Many of you may know what a voter file is - it's the database of registered voters in a given state/district to which campaigns buy access. Voters' names, ages, phone numbers, addresses, alternate addresses, official political party registration (if applicable) all go in there. For anyone who's ever been surprised to receive a phone call from a political campaign and wondered how they got their number, especially if it's a cell number ("I'm on the Do Not Call List!"), political campaigns are exempt from that rule, and your number is in the voter file.
Not all voter files are created equal. Some consist of a giant, amorphous lump of data. Some voter files are corrupted by sloppiness, mistakes and incompletions. But some voter files are finely honed tools of accurate information. Therein lies much of the competition in a campaign's ground game. To be able to get your voters to the polls and to work on the persuadable voters, you first have to know exactly who they are. For anyone who's ever volunteered for a campaign and been instructed at the outset to record accurate info in their lists, this is why.
Some states keep track of partisan registration. Others, such as Montana, do not have party registration, so it falls to information like, "voted in the Democratic primary" as a way to begin culling targeted voters. Well-funded and smart campaigns spend major time and money from an early stage first identifying voters as Democrats/Republicans/Undecideds/Other, then deciding who they will try and target for persuasion, and finally who they will swarm with contacts over the final few days in the GOTV (get out the vote) effort.
The more money a campaign has, and the better it spends that money, it builds a field staff who begins ID'ing voters from very early on, usually finding lots of soft support and undecideds and a few strongly committed people. The staff then begins a pyramid scheme of recruiting volunteers to make further voter contact. If one staff organizer can call 400 numbers in an evening and reach 100 live people and get partial or full information out of 50 of them, then an organizer who spends all evening calling to find 5 volunteers to make 400 calls each is a more efficient use of that organizer's time. (It also quickly builds up in an organizer disdain for people who just yak on blog sites without taking action, and a deep sense of gratitude for the people who actually show up and make calls or knock on doors.)
Through phone calls, through doorknocking, through information gleaned from sign up sheets and cards at rallies and picnics and other events, the campaign staff refines and refines its own understanding of which voters it can count on, which ones it might be able to persuade with targeted messaging, and which ones would be a waste of energy. Since voters can change their minds, any given voter might have a record of repeated contacts in the database. They might have been reached by phone in March, met at their door in May, on the phone again in August, and on the phone again in October. Their support may have never wavered, or the different contacts might have tracked iffy support.
Voter files also have information about how often that voter has voted. Do they vote in general elections only, or are they a regular primary voter? Have they voted only once in the past 3 elections? Do they early/absentee vote?
Where there is early voting - and this is one of the reasons good campaigns put such an emphasis on it - access to the voter file allows a campaign to see which specific voters have returned their ballots, because when the election board gets the ballot back, they upload the data and campaigns can see who's procrastinating and who's not. Obviously that vote hasn't been unsealed, but if your campaign registered that person to vote, they told you they were supporting your candidate, you alerted them to the option of early voting, they requested an early ballot, they then returned that ballot to the elections office and the elections office noted electronically that they'd returned it, well, you can save yourself some resources about having to call that voter or knock on her door to remind them on Election Day. Resources instead can be placed elsewhere. It's one of the reasons that Oregon, for example, with its total mail-in process, is a field organizer's dream. You get to see exactly who's voted so far and who hasn't, and focus on the ones who haven't.
For those of you unfamiliar with this process, you are surely getting the picture that it's critical to have excellent organization, motivation and accuracy in the data collecting/voter identifying process. And how critical it is to start early and have money to build a staff. And to find the right staff - the best pyramid builders. If you've ever read on anecdotal blogs about volunteers going to this or that office to make phone calls, knock on doors, etc., from the campaign's perspective it's all about collecting all that data and pipelining it into the system accurately in quick turnaround so that the next day's wave of human effort is that much more efficient. When you read some blurb from somewhere that Obama's team made 1 million contacts in such and such a small primary state (particularly in a state where that's around 3 times the number of voters combined on both sides), the reason that is a meaningful number is that voter file is probably very, very useful by now.
