent's home turf, he improved on the Kerry-Bush margin in a staggering 265 of 266 counties in the other seven states. The only county that regressed? Wyoming's second smallest county, Hot Springs, where McCain improved on Bush's margin by a minuscule 0.22%. This is a tiny oil and gas county that produced 2,480 votes in 2004 and only 2,546 in 2008.
Obama improved the D:R margin in all 64 Colorado counties, all 56 Montana counties, all 44 Idaho counties, all 33 New Mexico counties, all 29 Utah counties, all 17 Nevada counties, and 22 of 23 Wyoming counties.
In the two Mountain West states we can safely say are now structurally Democratic given voter registration totals (Nevada and New Mexico), Obama improved by double digits in 43 of those states' 50 counties. Half of those 50 counties drew 10,000 votes and above, and Obama improved by double digits in 23 of 25 of those.
(One of those two outliers was Nye County, Nevada, where we encountered one of the few obvious Republican organizer readers of FiveThirtyEight, and Obama only failed to improve on the Kerry-Bush margin by double digits because McCain improved on Bush by 12.35%, McCain's best county improvement outside of Arizona aside from tiny Sublette County, Wyoming).
Moreover, Obama won 66 counties outright, an improvement by 25 counties over Kerry. Stunningly, Obama won Salt Lake County, Utah by 296 votes. He also flipped Summit and Grand counties in 2004's all-red Beehive State. Obama flipped Washoe and Carson City in Nevada. Obama flipped Albany County, Wyoming and two counties in Idaho, Latah and Teton. In Colorado, while McCain held Garfield County (Glenwood Springs) by two votes and Chaffee County (Salida) by 13 votes, Obama flipped Denver's suburban Broomfield County, as well as Alamosa and Huerfano counties in south central Colorado, and Ouray County on the Western Slope.
In New Mexico, Obama flipped Sandoval and Valencia counties to the north and south of Albuquerque, as well as adjoining Los Alamos County. He flipped Colfax County in the northeast and Luna and Hidalgo counties in the southwest of New Mexico. Finally, Obama flipped seven Montana counties, including Gallatin (Bozeman), Cascade (Great Falls), and Lewis and Clark (Helena). Obama also flipped Lake, Hill, Rosebud and Blaine counties, in no small part because Native voters turned out.
Though Obama didn't win Montana, that state has clearly shifted back from an all-red enclave. Given the success of Brian Schweitzer, Jon Tester, and Obama's dramatic gap-closing vote gains in Montana, it's clear that the Democratic Party brand as a whole has made dramatic gains in what is now the swing region's swing state.
Given all the foregoing, it's time to bring around the point we made at the outset, about how the Mountain West shift breaks the back of Republican base presidential candidacies.
Consider the electoral advantages Democrats hold elsewhere. Democrats have strong holds on the following: 77 EVs on the Pacific Coast (CA, OR, WA, HI), 117 EVs in the Northeast (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, DE, PA, MD, DC) and 65 EVs in the Upper Midwest (MI, WI, MN, IA, IL), accounting for 259 electoral votes.
It's hard to quibble with states on that list, as far as being susceptible to a Republican running for the presidency who doesn't strongly appeal to moderates and at least some Democrats. Maybe Iowa, where Bush won in 2004, but that state has seen a shift to Democratic voting in 2006 and 2008. Though Pennsylvania has been considered a swing state in recent cycles, that can be put to rest with this election, which saw a blowout win by Obama and a structural edge of 52% registration. The other Upper Midwest states proved easy Democratic wins.
Given that Democrats have broken through and are in clear control along partisan registration lines in Nevada and New Mexico, those ten electoral votes put the Democratic candidate at a minimum tie, with one more EV needed for a clear win. Republicans could even regain Florida, Ohio, Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, Colorado and Omaha, Nebraska and still lose the presidency.
If Republicans want to draw some kind of conclusion that they're on the rebound given Louisiana House seats and Georgia's expected victory, which we put at 88% likelihood before November 4, it may delay the urgency to revamp the party so that it can compete nationally in places like Colorado and Michigan. That denial is unequivocally good for Democrats. The Chambliss victory in Georgia disguises the fact that nationally, at the presidential level, the Republican base is too small and generates too few electoral votes. Republican lockup of the Plains, Deep South and Appalachia just isn't enough. Republicans can't simply point fingers at the media and insist it was all Obama favoritism and ACORN, a refrain we heard from Republican phonebankers -- where they existed -- coast to coast.
It's uncomfortable to play the concern troll role of declaring what Republicans need to do to fix their party. That's for the party and its members to decide. But we can point out that Obama won 283 electoral votes by 9 points or more, and 263 by double digits. As the Mountain West shows, coming to the conclusion that Obama 2008 was a perfect storm that will pass ignores the reality of the massive voter registration edges that storm leaves behind in places like Pennsylvania and Nevada.
Moreover, Republicans are on the losing end of the age and racial demographic shifts. Young voters and Latinos went overwhelmingly for Democrats. First time voters tend to brand themselves to one party, and that's nothing but good news for Democrats. Folks like Michael Barone will continue to write pieces about how the kids won't show up in the future, and Democrats should encourage that kind of straw-grasping. Democrats have caught up in the field program technology that gave Republicans a kind of false comfort in at least a several-point field turnout cushion.
The attitude was, "until you knock us out, the champ is the champ." Well, consider 2008 a knockout.
What Jake Tapper Doesn't Know About What Obama Knew
@ 1:22 AM
I can't say I'd give Barack Obama high marks for his handling of the Rod Blagojevich indictment today. But some reporting is being a little presumptuous about what the President-elect and his team might or might not have known. As Jake Tapper writes:
Then there's the big question about how Blago was so sure -- so angry -- that Team Obama would not pay to play.One needs to remember that the bulk of the criminal complaint against Blagojevich consists of somewhat delusional, masturbatory and half-baked schemes discussed between Blagojevich and his advisers. On the other hand, there are relatively few conversations between Blagojevich and representatives of any of the various Senate candidates, and when such conversations do occur, Blagojevich proceeds at least somewhat more cautiously.
Who in the Obama Team was talking to the Governor's office?
When they found out that Blago wanted to quid pro quo Team Obama (Jarrett gets the Senate seat if Blago gets a Cabinet position, or a good-paying job with a union-affiliated organization, or his wife gets a seat on some corporate boards) what did they do?
Let's look at the meat of Fitzgerald's complaint:
101. On November 10, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH, his wife, JOHN HARRIS, Governor General Counsel, and various Washington-D.C. based advisors, including Advisor B, discussed the open Senate seat during a conference call. (The Washington D.C.-based advisors to ROD BLAGOJEVICH are believed to have participated on this call from Washington D.C.). Various individuals participated at different times during the call. The call lasted for approximately two hours, and what follows are simply summaries of various portions of the two-hour call.At this point, November 10th, Blagojevich is obviously aware of Valerie Jarrett's ("Candidate 1's") prospective interest in the position. However, it would also appear that to this point, Blagojevich had not yet asked for any sort of quid-pro-quo in exchange for her appointment. Hence, the language that Blagojevich "should ask the President-elect for something".
[...]
c. ROD BLAGOJEVICH said that the consultants (Advisor B and another consultant are believed to be on the call at that time) are telling him that he has to “suck it up” for two years and do nothing and give this “motherfucker [the President-elect] his senator. Fuck him. For nothing? Fuck him.” ROD BLAGOJEVICH states that he will put 64 “[Senate Candidate 4]” in the Senate “before I just give fucking [Senate Candidate 1] a fucking Senate seat and I don’t get anything.” (Senate Candidate 4 is a Deputy Governor of the State of Illinois). ROD BLAGOJEVICH stated that he needs to find a way to take the “financial stress” off of his family and that his wife is as qualified or more qualified than another specifically named individual to sit on corporate boards. According to ROD BLAGOJEVICH, “the immediate challenge [is] how do we take some of the financial pressure off of our family.” Later in the phone call, ROD BLAGOJEVICH stated that absent getting something back, ROD BLAGOJEVICH will not pick Senate Candidate 1. HARRIS re-stated ROD BLAGOJEVICH’s thoughts that they should ask the President-elect for something for ROD BLAGOJEVICH’s financial security as well as maintain his political viability. HARRIS said they could work out a three-way deal with SEIU and the President-elect where SEIU could help the President-elect with ROD BLAGOJEVICH’s appointment of Senate Candidate 1 to the vacant Senate seat, ROD BLAGOJEVICH would obtain a position as the National Director of the Change to Win campaign, and SEIU would get something favorable from the President-elect in the future.
Blagojevich, certainly, is highly frustrated by the situation. That could represent any number of things -- perhaps Blagojevich recognizes that it will be very difficult to wring anything out of Obama, a conclusion that one could reasonably come to without actually having asked anything of him. Obama's having signaled his support for Jarrett is a nuisance to him; Blagojevich would rather be left to his own devices, free to play the various candidates off of one another.
104. On November 11, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH talked with JOHN HARRIS about the Senate seat. ROD BLAGOJEVICH suggested starting a 501(c)(4) organization (a non-profit organization that may engage in political activity and lobbying) and getting “his (believed to be the President-elect’s) friend Warren Buffett or some of those guys to help us on something like that.” HARRIS asked, “what, for you?” ROD BLAGOJEVICH replied, “yeah.” Later in the conversation, ROD BLAGOJEVICH stated that if he appoints Senate Candidate 4 to the Senate seat and, thereafter, it appears that ROD BLAGOJEVICH might get impeached, he could “count on [Senate Candidate 4], if things got hot, to give [the Senate seat] up and let me parachute over there.” HARRIS said, “you can count on [Senate Candidate 4] to do that.” 104. On November 11, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH talked with JOHN HARRIS about the Senate seat. ROD BLAGOJEVICH suggested starting a 501(c)(4) organization (a non-profit organization that may engage in political activity and lobbying) and getting “his (believed to be the President-elect’s) friend Warren Buffett or some of those guys to help us on something like that.” HARRIS asked, “what, for you?” ROD BLAGOJEVICH replied, “yeah.” Later in the conversation, ROD BLAGOJEVICH stated that if he appoints Senate Candidate 4 to the Senate seat and, thereafter, it appears that ROD BLAGOJEVICH might get impeached, he could “count on [Senate Candidate 4], if things got hot, to give [the Senate seat] up and let me parachute over there.” HARRIS said, “you can count on [Senate Candidate 4] to do that.” Later in the conversation, ROD BLAGOJEVICH said he knows that the President-elect wants Senate Candidate 1 for the Senate seat but “they’re not willing to give me anything except appreciation. Fuck them.”The next day, Blagojevich comes up with an idea: perhaps a 501(c)(4) can be set up for him; presumably he could gain money and stature by being the chief executive of such a 501(c)(4). (A 501(c)(4) is a nonprofit interest group; examples include the AARP and the NAACP, although others are more overtly partisan). Perhaps the 501(c)(4) idea is something that can be peddled to Obama without seeming too overtly corrupt, something closer to the 'favor' end of the spectrum than the 'bribe' end.