It's also one way you find out about what the other side is doing in terms of messaging and their own voter contact - you note the anecdotal reports of the phone calls or mailers the people you talk to are receiving. Reporting what you're hearing then informs the top staff so that they can decide if they need to counter the messaging and if so, how.
Some of you, particularly in the wake of the FISA brou-ha-ha, may be sensitive to the idea of campaigns collecting a lot of data out of innocent-seeming conversations. But if you are a political partisan and even an objective observer you understand the efficiency merit and competitive edge in having the most complete voter file possible. If Barack Obama's campaign helps refine the voter file list for Democrats in, say, Washington State, then later on the woman running for the Washington state legislature in her local House district can access the same file and compile a list of doors she's going to knock on that weekend. Maybe she feels like finding all the voters who regularly vote Democratic, or maybe she feels like talking to regular Republican voters to see if she can persuade them to support her in the local race. She can slice and dice the data to compile a list of phone numbers and addresses for her own contacts. If the voter file helps her make contacts and win rather than lose, now we're talking about how a 50-state strategy helps build political parties.
People don't like to be bothered, most of them, and most people don't like to call up 400 total strangers a night to quiz them on their political leanings. It's draining, especially for introverts. But that's the ground work of campaigns. Every drop in that bucket for either side helps on Election Day. (And by the way, screw yard signs. What a total waste of time.)
Now, a word about Virginia, and the Democratic resurgence there. I lived in Charlottesville for awhile (shout out to Greenberry's coffee), but I wasn't active politically. So I have no direct experience with ground work there. But one of the reasons Virginia's elections are getting more and more competitive is that, from what I've heard from a number of firsthand sources who have worked cycles in Virginia, is that that voter file is as good a state voter file as Democrats have anywhere. It's more than just changing demographics in NoVa.
The quality of Virginia's voter file makes sense. Gubernatorial races in 2001 and 2005 resulted in big Democratic wins (Mark Warner and Tim Kaine). 2004 was a Presidential year with plenty of resources allocated to voter contact in Virginia, 2006 was the Congressional wave year of Jim Webb's upset win in which the DSCC spent massively, and 2007 featured many state legislative races with individual campaign budgets in the mid-high hundreds of thousands of dollars. In off years like 2007, organizers who work campaign cycles come off of national election cycles looking for the action. There isn't much - a handful of special election races, the Kentucky governor's race last year, and Virginia. In 2007, ironically, it was the Virginia legislative races that attracted many quality organizers who weren't early presidential staffers.
By explaining this aspect of campaigns to those who aren't already aware and by highlighting Virginia, I don't mean to say that 1+1=2, that Democrats will therefore win Virginia. What I do mean to suggest, a bit building on yesterday's discussion of MN and WI, is that the campaigns know where they need to pour resources. The contrast in yesterday's post was the comment by an anonymous McCain high-level staffer about what the internal polls showed in Minnesota and Wisconsin if Pawlenty were picked, contrasted with the actual behavior of Barack Obama's campaign not even deigning to put Pawlenty's home state of Minnesota in the top 18 ad states or the 17 states receiving 3,600 organizing fellows. There's no bias in inferring how the Obama camp is perceiving Minnesota's chances based on that observance of actual behavior. It's even possible that Obama's staff is wildly miscalculating Minnesota, and my conclusions that the McCain camp comments were Lanny Davis/Terry McAuliffe-esque hype are totally wrong. But if I concede that it's possible I'm wrong, those who disagree with me should certainly lend a lot of weight to the telegraphed signals about what Obama's camp thinks of those Minnesota chances. Action (ad buys and organizing fellow deployments) speaks louder than words (insider comments to a reporter).
Despite the sturm und drang over how a long primary season could "weaken" the Democratic nominee, the big advantage in having the Democrats go through a 50-state competitive primary is that 50 voter files just improved even before the general election re-refines them. Massive volunteer lists were compiled to insta-build those pyramids I talked about. Dismissing the value of social networking organizations and internet small-dollar fundraising is a huge mistake, in my view.