[...]
ROD BLAGOJEVICH asked, “if I get [Senate Candidate 6] to do something like that, is it worth giving him the Senate seat?” Advisor A responded that it would be hard to put Senate Candidate 6 in the Senate seat. ROD BLAGOJEVICH said that it would be better than putting Senate Candidate 1 in the Senate and not getting anything back. Later in the conversation, ROD BLAGOJEVICH and Advisor A again discussed the possibility of a 501(c)(4) organization, and ROD BLAGOJEVICH again noted that “[Senate Candidate 6]” could “do it.” ROD BLAGOJEVICH and Advisor A discussed who might be close to Senate Candidate 6 to talk with him about the issue, because ROD BLAGOJEVICH did not “want to be the one to ask something like that.” Advisor A agreed to find out who is close to Senate Candidate 6.
Also note that Blagojevich is at least somewhat aware of his need to use discretion. In a subsequent conversation about a different candidate ("Candidate 6"), he suggests that he would be uncomfortable expressing the 501(c)(4) idea directly to the candidate, and seeks an intermediate.
106. On November 12, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH talked with JOHN HARRIS. ROD BLAGOJEVICH noted that CNN is reporting that Senate Candidate 1 does not want the open Senate seat. HARRIS said he thought that is just a tactic.The following day, Blagojeivch hears reports that Jarrett is not interested in the Senate seat (Ed -- These reports were circulating as early as November 10th). Nevertheless, he arranges a phone call with "SEIU Official", believed to be Andy Stern, whom he had also spoken to a week earlier. In this conversation, Blagjoveich brings up the idea of the 501(c)(4). However, he does so somewhat obliquely, not expressly discussing the idea in terms of a quid-pro-quo.
[...]
109. On November 12, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH spoke with SEIU Official, who was in Washington, D.C. Prior intercepted phone conversations indicate that approximately a week before this call, ROD BLAGOJEVICH met with SEIU Official to discuss the vacant Senate seat, and ROD BLAGOJEVICH understood that SEIU Official was an emissary to discuss Senate Candidate 1’s interest in the Senate seat. During the conversation with SEIU Official on November 12, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH informed SEIU Official that he had heard the President-elect wanted persons other than Senate Candidate 1 to be considered for the Senate seat. SEIU Official stated that he would find out if Senate Candidate 1 wanted SEIU Official to keep pushing her for Senator with ROD BLAGOJEVICH. ROD BLAGOJEVICH said that “one thing I’d be interested in” is a 501(c)(4) organization. ROD BLAGOJEVICH explained the 501(c)(4) idea to SEIU Official and said that the 501(c)(4) could help “our new Senator [Senate Candidate 1].” SEIU Official agreed to “put that flag up and see where it goes.”
112. On November 13, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH talked with JOHN HARRIS. ROD BLAGOJEVICH said he wanted to be able to call “[President-elect Advisor]” and tell President-elect Advisor that “this has nothing to do with anything else we’re working on but the Governor wants to put together a 501(c)(4)” and “can you guys help him. . . raise 10, 15 million.” ROD BLAGOJEVICH said he wanted “[President-elect Advisor] to get the word today,” and that when “he asks me for the Fifth CD thing I want it to be in his head.” (The reference to the “Fifth CD thing” is believed to relate to a seat in the United States House of Representatives from Illinois’ Fifth Congressional District. Prior intercepted phone conversations indicate that ROD BLAGOJEVICH and others were determining whether ROD BLAGOJEVICH has the power to appoint an interim replacement until a special election for the seat can be held.).Apparently feeling uncertain about whether Stern got his message, the next day Blagojevich brings up the idea of discussing the 501(c)(4) idea directly with an adviser to President Obama (which Stern is not). Blagojevich understands that any such discussions would need to be very discreet ("it's unsaid, it's unsaid"; "this has nothing to do with anything else we're working on") and involve several degrees of separation between him and the transition team (his adviser would call an intermediary, who would then call the Obama adviser, whose rank or title isn't known).
113. Also on November 13, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH talked with Advisor A. ROD BLAGOJEVICH said he wants the idea of the 501(c)(4) in President-elect Advisor’s head, but not in connection with the Senate appointment or the congressional seat. Advisor A asked whether the conversation about the 501(c)(4) with President-elect Advisor is connected with anything else. ROD BLAGOJEVICH replied that “it’s unsaid. It’s unsaid.”
114. Later on November 13, 2008, ROD BLAGOJEVICH spoke with Advisor A. ROD BLAGOJEVICH asked Advisor A to call Individual A and have Individual A pitch the idea of the 501(c)(4) to “[President-elect Advisor].” Advisor A said that, “while it’s not said this is a play to put in play other things.” ROD BLAGOJEVICH responded, “correct.” Advisor A asked if this is “because we think there’s still some life in [Senate Candidate 1] potentially?” ROD BLAGOJEVICH said, “not so much her, but possibly her. But others.”
The complaint never says whether this conversation actually took place. One day later, however, on November 14th, Jarrett is named to the White House staff, rendering any further discussions moot.
*-*
So what did the President-elect's team know? Perhaps not a whole lot. We know that Blagojevich had at least two conversations with an SEIU official, probably Andy Stern; Stern is certainly well-connected, but has no formal role with the Obama transition team. In the second of these conversations, Blagojevich broached the idea of setting up a 501(c)(4). He does so somewhat discretely, only loosely tying it to Jarrett, whom at that point may already have become disinterested in the Senate seat. Within 48 hours, Jarrett is named to the White House staff, effectively removing her from consideration for the Senate.
And that's really all that we know. It's certainly possible, and maybe somewhat probable, that there were other conversations outside of what is described in the criminal complaint, but at that point we're just guessing: there is no specific allegation that Blagojevich had any direct discussion with a member of Team Obama.
Stern is whip-smart; in either or both of his conversations with Blagojevich, he may well have picked up an uncomfortable vibe, and that might well have contributed to Jarrett's apparent decision to withdraw herself from consideration from the Senate seat. However, there is probably some sort of purgatory between a conversation that would make you uncomfortable, and a conversation that you would report to the FBI. Blagojevich was buffoonish in his conversations with his advisers, but far less so in his conversation with outside parties, with whom he understood the need to cover his ass and be discreet.
So to answer Tapper's questions:
Then there's the big question about how Blago was so sure -- so angry -- that Team Obama would not pay to play.Perhaps because Obama's the fraking President-elect and you don't shake down the President-elect. That's not something you should need to be told. Behind the scenes, Blagojevich dreamed of being omnipotent, but he may have recognized his impotence when it came to Obama; that is something that would have made him angry.
Who in the Obama Team was talking to the Governor's office?Andy Stern was talking to Blago. Andy Stern is close to Team Obama, and pretty much everyone else in the "new" Democratic Party, but he isn't a part of Team Obama. (This is probably no accident. For any number of reasons -- for instance, not wanting to upset his colleagues in Illinois by lobbying against their ascendancy to the Senate -- it might have been useful to Obama to have some insulation between the transition team and Blagojevich.) It's not clear from Fitzgerald's complaint that Blagojevich had conversations with anyone but Stern about Jarrett, although he was certainly contemplating doing so.
When they found out that Blago wanted to quid pro quo Team Obama (Jarrett gets the Senate seat if Blago gets a Cabinet position, or a good-paying job with a union-affiliated organization, or his wife gets a seat on some corporate boards) what did they do?Tapper is confusing what Blagojevich discussed with his kitchen cabinet with what he discussed with Stern. Some of the more labyrinthine schemes that he and his advisers hatched would have sounded crazy -- the only idea that we know he broached with Stern was that of the 501(c)(4), and he did so very discretely.
Blagojevich is an imbecile, but he has at least some street smarts, or he would not have gotten as far as he did. It's not like Blagojevich picked up the Red Phone, called David Alexrod, and demanded to be Secretary of State. That doesn't make him any less guilty, but one needs to remember that it's the FBI that was tapping Blagoveich's phone, and not the President-elect.
12.09.2008
Senate Might Not Have Authority to Reject Blago Appointment
@ 9:39 PM
Contrary to much reporting -- including some of our own - the U.S. Senate probably lacks the Constitutional authority to refuse to seat an appointment made by indicated Governor Rod Blagojevich. As a law school friend writes:
This places even more pressure on the Illinois Legislature to impeach Blagojevich, who in all likelihood is too delusional and/or too stupid to resign his seat. Impeachments have been a rarity in Illinois, and the state's Constitution does not establish specific grounds for a conviction on impeachment proceedings (that is, there's nothing analogous to "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" as stated in the US Constitution). But nobody stands anything to gain by defending Blagojevich and he'd seem like a longshot to survive an impeachment trial, even if the legislature is somewhat making up the precedents as it goes along.
EDIT: Short of impeaching Blagojevich, the Illinois Legislature could also rewrite its appointments law in conjunction with establishing a special elections procedure, removing the governor's power to make an appointment, as some states like Oregon have done. See Adam B's legal explainer for more. FURTHER UPDATE: Crain's Chicago Business suggests this is exactly what the state legislature will try and do.
FYI. If the Supreme Court took the case, It isn't clear that the Senate has the Constitutional authority to refuse to seat a senator who has been validly appointed under the Constitution.The tricky part here is that Article 1 of the Constitution stipulates that the Senate is the "Judge of Elections, Returns and Qualifications" of its own members. The Senate actually has fairly broad latitude on questions of "Elections and Returns", which is why it could intervene, say, in the Minnesota recount (as it has done in similar cases in the past). An appointment, however, is not an election, which means the only vehicle open to the Senate is challenging the appointee's qualifications, and the Powell v McCormack precedent stipulates that such a review would be limited to his age, residency or citizenship. What the Senate would have to do instead is actually expel the member they just admitted to the chamber, which requires a 2/3 majority and would be much stickier in terms of precedent -- the Senate has not expelled a member since the Civil War.
Art I Section 5 says that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members..."
In Powell v McCormack, the Court held that the House of Reps couldn't refuse to seat Adam Clayton Powell as long as he met the Constitution's qualifications for membership (age, residency, citizenship.).
I guess, theoretically, the Senate could seat the appointee and then expel him with a 2/3rds vote. The Court wouldn't interfere on Political Question grounds: the Constitution doesn't specify the standard for expulsion so it is properly at the discretion of the Senate.
This places even more pressure on the Illinois Legislature to impeach Blagojevich, who in all likelihood is too delusional and/or too stupid to resign his seat. Impeachments have been a rarity in Illinois, and the state's Constitution does not establish specific grounds for a conviction on impeachment proceedings (that is, there's nothing analogous to "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" as stated in the US Constitution). But nobody stands anything to gain by defending Blagojevich and he'd seem like a longshot to survive an impeachment trial, even if the legislature is somewhat making up the precedents as it goes along.
EDIT: Short of impeaching Blagojevich, the Illinois Legislature could also rewrite its appointments law in conjunction with establishing a special elections procedure, removing the governor's power to make an appointment, as some states like Oregon have done. See Adam B's legal explainer for more. FURTHER UPDATE: Crain's Chicago Business suggests this is exactly what the state legislature will try and do.
Illinois: What Happens Next
@ 7:25 PM
Reports are that the Illinois Legislature will meet in a special session ASAP, and call for a special election to be held sometime in early 2009 to fill the senate seat formerly held by Barack Obama. This is one way to sidestep the possibility that Rod Blagojevich will still try and appoint Obama's successor. Contrary to our earlier reporting, the Senate probably lacks the authority to reject Blagojevich's appointee outright (although it could feasibly try and expel him from the Senate). Assuming that the special election goes forward, here is a sense for the timing it might entail.
1. How long will it take to hold the Special Election?
When members of the House depart, they are routinely subject to special elections. Between the 109th and 110th Congresses, there was an average gap of 106 days between the departure of a sitting House member and the swearing in of his replacement following a Special Election. This gap, however, varied significantly from seat to seat, from a minimum of 19 days (Donna Edwards replacing Al Wynn in MD-4, whom she had already primaried out) to a maximum of 194 (Duke Cunningham's seat in CA-50). We exclude cases in which the state waited until the subsequent General Election to select a replacement, as happens occasionally.
The states generally have broad latitude for how they want to conduct their special elections. In some cases, the governor will call for nominations from each party, effectively bypassing the primary phase. In other cases, such as in California, candidates from all parties will compete in a "jungle primary", with a runoff to be held between the top two candidates if no candidate achieves 50 percent of the vote. In still others, of course, the state will hold both a special primary and a special general election; this is what happened in IL-14 after Dennis Hastert resigned, which required a total turnaround time of 106 days.
We don't know what Illinois will do, because it does not have a fast special elections law for Senate vacancies and will literally be writing the rules as it goes along. But with several viable candidates on either side it is safe to assume that the state will want to hold some kind of full-fledged primary, whether a standard-issue type like happened in IL-14 or, less likely, a jungle primary followed by a runoff.
A 106-day window from today would suggest that the vacancy could be filled by March 25. However, that average is taken from House vacancies rather than Seante vacancies, which are more consequential and arguably call for a longer campaign cycle. If I had to set an over-under, I would expect a special primary on or around Tuesday, March 10th, and a special general on or around Tuesday, April 20th.
Regardless of what happens in the special election, this seat will again be contested in 2010, when Barack Obama's first term was originally set to expire. Special elections do not reset a senator's clock.
2. What happens to the seat until the Special Election occurs?
Although vacancies in the Senate are usually filled by gubernatorial appointment until a special election can be held, this is not a requirement, and a couple of states in fact prohibit the practice. Oregon, for instance, which is one state that does not permit a gubernatorial appointment, had a vacancy that lasted for approximately four months between Bob Packwood's resignation and the swearing in of Ron Wyden after he won his special election.
Vacant seats are not accounted for in the denominator when calculating the three-fifths majority required for cloture (filibuster-breaking) motions. That is, in order to break a filibuster, the Democrats would require three-fifths of 99 votes rather than three-fifths of 100. Three-fifths of 99 is 59.4. I believe, however, that the Senate would round up to the nearest whole number rather than down, meaning that 60 votes would still be required for cloture. Effectively, then, a vacant seat would work against the Democrats, and so they have some incentive to avoid this.
The Senate is in a bit of a pickle if Blagojevich tries to appoint someone before he vacates the governor's office (and before any special election were held). It could conceivably try and expel Blagojevich's appointee, although Blagojevich could then simply appoint another candidate, starting the process over again.
If Blagojevich resigns or is impeached before the special election occurs, then Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn might appoint a replacement (although he wouldn't have to); the Senate would presumably be happy enough to seat such an appointee. Who might Quinn appoint under such a scenario? Presumably, nobody who was on the Blagojevich short list would want to touch the position, feeling as though they now had to win the seat fair and square in the special election. However, Quinn does have a couple of interesting choices. Specifically, Illinois has five living ex-senators (not counting Barack Obama): Democrats Carol Moseley Braun, Alan Dixon, and Adlai Stevenson III, and Republicans Peter Fitzgerald and Chuck Percy. While Percy is now 89 years old, any one of the other four might restore some credibility to the position. Fitzgerald, of course, being a Republican, might seem the least likely alternative, but presuming that he was comfortable with serving for a couple of months and then bowing out for the winner of the special election, he might allow Quinn (and the rest of the Illinois Democrats) to build some goodwill.
1. How long will it take to hold the Special Election?
When members of the House depart, they are routinely subject to special elections. Between the 109th and 110th Congresses, there was an average gap of 106 days between the departure of a sitting House member and the swearing in of his replacement following a Special Election. This gap, however, varied significantly from seat to seat, from a minimum of 19 days (Donna Edwards replacing Al Wynn in MD-4, whom she had already primaried out) to a maximum of 194 (Duke Cunningham's seat in CA-50). We exclude cases in which the state waited until the subsequent General Election to select a replacement, as happens occasionally.
The states generally have broad latitude for how they want to conduct their special elections. In some cases, the governor will call for nominations from each party, effectively bypassing the primary phase. In other cases, such as in California, candidates from all parties will compete in a "jungle primary", with a runoff to be held between the top two candidates if no candidate achieves 50 percent of the vote. In still others, of course, the state will hold both a special primary and a special general election; this is what happened in IL-14 after Dennis Hastert resigned, which required a total turnaround time of 106 days.
We don't know what Illinois will do, because it does not have a fast special elections law for Senate vacancies and will literally be writing the rules as it goes along. But with several viable candidates on either side it is safe to assume that the state will want to hold some kind of full-fledged primary, whether a standard-issue type like happened in IL-14 or, less likely, a jungle primary followed by a runoff.
A 106-day window from today would suggest that the vacancy could be filled by March 25. However, that average is taken from House vacancies rather than Seante vacancies, which are more consequential and arguably call for a longer campaign cycle. If I had to set an over-under, I would expect a special primary on or around Tuesday, March 10th, and a special general on or around Tuesday, April 20th.
Regardless of what happens in the special election, this seat will again be contested in 2010, when Barack Obama's first term was originally set to expire. Special elections do not reset a senator's clock.
2. What happens to the seat until the Special Election occurs?
Although vacancies in the Senate are usually filled by gubernatorial appointment until a special election can be held, this is not a requirement, and a couple of states in fact prohibit the practice. Oregon, for instance, which is one state that does not permit a gubernatorial appointment, had a vacancy that lasted for approximately four months between Bob Packwood's resignation and the swearing in of Ron Wyden after he won his special election.
Vacant seats are not accounted for in the denominator when calculating the three-fifths majority required for cloture (filibuster-breaking) motions. That is, in order to break a filibuster, the Democrats would require three-fifths of 99 votes rather than three-fifths of 100. Three-fifths of 99 is 59.4. I believe, however, that the Senate would round up to the nearest whole number rather than down, meaning that 60 votes would still be required for cloture. Effectively, then, a vacant seat would work against the Democrats, and so they have some incentive to avoid this.
The Senate is in a bit of a pickle if Blagojevich tries to appoint someone before he vacates the governor's office (and before any special election were held). It could conceivably try and expel Blagojevich's appointee, although Blagojevich could then simply appoint another candidate, starting the process over again.
If Blagojevich resigns or is impeached before the special election occurs, then Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn might appoint a replacement (although he wouldn't have to); the Senate would presumably be happy enough to seat such an appointee. Who might Quinn appoint under such a scenario? Presumably, nobody who was on the Blagojevich short list would want to touch the position, feeling as though they now had to win the seat fair and square in the special election. However, Quinn does have a couple of interesting choices. Specifically, Illinois has five living ex-senators (not counting Barack Obama): Democrats Carol Moseley Braun, Alan Dixon, and Adlai Stevenson III, and Republicans Peter Fitzgerald and Chuck Percy. While Percy is now 89 years old, any one of the other four might restore some credibility to the position. Fitzgerald, of course, being a Republican, might seem the least likely alternative, but presuming that he was comfortable with serving for a couple of months and then bowing out for the winner of the special election, he might allow Quinn (and the rest of the Illinois Democrats) to build some goodwill.
What, No Oprah?
@ 5:32 PM
Running list of people and organizations that Rod Blagojevich thought he could leverage, bribe, cajole, or threaten:
Possibly also Lisa Madigan, Jesse Jackson Jr., and J.B. Pritzker, although those are more speculative.
President Elect Barack Obama
Warren Buffett
Bill Gates
Service Employees International Union
The Chicago Cubs
The Chicago Tribune
The American Red Cross
EDIT: and Children's Memorial Hospital
The Blagojevich Fallout
@ 2:54 PM
I'd been hearing more and more rumors Blago wasn't going to survive his term, but nobody saw this coming:
We saw in LA-2 this weekend about what can happen to Democrats in instances of extreme corruption, even in very blue regions of the country. This case is a little different, in that the person who is responsible for the corruption isn't running for re-election (although Blagojevich hasn't yet declared himself out of the running for 2010!). On the other hand, the scope and the sheer drama of the corruption -- if the charges are validated -- is of greater magnitude than we saw in the Jefferson case, and odds are that at least one or two prominent Illinois politicians will get caught having done something less than above-board.