I'd like to read in some of the comments anecdotal evidence - on both partisan sides - about which state voter files look particularly good or bad, just out of curiosity. I can say that Montana's seems pretty good for Dems (the Tester race meant massive DSCC resources were spent improving the thing), and Texas' file needed a ton of work as of a couple years ago.
(PS - "a Saturday for beer and baseball?" Pfft. The beer's ok, but how bout rounds 2-7 of the NHL Draft and a little poker? Now that's what I'm talking about. Alex Pietrangelo, baby.)
6.21.2008
Today's Polls, 6/21
@ 5:31 PM
This is a Saturday for beer and baseball, and not for polling, but we do have one result out. In Washington, SurveyUSA has Barack Obama leading John McCain by 15 points. SurveyUSA conducts two separate sets of Washington polls each month. This month, Barack Obama has led in those surveys by 15 and 17 points; last month, he led by 16 and 12.
As The Stranger has noted, Barack Obama has dropped Washington and Oregon from his first large-scale general election ad buy. That is because there really isn't any indication that those states are going to be at all close. Washington (State) and Oregon like their Democrats pretty liberal, but like much of the West, they aren't particularly fond of candidates from the D.C. establishment. Barack Obama's is not (yet) perceived as a creature of Washington, and so he's getting pretty much the best of both worlds in these states. They're also especially unhappy with the Iraq war, a bad fit for the increasingly hawkish McCain. Although these cross-tabs aren't available in today's version of the SurveyUSA poll, Barack Obama led 82-14 among voters whose top priority is the Iraq war in their Washington poll last week.
The only other numbers we've got for you are from the national tracking polls: Gallup is unchanged from yesterday, showing the race at Obama 46, McCain 44; Obama ticked up one point to gain a 5-point advantage in the Rasmussen tracker.
As The Stranger has noted, Barack Obama has dropped Washington and Oregon from his first large-scale general election ad buy. That is because there really isn't any indication that those states are going to be at all close. Washington (State) and Oregon like their Democrats pretty liberal, but like much of the West, they aren't particularly fond of candidates from the D.C. establishment. Barack Obama's is not (yet) perceived as a creature of Washington, and so he's getting pretty much the best of both worlds in these states. They're also especially unhappy with the Iraq war, a bad fit for the increasingly hawkish McCain. Although these cross-tabs aren't available in today's version of the SurveyUSA poll, Barack Obama led 82-14 among voters whose top priority is the Iraq war in their Washington poll last week.
The only other numbers we've got for you are from the national tracking polls: Gallup is unchanged from yesterday, showing the race at Obama 46, McCain 44; Obama ticked up one point to gain a 5-point advantage in the Rasmussen tracker.
Obama's bounce in state vs national polls
@ 3:55 PM
Particularly before the Newsweek poll came out last night, which showed an oversized, 15-point post-primary bounce for Barack Obama, there had been an apparent discrepancy in the size of the bounce that Obama had received in state and national polling.
Firstly, let's update our chart of Obama's numbers in state polling. What follows is a comparison of the Obama less McCain margin in all states that have been polled since the primaries concluded that were also surveyed by the same agency at some point in May:
What about Obama's bounce in national polling?
Firstly, the national polls that showed Obama regressing this month all had him at a pretty high number before. ABC/WaPo had him 7 points ahead of John McCain last month, Zogby had him 8 points ahead, and IBD/Tipp had him 11 points ahead. The most recent version of each of these polls all showed Obama regressing. But really all Obama may have been doing is regressing toward the mean. Does anybody really believe that Obama was ahead by 7, 8 or even 11 points last month? That's certainly not the impression one was getting from the state-by-state polling results we were seeing in May. If Obama wins this election by 11 points, you will see things happen like him winning Pennsylvania by 16 points, or winning states like Texas, Arizona and Kansas, or winning Florida by high single digits. Those aren't the sorts of results we are seeing now, and they certainly weren't the sorts of results we were seeing in May.