The Republicans are extremely disorganized in Illinois, but both the governor's seat and Obama's senate seat now need to be considered viable pickup opportunities for them in 2010. The Republican with the strongest statewide brand name is former senator Peter Fitzgerald, who retired from the Senate in 2004. With that said, the Democrats have several rising stars of their own, such as Alexi Giannoulias, Jan Schakowsky, Lisa Madigan, and Luis Guiterrez, all of whom have pretty clean reputations.
And then there is the question of what happens with Barack Obama's senate seat in the meantime. I don't see how it can possibly be acceptable for Blagojevich to have any say in naming Obama's successor, but elections law isn't set up to deal with situations as bizarre as these.
The ultimate judge and jury of senate appointments, we should remember, is the Senate itself, which has the Constitutional authority to decide who it seats in its chamber. There might be some precedent in the New Hampshire senate race of 1974, when the winner of the race remained unresolved after several recounts, and the Senate declared the seat vacant and than mandated a special election. Dick Durbin, Illinois' senior senator, is also calling for a special election. Alternatively, the Senate could simply wait until Blagojevich resigns or is impeached before accepting a replacement to be named by Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn.
CHICAGO — Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich of Illinois was arrested by federal authorities on Tuesday morning on corruption charges, including an allegation that he conspired to effectively sell President-elect Barack Obama’s seat in the United States Senate to the highest bidder.Just despicable. What else can you say? This is an absolutely radioactive, Hurricane-force event that will have implications in Illinois for years to come.
Mr. Blagojevich, a Democrat, called his sole authority to name Mr. Obama’s successor “golden,” and he sought to parlay it into a job as an ambassador or secretary of Health and Human Services, or a high-paying position at a nonprofit or an organization connected to labor unions, prosecutors said.
He also suggested, they said, that in exchange for the Senate appointment, his wife could be placed on corporate boards where she might earn as much as $150,000 a year, and he tried to gain promises of money for his campaign fund.
If Mr. Blagojevich could not secure a deal to his liking, prosecutors said, he was willing to appoint himself.
“If I don’t get what I want and I’m not satisfied with it, then I’ll just take the Senate seat myself,” the governor said in recorded conversation, prosecutors said.
We saw in LA-2 this weekend about what can happen to Democrats in instances of extreme corruption, even in very blue regions of the country. This case is a little different, in that the person who is responsible for the corruption isn't running for re-election (although Blagojevich hasn't yet declared himself out of the running for 2010!). On the other hand, the scope and the sheer drama of the corruption -- if the charges are validated -- is of greater magnitude than we saw in the Jefferson case, and odds are that at least one or two prominent Illinois politicians will get caught having done something less than above-board.
The Republicans are extremely disorganized in Illinois, but both the governor's seat and Obama's senate seat now need to be considered viable pickup opportunities for them in 2010. The Republican with the strongest statewide brand name is former senator Peter Fitzgerald, who retired from the Senate in 2004. With that said, the Democrats have several rising stars of their own, such as Alexi Giannoulias, Jan Schakowsky, Lisa Madigan, and Luis Guiterrez, all of whom have pretty clean reputations.
And then there is the question of what happens with Barack Obama's senate seat in the meantime. I don't see how it can possibly be acceptable for Blagojevich to have any say in naming Obama's successor, but elections law isn't set up to deal with situations as bizarre as these.
The ultimate judge and jury of senate appointments, we should remember, is the Senate itself, which has the Constitutional authority to decide who it seats in its chamber. There might be some precedent in the New Hampshire senate race of 1974, when the winner of the race remained unresolved after several recounts, and the Senate declared the seat vacant and than mandated a special election. Dick Durbin, Illinois' senior senator, is also calling for a special election. Alternatively, the Senate could simply wait until Blagojevich resigns or is impeached before accepting a replacement to be named by Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn.
12.08.2008
The Wrong Ads and the Wright One
@ 11:53 PM
At the Dole Institute panel last week, I got into an extended discussion with Sarah Simmons and Christian Ferry, the gracious and sporting McCain senior staffers present, about the wisdom or lack thereof of McCain's messaging strategy. My point, which I might or might not have articulated very well, was that maintaining the strength of the McCain brand -- and particularly, maintaining the differentiation between the McCain brand and the Republican brand -- was an essential component of any winning strategy. This is the same point that I tried to make in the Los Angeles Times in August, at which time McCain was polling within the margin of error against Obama. I argued that this had at least as much to do with McCain as with Obama, and that against virtually any other Republican, Obama would have been cruising. I then suggested to Simmons and Ferry that certain of their commercials, such as the 'Education' ad (a.k.a. kindergarten sex ed), the 'Celebrity' ad, and various of their Bill Ayers commercials, were petty and vindictive enough as to have undermined McCain's brand, and made him easier to caricature as a generic Republican.
What exactly is the McCain brand, by the way? I would argue that at its strongest, it was organized around two themes: honor and independence. These commercials, particularly 'Education', seemed dishonorable, as did the negative and often smallball (e.g. "Lipstick on a Pig") tone of the campaign. The notion that McCain was independent, meanwhile, was also undermined by the tone of his campaign, which may have reminded voters too much of the Bush/Rove brand of politics -- although the selection of Sarah Palin was probably the bigger impediment there.
Simmons and Ferry responded by saying that their campaign had perceived the election as a referendum on Barack Obama, and that only by undermining Obama could they hope to win. I don't necessarily disagree with that, but I would argue that it was a necessary rather than sufficient condition. That is, in order to win an election in which Republicans faced a 7-10 point generic ballot disadvantage, McCain had to both:
(i) Undermine Obama's brand, e.g. differentiate Obama in an unfavorable way from a generic Democrat, and
(ii) Present some reasonably compelling alternative, e.g. differentiate McCain in a favorable way from a generic Republican.
Had McCain managed to do one of these things but not the other -- say, undermine Obama while taking himself down a notch in the process -- the election might have been a little closer than it turned out to be, but Obama would probably have prevailed by 2-3 points on the strength of base turnout, with a lot of independents simply getting fed up with the whole thing and staying home. As it happened, however, McCain really managed to do neither; his unfavorables peaked mere days before the election, while he never managed to make much of a dent in Obama's numbers.
Perhaps accomplishing both of these things at once was impossible -- McCain could not have substantially damaged Obama's brand without substantially damaging his own. In this case, the election was probably unwinnable, at least once the financial crisis hit.
The best attempt I have seen, however, may have come in the form of an ad that the McCain campaign chose not to run, which is an unaired spot they apparently were producing on Jeremiah Wright. Click forward to about 1:15 in the ABC News clip below to see the commercial:
There are two things that make this commercial effective. Firstly, it sets up an obvious contrast between the two candidates: McCain as honorable (cue the POW footage), and Obama as less so (cue "God Damn America"). None of the other commercials ("Celebrity", Ayers, etc.) really managed to do that, or at least not very explicitly. Secondly, the ad shows some restraint. Wright is on screen for a grand total of five seconds, just long enough to get the point across, but he's part of a broader narrative, and there isn't the scolding and overbearing tone of many of McCain's commercials.
Now, I don't think that this commercial would have been any sort of a magic bullet -- particularly not if it was released in the final few days of the campaign, when the media would surely have slammed it as a sign of desperation. But, this is arguably a fairer attack than Ayers or "Education", and if it had aired in July or August instead of those Britney Spears commercials, it might have had more lasting resonance.
Simmons and Ferry also said that the decision not to go after Obama on Wright was not really a calculated move at all; McCain had vetoed the idea, and that was that. You can choose to believe that or not. I do tend to believe it, because it squares with my impression of McCain (both the man and his campaign) as being more ad-hoc than methodical or strategic.
For better or for worse, there aren't a lot of politicians who would have made that decision. But that, in a way, is precisely my premise: McCain was pretty well differentiated from a generic politician, and particularly a generic, circa 2008, oogedy-boogedy Republican. If McCain wasn't willing to air an ad on Jeremiah Wright -- well, then, the McCain campaign should have been shouting from the rooftops that this was the case. And they should have been working backward from that decision by also not airing ads like "Education", which had half the impact for twice the sacrifice of credibility.
All easier to say in hindsight, of course. But at the end of the day, the McCain campaign was too cynical to believe that the older, more maverick-y version of their candidate could have closed the sale. McCain had to pander to the base in the primaries because that's how things are done in the Republican Party. He had to attack his opponent's character (even if it meant tarnishing his own) because that's what Republicans do. But Republicans have also been losing elections in droves since Hurricane Katrina hit, and a campaign that didn't have the self-confidence to perceive that was probably due to meet the same fate.
What exactly is the McCain brand, by the way? I would argue that at its strongest, it was organized around two themes: honor and independence. These commercials, particularly 'Education', seemed dishonorable, as did the negative and often smallball (e.g. "Lipstick on a Pig") tone of the campaign. The notion that McCain was independent, meanwhile, was also undermined by the tone of his campaign, which may have reminded voters too much of the Bush/Rove brand of politics -- although the selection of Sarah Palin was probably the bigger impediment there.
Simmons and Ferry responded by saying that their campaign had perceived the election as a referendum on Barack Obama, and that only by undermining Obama could they hope to win. I don't necessarily disagree with that, but I would argue that it was a necessary rather than sufficient condition. That is, in order to win an election in which Republicans faced a 7-10 point generic ballot disadvantage, McCain had to both:
(i) Undermine Obama's brand, e.g. differentiate Obama in an unfavorable way from a generic Democrat, and
(ii) Present some reasonably compelling alternative, e.g. differentiate McCain in a favorable way from a generic Republican.
Had McCain managed to do one of these things but not the other -- say, undermine Obama while taking himself down a notch in the process -- the election might have been a little closer than it turned out to be, but Obama would probably have prevailed by 2-3 points on the strength of base turnout, with a lot of independents simply getting fed up with the whole thing and staying home. As it happened, however, McCain really managed to do neither; his unfavorables peaked mere days before the election, while he never managed to make much of a dent in Obama's numbers.
Perhaps accomplishing both of these things at once was impossible -- McCain could not have substantially damaged Obama's brand without substantially damaging his own. In this case, the election was probably unwinnable, at least once the financial crisis hit.
The best attempt I have seen, however, may have come in the form of an ad that the McCain campaign chose not to run, which is an unaired spot they apparently were producing on Jeremiah Wright. Click forward to about 1:15 in the ABC News clip below to see the commercial:
There are two things that make this commercial effective. Firstly, it sets up an obvious contrast between the two candidates: McCain as honorable (cue the POW footage), and Obama as less so (cue "God Damn America"). None of the other commercials ("Celebrity", Ayers, etc.) really managed to do that, or at least not very explicitly. Secondly, the ad shows some restraint. Wright is on screen for a grand total of five seconds, just long enough to get the point across, but he's part of a broader narrative, and there isn't the scolding and overbearing tone of many of McCain's commercials.
Now, I don't think that this commercial would have been any sort of a magic bullet -- particularly not if it was released in the final few days of the campaign, when the media would surely have slammed it as a sign of desperation. But, this is arguably a fairer attack than Ayers or "Education", and if it had aired in July or August instead of those Britney Spears commercials, it might have had more lasting resonance.
Simmons and Ferry also said that the decision not to go after Obama on Wright was not really a calculated move at all; McCain had vetoed the idea, and that was that. You can choose to believe that or not. I do tend to believe it, because it squares with my impression of McCain (both the man and his campaign) as being more ad-hoc than methodical or strategic.
For better or for worse, there aren't a lot of politicians who would have made that decision. But that, in a way, is precisely my premise: McCain was pretty well differentiated from a generic politician, and particularly a generic, circa 2008, oogedy-boogedy Republican. If McCain wasn't willing to air an ad on Jeremiah Wright -- well, then, the McCain campaign should have been shouting from the rooftops that this was the case. And they should have been working backward from that decision by also not airing ads like "Education", which had half the impact for twice the sacrifice of credibility.
All easier to say in hindsight, of course. But at the end of the day, the McCain campaign was too cynical to believe that the older, more maverick-y version of their candidate could have closed the sale. McCain had to pander to the base in the primaries because that's how things are done in the Republican Party. He had to attack his opponent's character (even if it meant tarnishing his own) because that's what Republicans do. But Republicans have also been losing elections in droves since Hurricane Katrina hit, and a campaign that didn't have the self-confidence to perceive that was probably due to meet the same fate.
58 Better Than 59? (A Probably Stupid Theory)
@ 2:10 PM
Depending on the outcome of the recount in Minnesota, Democrats will either wind up with a 58-seat caucus in the 111th Senate or a 59-seat one. Therefore, they will be either one or two votes short of the 60-member majority required to pass a cloture motion and end a filibuster, assuming that everyone votes along party lines.
But of course, not everyone will vote along party lines. We have identified at least five moderate Republicans in states won by Barack Obama who, for one reason or another, will be under pressure to vote with the majority. Conversely, there will be at least four moderate Democrats in states won by John McCain that will be under pressure to vote with the Republicans.
The theory is this. Imagine that you're a moderate Republican, like Olympia Snowe of Maine, and you're contemplating how to vote on a measure like the Employee Free Choice Act, which ought to be just on the threshold of that 60-seat majority. You have conflicting incentives here: perhaps your constituents support the bill, but your party caucus certainly does not; you might have mixed feelings about it personally.
There are four possible outcomes to this dilemma:
a. You vote for the bill and it passes.
b. You vote against the bill, but it passes.
c. You vote for the bill, but it fails.
d. You vote against the bill, and it fails.
Which of these four outcomes is the most desirable for you? Probably this one:
You vote against the bill, but it passes. This way, your colleagues in the Republican caucus will be happy. But, your constituents will probably be reasonably happy too. They get the piece of legislation they wanted, and in time, your nay vote will almost certainly be forgotten about. And your risks are pretty well hedged: if the bill becomes unpopular later on, you can always remind the voters that you were against it.
It seems to me, however, that if everyone thinks like this, and if the Democrats have exactly 59 votes, then you run into something of a NIMBY problem. Namely, if it takes just one Republican vote to pass a certain measure, then why does it have to be yours? Why can't your colleague Susan Collins vote for it instead -- or George Voinovich, or Arlen Specter? (And of course, Susan Collins and George Voinovich and Arlen Specter are thinking exactly the same thing about you.) If the Democrats have just 58 votes, on the other hand, you know that at least two Republicans will have to vote to approve the measure, and so you cannot rely solely on someone else taking one for the team.
A related principle is probably this: if the bill passes, you would probably rather it pass with as many Republican votes as possible. This gives you more cover with your party leadership: they have any of several people they can blame, as opposed to you and you exclusively. Being the only member of your party to vote for the bill, on the other hand, could be pretty terrifying. But this too becomes tricky if the Democrats have exactly 59 votes. If the Democrats have 58 votes, then you know the cloture motion will not pass without you and at least one other Republican voting for it. If they have 59 votes, on the other hand, then your vote and yours alone could make the difference.
My point, of course, is that the psychology could be surprisingly different if the Democrats have 59 votes as opposed to 58. In the former case, it's everyone out for herself, and you risk creating some sort of multi-way Prisoner's Dilemma, in which all the moderate Republicans bank on all the other moderate Republicans supporting the bill. The latter case, on the other hand, necessitates collaboration and collective action.
Now, there are a number of obvious critiques to this theory, most notably that it will rarely be the case that the Democrats are guaranteed to have exactly 59 (or 58) votes in hand, since any of several moderate Democrats could plausibly break with the majority on any given measure. Still, it is easy enough to imagine a case where one is the most dangerous number to Democrats. I suspect that 59 is in fact a better number for the Democrats than 58, but perhaps by a surprisingly small margin.
Addendum: Another lens to view this through is as follows: it may be easier for the Republicans to maintain party discipline when they know that every single member of their caucus will need to vote against a cloture measure in order to defeat it.
But of course, not everyone will vote along party lines. We have identified at least five moderate Republicans in states won by Barack Obama who, for one reason or another, will be under pressure to vote with the majority. Conversely, there will be at least four moderate Democrats in states won by John McCain that will be under pressure to vote with the Republicans.
The theory is this. Imagine that you're a moderate Republican, like Olympia Snowe of Maine, and you're contemplating how to vote on a measure like the Employee Free Choice Act, which ought to be just on the threshold of that 60-seat majority. You have conflicting incentives here: perhaps your constituents support the bill, but your party caucus certainly does not; you might have mixed feelings about it personally.
There are four possible outcomes to this dilemma:
a. You vote for the bill and it passes.
b. You vote against the bill, but it passes.
c. You vote for the bill, but it fails.
d. You vote against the bill, and it fails.
Which of these four outcomes is the most desirable for you? Probably this one:
You vote against the bill, but it passes. This way, your colleagues in the Republican caucus will be happy. But, your constituents will probably be reasonably happy too. They get the piece of legislation they wanted, and in time, your nay vote will almost certainly be forgotten about. And your risks are pretty well hedged: if the bill becomes unpopular later on, you can always remind the voters that you were against it.
It seems to me, however, that if everyone thinks like this, and if the Democrats have exactly 59 votes, then you run into something of a NIMBY problem. Namely, if it takes just one Republican vote to pass a certain measure, then why does it have to be yours? Why can't your colleague Susan Collins vote for it instead -- or George Voinovich, or Arlen Specter? (And of course, Susan Collins and George Voinovich and Arlen Specter are thinking exactly the same thing about you.) If the Democrats have just 58 votes, on the other hand, you know that at least two Republicans will have to vote to approve the measure, and so you cannot rely solely on someone else taking one for the team.
A related principle is probably this: if the bill passes, you would probably rather it pass with as many Republican votes as possible. This gives you more cover with your party leadership: they have any of several people they can blame, as opposed to you and you exclusively. Being the only member of your party to vote for the bill, on the other hand, could be pretty terrifying. But this too becomes tricky if the Democrats have exactly 59 votes. If the Democrats have 58 votes, then you know the cloture motion will not pass without you and at least one other Republican voting for it. If they have 59 votes, on the other hand, then your vote and yours alone could make the difference.
My point, of course, is that the psychology could be surprisingly different if the Democrats have 59 votes as opposed to 58. In the former case, it's everyone out for herself, and you risk creating some sort of multi-way Prisoner's Dilemma, in which all the moderate Republicans bank on all the other moderate Republicans supporting the bill. The latter case, on the other hand, necessitates collaboration and collective action.
Now, there are a number of obvious critiques to this theory, most notably that it will rarely be the case that the Democrats are guaranteed to have exactly 59 (or 58) votes in hand, since any of several moderate Democrats could plausibly break with the majority on any given measure. Still, it is easy enough to imagine a case where one is the most dangerous number to Democrats. I suspect that 59 is in fact a better number for the Democrats than 58, but perhaps by a surprisingly small margin.
Addendum: Another lens to view this through is as follows: it may be easier for the Republicans to maintain party discipline when they know that every single member of their caucus will need to vote against a cloture measure in order to defeat it.
2010 Senate Rankings, Revised and Extended
@ 9:09 AM
Time to start over. Rather than giving you the third and final installment of our 2010 Senate Race Rankings, I'm going to re-do the project from scratch, ranking all 37 potential contests from top to bottom based on their probability of changing parties.
The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, there's been quite a bit of news in any number of these contests, meaning that things we thought we knew a couple of weeks ago may no longer apply. And secondly, there are enough contingencies in so many of these races (Will so-and-so retire? Will so-and-so run for office?) that a more systematic treatment of them is in order. What I mean by this is that it's worth going through and calculating the conditional probabilities. In California, for example, the race will look much different if Arnold Schwarzenegger enters than if he does not, which means I'm going to show you something like this:
Where, you might be asking, do all these probabilities (30%, 5%, 25%) come from? They're my educated guesstimates -- nothing more and nothing less -- based on a combination of approval ratings, the strength of each party's organization in that state, rumor, gossip, innuendo, and various other intangibles. You should not regard the numbers as being especially precise or meaningful; they are ballpark estimates, a codification of my subjective knowledge.
One final reminder and caveat: the races are ranked strictly in order of their likelihood of changing parties. This is not quite the same thing a ranking of the most vulnerable incumbents, because it accounts for potentialities like retirements, as well as inferences about the probable strength of the opposition candidates. In Iowa, for instance, I assign the Democrats about a one-in-four chance of picking off Chuck Grassley's seat, but nearly all of that stems from the (distinct) possibility that Grassley will retire -- his seat should not be especially vulnerable if he decides to run for re-election.