So let's instead focus only on those pollsters that release national polls on a weekly-or-better basis. This means Rasmussen and Gallup, which release numbers daily, and Economist/YouGov, which releases numbers weekly. These polls are going to be far less subject to problems with small sample sizes than surveys that are conducted just once a month.
To the extent that one is going to use national polling results to divine trends, one ought to give a relatively large weight to the two national tracking polls. Gallup and Rasmussen are each surveying about 25,000 voters per month for their national trackers, as compared to a once-a-month survey like ABC/WaPo, which might poll one-twentieth that many people. Although there are some diminishing returns associated with large sample sizes, it is also not a case where all polls should be treated equally.
Firstly, let's update our chart of Obama's numbers in state polling. What follows is a comparison of the Obama less McCain margin in all states that have been polled since the primaries concluded that were also surveyed by the same agency at some point in May:
State / Agency May June ChangeAcross 29 state polls, Obama's bounce is 4.1 points -- down slightly from our estimate earlier in the week. The bounce appears to be roughly normally distributed; if you drew a histogram of the bounce in individual states, it would resemble a bell curve.
AR Rasmussen -24 -9 +15
KY SurveyUSA -24 -12 +12
OH Quinnipiac -4 +6 +10
KS Rasmussen -19 -10 +9
ME Rasmsseun +13 +22 +9
GA Insider Adv -10 -1 +9
FL Quinnipiac -4 +4 +8
NY Siena +11 +18 +7
WA Rasmussen +11 +18 +7
NH Rasmussen +5 +11 +6
PA Quinnipaic +6 +12 +6
WI Rasmussen -4 +2 +6
AK Rasmussen -9 -4 +5
IA Rasmussen +2 +7 +5
CA SurveyUSA +8 +12 +4
VA Rasmussen -3 +1 +4
MI Rasmussen -1 +3 +4
WA SurveyUSA +14.0* +17 +3
NV Rasmussen -6 -3 +3
WI SurveyUSA +6 +9 +3
FL Rasmussen -10 -8 +2
NC Rasmussen -3 -2 +1
NC Civitas -5 -4 +1
OH Rasmussen -1 -1 0
MN Rasmussen +15 +13 -2
MN SurveyUSA +5 +1 -4
CO Rasmussen +6 +2 -4
IA SurveyUSA +9 +4 -5
OR Rasmussen +14 +8 -6
==========================================
AVERAGE -0.1 +4.0 +4.1
* Average of all May surveys.
What about Obama's bounce in national polling?
State / Agency May June ChangeIn national polling, Obama's average bounce has been 2.7 points. That isn't all that far away from our state polling bounce to begin with, but there are a couple of additional things to notice that make discrepancy even smaller.
US Newsweek 0 +15 +15
US Harris +4 +11 +7
US Economist -3.2* +3 +6.2
US Rasmussen -1.1* +5 +6.1
US USA Today +2.0* +6 +4
US AP-Ipsos +4 +7 +3
US Cook/RT +1 +4 +3
US Gallup +0.1* +2 +1.9
US ABC/WaPo +7 +6 -1
US Diageo/Hotline +4 +2 -2
US Zogby +8 +5 -3
US IBD/Tipp +11 +3 -8
==========================================
AVERAGE +3.1 +5.8 +2.7
* Average of all May surveys.
Firstly, the national polls that showed Obama regressing this month all had him at a pretty high number before. ABC/WaPo had him 7 points ahead of John McCain last month, Zogby had him 8 points ahead, and IBD/Tipp had him 11 points ahead. The most recent version of each of these polls all showed Obama regressing. But really all Obama may have been doing is regressing toward the mean. Does anybody really believe that Obama was ahead by 7, 8 or even 11 points last month? That's certainly not the impression one was getting from the state-by-state polling results we were seeing in May. If Obama wins this election by 11 points, you will see things happen like him winning Pennsylvania by 16 points, or winning states like Texas, Arizona and Kansas, or winning Florida by high single digits. Those aren't the sorts of results we are seeing now, and they certainly weren't the sorts of results we were seeing in May.