1. Kansas (R-Open; Brownback retiring)
Believe it or not, this might be the most likely seat in the country to flip parties. And it's all because of Governor Kathleen Sebelius, who announced Saturday that she was withdrawing herself from consideration for Barack Obama's cabinet. This comes as a mild surprise; the scuttlebutt I'd heard is that Sebelius, who is term-limited in 2010, would have liked the opportunity to serve in Obama's cabinet. Sebelius enjoys politics, and that she's turned the opportunity down suggests she has something else up her sleeve. Unless that something is becoming DNC Chair, that probably means a senate run.
Sebelius is no shoo-in if she runs -- Kansas hasn't elected a Democrat to the Senate since the Great Depression, and KS-1's Jerry Moran, who has already announced his intention to run for the seat, would be a credible opponent. But with her sky-high approval ratings, Sebelius is probably the favorite to win the seat. As Sam Brownback is likely to run for governor, it might also help her in terms of voter psychology if Kansans simply feel as though they're swapping the two, rather than turning a traditionally Republican seat over to a Democrat.
In the event that Sebelius has other plans, the Democrats' odds are daunting, as Kansas would likely revert back to its red-leaning steady state, though current lieutenant governor (and ex-GOPer) Mark Parkinson might have a fighting chance.
First, obviously, his health is not good.
Second, he could get primaried out. As the Democrats made fairly massive voter registration gains in Pennsylvania throughout 2008, what remains of the Republican primary electorate is the conservative base, and the very conservative Pat Toomey is threatening to challenge Specter again after having lost to him by just 2 points in the Republican primary in 2004.
Third, the Democrats might be able to beat Specter straight up. Although Specter's approval ratings remain strong, the fact that Chris Matthews has been able to poll close to him in some recent surveys suggests that much of that support is soft, making him vulnerable against the right Democrat (which might or might not be Matthews). Specter is in an unenviable position: if he obstructs Barack Obama's agenda, he'll anger Democrats in this structurally blue state, but if he sides with Democrats too often, he'll be vulnerable to a primary challenge.
With that said, Voinovich still probably represents the Republicans' best chance of holding onto their seat. The structural advantages of incumbency are worth something, whereas Voinovich's mediocre approval ratings likely reflect the tough climate for Ohio Republicans in general right now rather than anything about Voinovich in particular; those cooties would probably transfer to any potential Republican alternative, in other words. Portman, meanwhile, while a capable administrator, is relatively unproven electorally.
I expected Florida to rank somewhere in the top two, but upon further review, Jeb Bush's potential entry into the race complicates things for Democrats, as Bush has star power that no Democrat in the state can match and as he left Florida's governorship with his popularity largely intact. Furthermore, I indeed think Bush is fairly likely to run, as among other things he might feel compelled to restore dignity to his surname.
The Democrats' odds of a pickup improve significantly if Ben Chandler decides to enter, although Chris Cillizza thinks he's somewhat unlikely to. Republican odds might go up, frankly, if Bunning decides to retire, although for now he appears game for another go-around.
Republican hopes probably rely on At-Large Representative Mike Castle running for the seat, something which I haven't heard one way or the other about, but which might not be entirely implausible since Castle is too old to wait for a better opportunity. If Beau Biden throws his hat in the ring for 2010, as is somewhat likely, that might be a deterrent to Castle.
It's hard to get good information on what Rod Blagojevich is likely to do with his senate appointment, although one source suggests that Blagojevich is inclined to pick an African-American. If so, Blagojevich would be taking a significant risk if he appointed Jesse Jackson Jr., who might be the plurality choice of Illinois Democrats, but who has little support outside of his base. That said, the Illinois Republican bench is incredibly weak, and even Jackson would probably be a favorite to win re-election.
This is Kay Bailey Hutchinson's seat. I'm going to put this on our radar screen because on Friday, Hutchinson launched an exploratory committee to challenge Rick Perry for governor, and is better than even money to resign from the Senate to pursue that opportunity; one TV station goes so far as saying that she's "confirmed" a bid for the governorship. This makes all the sense in the world for Hutchinson: she's quite likely to beat Perry in the primary, and if she prevailed in the general, would become a star of her party as governor of the largest red state in the land. If this happens, Democrats have a couple of potentially intriguing candidates: TX-17's Chet Edwards, and Houston Mayor Bill White, who was thought to be contemplating a run for governor but who could re-direct his efforts to the Senate as Hutchinson represents a more formidable opponent than Perry.
With that said, some Republican observers were surprised by the speed with which McCain declared his interest in the 2010 race. His relationships with the Senate Republican caucus are lukewarm, and McCain may find he has less interest in the banalities of the Senate after spending the better part of a year away from the chamber. Retirement, in other words, remains a possibility, in which case the race should draw a credible Democratic challenger, although popular Republican congressman Jeff Flake would likely be the favorite.
One rumor we've heard is that Rudy Giuliani is concerned about his ability to defeat David Paterson and might run for Senate instead if Paterson appoints a no-name candidate (e.g. anyone not named "Cuomo" or "Kennedy").
Lisa Murkowski, in other words, is not being entirely paranoid when she's warning Palin to stay away from her seat. The potential opening for Democrats is if Murkowski is bloodied but not beaten by Palin, either surviving a tough primary challenge, or perhaps losing credibility by getting in a public spat with the 'Cuda. This is also, in theory, the sort of seat a third-party candidate might target.
Summary
Even if momentum has swung somewhat against the Democrats by 2010, they remain in a strong position to gain seats in the Senate. They are pretty much locked into reasonably competitive races in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina and New Hampshire, will probably get one in Kansas, and could potentially get one in Iowa and perhaps even Texas or Arizona depending on retirements. By contrast, the only near-certain competitive Democratic seat is in Nevada; beyond that, the Republicans are looking at a series of second- and third-tier races like Colorado and Wisconsin, or races that require a white knight like Arkansas, California, North Dakota and New York. Overall, our guesstimate is that the Democrats will pick up 3-4 Republican seats and the Republicans 1-2 Democratic seats, for a net swing of 1-3 seats for the Democrats, potentially placing them beyond the 60-seat threshold. Democratic gains in the Senate, indeed, are possible or even likely even if they lose ground in the House. Although much of this simply reflects the staggered nature of US Senate seats -- it's Democrats who will have their backs to the wall in 2012 -- there are some deeper implications as well, which we will explore at a later date.
The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, there's been quite a bit of news in any number of these contests, meaning that things we thought we knew a couple of weeks ago may no longer apply. And secondly, there are enough contingencies in so many of these races (Will so-and-so retire? Will so-and-so run for office?) that a more systematic treatment of them is in order. What I mean by this is that it's worth going through and calculating the conditional probabilities. In California, for example, the race will look much different if Arnold Schwarzenegger enters than if he does not, which means I'm going to show you something like this:
75% Generic R vs Boxer (D) 5%
25% Schwarzenegger (R) vs Boxer (D) 30%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 11.3%What does this mean? The numbers along the left-hand column indicate the probability of various scenarios occurring. In this case, I think there's about a 25% chance that Schwarzenegger will run for the seat, and a 75% chance that he will not. The numbers in the right-handed column, then, represent the chances of the opposition party picking up the seat if each of these contingencies occurs; in this case, I think the Republicans have about a 30% chance of unseating Barbara Boxer if Schwarzenegger is the nominee, but only a 5% chance otherwise. I then multiply all these numbers together to give you the joint probability: Republicans have about an 11% chance of winning California's seat, combining those times that Schwarzenegger runs with those times that he does not.Where, you might be asking, do all these probabilities (30%, 5%, 25%) come from? They're my educated guesstimates -- nothing more and nothing less -- based on a combination of approval ratings, the strength of each party's organization in that state, rumor, gossip, innuendo, and various other intangibles. You should not regard the numbers as being especially precise or meaningful; they are ballpark estimates, a codification of my subjective knowledge.
One final reminder and caveat: the races are ranked strictly in order of their likelihood of changing parties. This is not quite the same thing a ranking of the most vulnerable incumbents, because it accounts for potentialities like retirements, as well as inferences about the probable strength of the opposition candidates. In Iowa, for instance, I assign the Democrats about a one-in-four chance of picking off Chuck Grassley's seat, but nearly all of that stems from the (distinct) possibility that Grassley will retire -- his seat should not be especially vulnerable if he decides to run for re-election.
1. Kansas (R-Open; Brownback retiring)
Believe it or not, this might be the most likely seat in the country to flip parties. And it's all because of Governor Kathleen Sebelius, who announced Saturday that she was withdrawing herself from consideration for Barack Obama's cabinet. This comes as a mild surprise; the scuttlebutt I'd heard is that Sebelius, who is term-limited in 2010, would have liked the opportunity to serve in Obama's cabinet. Sebelius enjoys politics, and that she's turned the opportunity down suggests she has something else up her sleeve. Unless that something is becoming DNC Chair, that probably means a senate run.
Sebelius is no shoo-in if she runs -- Kansas hasn't elected a Democrat to the Senate since the Great Depression, and KS-1's Jerry Moran, who has already announced his intention to run for the seat, would be a credible opponent. But with her sky-high approval ratings, Sebelius is probably the favorite to win the seat. As Sam Brownback is likely to run for governor, it might also help her in terms of voter psychology if Kansans simply feel as though they're swapping the two, rather than turning a traditionally Republican seat over to a Democrat.
In the event that Sebelius has other plans, the Democrats' odds are daunting, as Kansas would likely revert back to its red-leaning steady state, though current lieutenant governor (and ex-GOPer) Mark Parkinson might have a fighting chance.
70% Sebelius (D) vs Generic R 60%
30% Generic D vs Generic R 5%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 43.5%2. Pennsylvania (R-Specter)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Arlen Specter (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Rasmussen 12/2 60 35 +25
Quinnipiac 11/26 56 23 +33
Strategic Vision 11/1 53 34 +19There are a lot of ways that Arlen Specter could lose his seat.First, obviously, his health is not good.
Second, he could get primaried out. As the Democrats made fairly massive voter registration gains in Pennsylvania throughout 2008, what remains of the Republican primary electorate is the conservative base, and the very conservative Pat Toomey is threatening to challenge Specter again after having lost to him by just 2 points in the Republican primary in 2004.
Third, the Democrats might be able to beat Specter straight up. Although Specter's approval ratings remain strong, the fact that Chris Matthews has been able to poll close to him in some recent surveys suggests that much of that support is soft, making him vulnerable against the right Democrat (which might or might not be Matthews). Specter is in an unenviable position: if he obstructs Barack Obama's agenda, he'll anger Democrats in this structurally blue state, but if he sides with Democrats too often, he'll be vulnerable to a primary challenge.
60% Generic D vs Specter (R) 22.5%
40% Generic D vs Generic R 70%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 41.5%3. Ohio (R-Voinovich)Approval/Favorability Ratings: George Voinovich (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Strategic Vision 11/1 53 37 +16
SurveyUSA 10/18 51 39 +12
Quinnipiac 8/8 51 32 +19This parallels the Specter race in certain respects, winnable either through retirement (Marc Ambinder has suggested that Voinovich might hang it up) or through a straight-up takeover (Voinovich is in fact a bit less popular than Specter). But there are a couple of mitigating factors. Firstly, there's no indication that Voinovich will face a serious primary challenge, which removes at least once concern for him. And secondly, if Voinovich retires, the Republicans have a fairly strong potential alternative in Rob Portman, who has suggested he might be interested in the position.With that said, Voinovich still probably represents the Republicans' best chance of holding onto their seat. The structural advantages of incumbency are worth something, whereas Voinovich's mediocre approval ratings likely reflect the tough climate for Ohio Republicans in general right now rather than anything about Voinovich in particular; those cooties would probably transfer to any potential Republican alternative, in other words. Portman, meanwhile, while a capable administrator, is relatively unproven electorally.
60% Generic D vs Voinovich (R) 30%
20% Generic D vs Portman (R) 50%
20% Generic D vs Generic R 60%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 40.0%4. Florida (R-Open; Martinez retiring)I expected Florida to rank somewhere in the top two, but upon further review, Jeb Bush's potential entry into the race complicates things for Democrats, as Bush has star power that no Democrat in the state can match and as he left Florida's governorship with his popularity largely intact. Furthermore, I indeed think Bush is fairly likely to run, as among other things he might feel compelled to restore dignity to his surname.
67% Generic D vs Bush (R) 30%
33% Generic D vs Generic R 50%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 38.3%5. Kentucky (R-Bunning)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Jim Bunning (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 40 44 -4It's easy to understand why Democrats are salivating over this opportunity. Bunning nearly lost in 2004, a relatively good cycle for Republicans, against a fairly marginal Democratic opponent; he's now six years older and no more popular than he was before. Still, this is one state that moved away from Democrats in 2008 (although they retain a party identification advantage) and one state in which campaigning against Obama might pay dividends. Bunning's goal, in other words, is to turn this into a referendum on the President rather than a referendum on himself.The Democrats' odds of a pickup improve significantly if Ben Chandler decides to enter, although Chris Cillizza thinks he's somewhat unlikely to. Republican odds might go up, frankly, if Bunning decides to retire, although for now he appears game for another go-around.
60% Generic D vs Bunning (R) 30%
20% Chandler (D) vs Bunning (R) 50%
10% Generic D vs Generic R 25%
10% Chandler (D) vs Generic R 50%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 35.3%6. Nevada (D-Reid)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Harry Reid (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Research 2000 11/24 38 54 -16
Mason-Dixon 8/14 46 43 +3I wanted to rank this race higher, since Reid's approval ratings are just awful, and are unlikely to be improved by the flak he'll take as the Majority Leader. But structurally speaking, the Republicans aren't in the position that they'd like to be in the Silver State. Nevada is turning blue very quickly, with the Democrats having made huge voter registration gains in 2008, and the Republicans have recruitment problems, as among their two most likely candidates, John Porter just lost his House seat, and as Lieutenant Governor Brian Krolicki was just indicted. The most probable outcome is an ugly, expensive win for Reid, although I give the Republicans' slightly better than a one in three chance of finding a compelling candidate somewhere and taking Reid down. Reid also might be vulnerable to a primary challenge, which could either help or hinder the Democrats' chances depending on the circumstances.Probability of Republican Pickup 35.0%
7. Missouri (R-Bond)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Kit Bond (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 51 42 +9
PPP 8/20 44 43 +1I may have underrated this race originally, as various trial heats show any of several Democrats polling within the margin of error against Bond. Retirement is also a possibility. Still, Missouri is not quite the swing state it once was.80% Generic D vs Bond (R) 27.5%
20% Generic D vs Generic R 50%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 32.0%8. North Carolina (R-Burr)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Richard Burr (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
PPP 6/17 27 26 +1
SurveyUSA 11/2006 44 42 +2Burr occupies North Carolina's buyer's remorse seat, which has changed parties five times in the past five elections; his tepid approval ratings suggest that he might not escape the curse. Still, Tarheel Democrats won't have the benefit of Barack Obama's coattails in 2010, nor are they likely to run into another campaign run as ineptly as Elizabeth Dole's.Probability of Democratic Pickup 25.0%9. Iowa (R-Grassley)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Chuck Grassley (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 63 29 +34
Selzer 2/19 67 18 +49This has moved up slightly on retirement rumors, and also rumors that Grassley might get a serious challenge (e.g. from Tom Vilsack or Bruce Braley) even if he doesn't drop out. I remain steadfastly unpersuaded that Democrats have much of a shot at winning this seat unless Grassley leaves it open; getting a +34 approval score with the way the US Congress is perceived nowadays is no small accomplishment. With that said, if someone like Vilsack were to form an exploratory committee, he might conceivably bluff Grassley into retiring (or at least into lining up with Barack Obama on cloture votes).70% Generic D vs Grassley (R) 5%
30% Generic D vs Generic R 70%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 24.5%10. New Hampshire (R-Gregg)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Judd Gregg (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Strategic Vision 10/28 53 37 +16
UNH 7/16 53 23 +30
Dartmouth 4/30 38 27 +11With Jeanne Shaheen having defeated John Sununu on November 4th, Gregg is now the only Republican among New Hampshire's four-person congressional delegation, leading a lot of Democrats to assume that he will be their next victim. Gregg's approval ratings, however, are considerably stronger than Sununu's were, and the Democrats don't offer any opponent with Shaheen's name-brand. New Hampshire, moreover, maintains its libertarian streak, and Gregg's fiscal conservatism may play well in the current economic environment, although his having voted for the bailout could prove a liability.Probability of Democratic Pickup 22.5%11. Delaware (D-Open; Kaufman retiring)Republican hopes probably rely on At-Large Representative Mike Castle running for the seat, something which I haven't heard one way or the other about, but which might not be entirely implausible since Castle is too old to wait for a better opportunity. If Beau Biden throws his hat in the ring for 2010, as is somewhat likely, that might be a deterrent to Castle.
50% Generic R vs Biden (D) 5%
25% Generic R vs Generic D 7.5%
15% Castle (R) vs Generic D 50%
10% Castle (R) vs Biden (D) 40%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 15.9% 12. Colorado (D-Salazar)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Ken Salazar (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
PPP 8/6 39 36 +3
SurveyUSA 11/2006 56 36 +20This remains one of the theoretically more viable pickup opportunities for Republicans, especially if the background political environment beings to swing in their favor, but Colorado is another state that's turning blue in a hurry, and there's no one Republican opponent that Colorado Democrats seem particularly worried about. Ex-Gov Bill Owens might be the closest thing to an exception, but he's declined his last couple of chances to run for national office.Probability of Republican Pickup 15.0%13. Illinois (D-???)It's hard to get good information on what Rod Blagojevich is likely to do with his senate appointment, although one source suggests that Blagojevich is inclined to pick an African-American. If so, Blagojevich would be taking a significant risk if he appointed Jesse Jackson Jr., who might be the plurality choice of Illinois Democrats, but who has little support outside of his base. That said, the Illinois Republican bench is incredibly weak, and even Jackson would probably be a favorite to win re-election.
70% Generic R vs Generic D 30%
30% Generic R vs Jackson (D) 10%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 15.0%14. Texas (possibly R-Open or R-??)This is Kay Bailey Hutchinson's seat. I'm going to put this on our radar screen because on Friday, Hutchinson launched an exploratory committee to challenge Rick Perry for governor, and is better than even money to resign from the Senate to pursue that opportunity; one TV station goes so far as saying that she's "confirmed" a bid for the governorship. This makes all the sense in the world for Hutchinson: she's quite likely to beat Perry in the primary, and if she prevailed in the general, would become a star of her party as governor of the largest red state in the land. If this happens, Democrats have a couple of potentially intriguing candidates: TX-17's Chet Edwards, and Houston Mayor Bill White, who was thought to be contemplating a run for governor but who could re-direct his efforts to the Senate as Hutchinson represents a more formidable opponent than Perry.
33% Hutchison keeps Senate Seat --
67% Generic D vs Generic R 20%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 13.3% 15. Arizona (R-McCain)Approval/Favorability Ratings: John McCain (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Research 2000 10/29 58 41 +17
SurveyUSA 11/2006 61 34 +27This race was originally to have rated much higher, but Janet Napolitano appears to be out of the running after being nominated to head Homeland Security, whereas John McCain now says he'll be up for re-election. It is unlikely that an up-and-coming Democrat like Gabrielle Giffords would want to risk her stature by running against McCain, especially when Arizona also has an open governor's seat.With that said, some Republican observers were surprised by the speed with which McCain declared his interest in the 2010 race. His relationships with the Senate Republican caucus are lukewarm, and McCain may find he has less interest in the banalities of the Senate after spending the better part of a year away from the chamber. Retirement, in other words, remains a possibility, in which case the race should draw a credible Democratic challenger, although popular Republican congressman Jeff Flake would likely be the favorite.
75% Generic D vs McCain (R) 5%
25% Generic D vs Generic R 35%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 12.5%16. Arkansas (D-Lincoln)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Blanche Lincoln (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Arkansas Poll 10/11 54 20 +34
SurveyUSA 11/2006 55 37 +18This is another race that I planned to rank higher originally, but the buzz I'm hearing is that Mike Huckabee is disinclined to be interested in the seat. In theory, this should be an intriguing seat to Republicans even if Huckabee does not run, as Arkansas is turning substantially redder. But since Lincoln's approval ratings are strong and since the Republicans just let Mark Pryor run unopposed, I wouldn't hold my breath.90% Generic R vs Lincoln (D) 7%
10% Huckabee (R) vs Lincoln (D) 60%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 12.3%17. California (D-Boxer)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Barbara Boxer (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 49 42 +7
PPIC 9/13 44 39 +5
Field Poll 5/22 48 31 +17An Arnold Schwarzenegger entry would certainly attract a lot of fanfare, and a poll taken a year ago had him running even with Barbara Boxer. However, the Governator's approval ratings have since slumped significantly, and there's no tangible sign that he's interested in the position. Apart from Schwarzenegger, there isn't another obvious top-tier Republican opponent.75% Generic R vs Boxer (D) 5%
25% Schwarzenegger (R) vs Boxer (D) 30%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 11.3%18. North Dakota (D-Dorgan)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Byron Dorgan (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 11/2006 75 21 +54Byron Dorgan is probably too popular to elicit a challenge from Governor John Hoeven, who just got re-elected and can afford to wait for a better cycle. If Hoeven were to run, however, we'd have a barnburner on our hands.80% Generic R vs Dorgan (D) 2%
20% Hoeven (R) vs Dorgan (D) 45%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 10.6%19. New York (D-??? née Clinton)One rumor we've heard is that Rudy Giuliani is concerned about his ability to defeat David Paterson and might run for Senate instead if Paterson appoints a no-name candidate (e.g. anyone not named "Cuomo" or "Kennedy").
50% Generic R vs Cuomo or Kennedy (D) 2%
35% Generic R vs Generic D 10%
15% Giuliani (R) vs Generic D 40%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 10.5%20. Connecticut (D-Dodd)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Chris Dodd (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Hartford Courant 10/29 43 46 -3
Quinnipiac 6/28 51 34 +17Ordinarily, an opponent with a negative approval rating would be a prime target, but among the two Republicans with some statewide cachet, Jodi Rell has no reason to leave the governor's mansion, and Chris Shays just lost his House seat and says he isn't interested in the Senate. I'm assigning a 10 percent probability of a Republican victory as a default, but they'll need to find a candidate first.Probability of Republican Pickup 10.0%21. Oklahoma (R-Coburn)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Tom Coburn (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Sooner Poll 7/21 59 24 +35
SurveyUSA 11/2006 50 38 +12Probably won't be competitive, but Democrats have a couple of contingencies to contemplate: (i) Democratic Governor Brad Henry is ridiculously popular and will be term-limited in 2010, although he had indicated in the past that he wasn't interested in running for the Senate; (ii) Coburn is less than 100% positive that he wants to run for re-election.70% Generic D vs Coburn (R) 1%
15% Henry (D) vs Coburn (R) 30%
10% Generic D vs Generic R 10%
5% Henry (D) vs Generic R 50%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 8.7%22. Wisconsin (D-Feingold)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Russ Feingold (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Strategic Vision 11/1 57 33 +24
SurveyUSA 10/18 53 43 +10
WisPolitics.com 6/9 59 29 +30Feingold does not look at all vulnerable now, but there is a chance he could become so if the mood of the country changes. WI-1's Paul Ryan, who has a history of overperforming in his district, would probably need to be the challenger.75% Generic R vs Feingold (D) 3%
25% Ryan vs Feingold (D) 20%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 7.3%23. Hawaii (D-Inouye)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Daniel Inouye (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 11/2006 68 26 +42Inoyue is a local institution and will not be defeated unless he retires or is unable to run for office, although that is not entirely unlikely since he'll be 86 years old by 2010. The Republicans will then need Governor Linda Lingle to run (who will be term-limited in 2010), who still might might be a slight underdog against Mazie Hirono or Neil Abercrombie in this very blue state. It's a longshot parlay for the GOP, but not inherently an impossible one.75% Generic R vs Inoyue (D) 0.1%
12.5% Lingle (R) vs Generic D 45%
12.5% Generic R vs Generic D 5%
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Combined Probability of Republican Pickup 6.3%24. Alaska (R-Murkowski)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Lisa Murkowski (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Hays Research 3/11 63 33 +30
SurveyUSA 11/2006 54 41 +13If there's action here, it's liable to be in the primary rather than in the general election. Most Republicans with aspirations for national office would prefer to be a governor rather than a senator. But Sarah Palin is potentially an exception, as Alaska's literal and figurative distance from Washington make it difficult for her to expand her network or her brand. Meanwhile, governance is likely to become substantially harder in Alaska if oil prices remain low, as the state relies on oil royalties for the bulk of its revenue.Lisa Murkowski, in other words, is not being entirely paranoid when she's warning Palin to stay away from her seat. The potential opening for Democrats is if Murkowski is bloodied but not beaten by Palin, either surviving a tough primary challenge, or perhaps losing credibility by getting in a public spat with the 'Cuda. This is also, in theory, the sort of seat a third-party candidate might target.
80% Generic D vs Murkowski (R) 7.5%
20% Generic D vs Palin (R) 1%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 6.2%25. Georgia (R-Isakson)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Johnny Isakson (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
PPP 11/24 30 25 +5
Strategic Vision 11/1 50 38 +12Although Isakson's approval scores are not terrific, this race has been demoted significantly as a result of Saxby Chambliss' strong performance in Georgia's runoff this week. The Democrats, moreover, lack strong candidates in Georgia, and will need some time to build a bench.Probability of Democratic Pickup 6.0%26. Louisiana (R-Vitter)Approval/Favorability Ratings: David Vitter (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SMOR 4/2 52 32 +20As we saw on Saturday night, the electoral environment is pretty brutal for Democrats in Louisiana right now, and unless I see polling to convince me otherwise, I don't see any reason to conclude that Vitter is anything other than what he seems, which is a fairly popular Republican incumbent in a red state. LA-3's Charlie Melancon, the only remaining Democrat to represent Louisiana in the House, is considered the most credible opponent, but unless he sees himself as a potential victim of redistricting (Louisiana is likely to lose a House seat once the Congress is redrawn in 2012), it would be a lot to ask him to give up his seat.Probability of Democratic Pickup 5.0%27. Maryland (D-Mikulski)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Barbara Mikulski (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 11/2006 57 35 +22If re-elected, Mikulski would become the longest-serving female senator in history, which might be the extra incentive she needs to steer her away from retirement; Republicans face long odds even if she quits.85% Generic R vs Mikulski (D) 2%
15% Generic R vs Generic D 10%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 3.2%28. South Carolina (R-DeMint)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Jim DeMint (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 2/19 49 37 +12Although DeMint's approval ratings are marginal enough to create some wiggle room for a challenge, Democrats have a weak bench in South Carolina.Probability of Democratic Pickup 3.0%29. Washington (D-Murray)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Patty Murray (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Strategic Vision 11/1 55 37 +18
SurveyUSA 10/18 55 35 +20Murray is fairly entrenched, and Washington isn't really behaving as a swing state of late.Probability of Republican Pickup 2.5% 30. Vermont (D-Leahy)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Pat Leahy (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Research 2000 10/2007 67 29 +38
SurveyUSA 11/2006 71 25 +46There's a small chance that Pat Leahy could retire, in which case Republican Governor Jim Douglas could run. Otherwise, the seat is untouchable.90% Generic R vs Leahy 0.01%
6% Generic R vs Generic D 2%
4% Douglas vs Generic D 40%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 1.7%31. Alabama (R-Shelby)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Richard Shelby (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 61 32 +29The Democrats have some candidates like Arthur Davis that might be compelling in another state, but are highly unlikely to be viable in Alabama, especially against a popular incumbent like Shelby. Shelby could retire, which might give the Dems an outside chance, but likely not more than that.85% Generic D vs Shelby (R) 0.5%
15% Generic D vs Generic R 5%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 1.2%32. South Dakota (R-Thune)Approval/Favorability Ratings: John Thune (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Mason-Dixon 10/14 64 34 +30
SurveyUSA 11/2006 61 35 +26One day, At-Large Representative Stephanie Herseth-Sandlin might take a run at this seat, but she has no reason to do so now while Thune remains highly popular, especially when South Dakota will also have an open governor's seat.Probability of Democratic Pickup 1.0% 33. Indiana (D-Bayh)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Evan Bayh (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 2/4 58 32 +26Bayh generally wins his races by large margins, and with Indiana turning bluer, this cycle is unlikely to break the pattern.Probability of Republican Pickup 0.5% 34. Oregon (D-Wyden)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Ron Wyden (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 10/18 54 34 +20
Davis/Hibbitts 12/2007 45 19 +26Wyden is quite popular; any credible Republican opposition will gravitate toward the governor's seat instead, where Ted Kulongoski will be term-limited.Probability of Republican Pickup 0.2%35. Utah (R-Bennett)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Bob Bennett (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Dan Jones 1/2007 67 18 +49
SurveyUSA 11/2006 58 32 +25Bennett might retire, in which case the Democrats will find out that Utah is still Utah.85% Generic D vs Bennett (R) 0.01%
15% Generic D vs Generic R 1%
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Combined Probability of Democratic Pickup 0.2%36. New York (D-Schumer)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Chuck Schumer (D)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
Marist 10/22 55 33 +22
SurveyUSA 10/18 60 31 +29
Quinnipiac 8/2 61 23 +38As this seat is now protected both by a governor's race and by a second, more vulnerable senate seat, Schumer should face only token opposition.Probability of Republican Pickup 0.1%37. Idaho (R-Crapo)Approval/Favorability Ratings: Mike Crapo (R)
Poll Date Approve Disapprove Net
SurveyUSA 7/2007 61 26 +35It's pronounced Cray-poh, so you can take your Larry Craig jokes elsewhere.Probability of Democratic Pickup 0.01%Summary
Even if momentum has swung somewhat against the Democrats by 2010, they remain in a strong position to gain seats in the Senate. They are pretty much locked into reasonably competitive races in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina and New Hampshire, will probably get one in Kansas, and could potentially get one in Iowa and perhaps even Texas or Arizona depending on retirements. By contrast, the only near-certain competitive Democratic seat is in Nevada; beyond that, the Republicans are looking at a series of second- and third-tier races like Colorado and Wisconsin, or races that require a white knight like Arkansas, California, North Dakota and New York. Overall, our guesstimate is that the Democrats will pick up 3-4 Republican seats and the Republicans 1-2 Democratic seats, for a net swing of 1-3 seats for the Democrats, potentially placing them beyond the 60-seat threshold. Democratic gains in the Senate, indeed, are possible or even likely even if they lose ground in the House. Although much of this simply reflects the staggered nature of US Senate seats -- it's Democrats who will have their backs to the wall in 2012 -- there are some deeper implications as well, which we will explore at a later date.
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