So let's instead focus only on those pollsters that release national polls on a weekly-or-better basis. This means Rasmussen and Gallup, which release numbers daily, and Economist/YouGov, which releases numbers weekly. These polls are going to be far less subject to problems with small sample sizes than surveys that are conducted just once a month.
State / Agency May June ChangeThese three polls show an average bounce of 4.7 points, barely different from our finding in the state-by-state results. If you exclude the Economist's poll and focus only on the two daily trackers, Obama's present bounce is 4.0 points, which is even closer to the target established by the state polls.
US Economist -3.2* +3 +6.7
US Rasmussen -1.1* +5 +6.1
US Gallup +0.1* +2 +1.9
===========================================
AVERAGE -1.4 +3.3 +4.7
* Average of all May surveys.
To the extent that one is going to use national polling results to divine trends, one ought to give a relatively large weight to the two national tracking polls. Gallup and Rasmussen are each surveying about 25,000 voters per month for their national trackers, as compared to a once-a-month survey like ABC/WaPo, which might poll one-twentieth that many people. Although there are some diminishing returns associated with large sample sizes, it is also not a case where all polls should be treated equally.
Swing District Dems voted for FISA Compromise
@ 8:45 AM
Yesterday's FISA legislation passed the House without a majority of support from Democrats, who opposed the measure 105-128 in spite of the votes of Reps. Pelosi and Hoyer. A notable exception however were Democrats in competitive districts.
The Cook Political Report counts 31 incumbent Democrats as being in potentially competitive House districts, not including those who are retiring. Here is how that group of 31 voted on the legislation:
That is 23 Yeas against 8 Nays; included among the Yeas were all 6 incumbent Democrats in districts rated as "toss-up". By contrast, those Democrats in noncompetitive districts (or those who are retiring) voted against the measure 82-120. A special star of sorts should go to IN-9's Baron Hill, who was the only Democrat in a competitive Red State district to oppose the measure. Hill has run for the House five times, winning on four occasions, but never by more than 25,000 votes.
Now, one should be careful about conflating cause and effect. Did these Democrats vote for the FISA bill because they think it will help them to get re-elected? Or were they elected in 2006 because they were conservative enough Democrats to vote for this legislation in the first place?
Either way, this certainly helps to explain Nancy Pelosi's mindset.
As for Barack Obama, I'm not sure that he had much choice but to come out in support of the legislation. Was he really going to throw Nancy Pelosi under the bus and pick an intraparty fight when she was as instrumental as anybody else in Washington in getting him the nomination? Was he really going to run afoul of the Blue Dogs when they are probably his swing voters in passing some version of national health care legislation?
This was certainly a political decision on Obama's part -- but not necessarily one that had very much to do with his own electoral prospects. The FISA issue simply isn't high-profile enough to register at the national level. Instead, it was a decision made with the politics of governance in mind: not a 2008 decision, but one for 2009.
The Cook Political Report counts 31 incumbent Democrats as being in potentially competitive House districts, not including those who are retiring. Here is how that group of 31 voted on the legislation:
That is 23 Yeas against 8 Nays; included among the Yeas were all 6 incumbent Democrats in districts rated as "toss-up". By contrast, those Democrats in noncompetitive districts (or those who are retiring) voted against the measure 82-120. A special star of sorts should go to IN-9's Baron Hill, who was the only Democrat in a competitive Red State district to oppose the measure. Hill has run for the House five times, winning on four occasions, but never by more than 25,000 votes.
Now, one should be careful about conflating cause and effect. Did these Democrats vote for the FISA bill because they think it will help them to get re-elected? Or were they elected in 2006 because they were conservative enough Democrats to vote for this legislation in the first place?
Either way, this certainly helps to explain Nancy Pelosi's mindset.
As for Barack Obama, I'm not sure that he had much choice but to come out in support of the legislation. Was he really going to throw Nancy Pelosi under the bus and pick an intraparty fight when she was as instrumental as anybody else in Washington in getting him the nomination? Was he really going to run afoul of the Blue Dogs when they are probably his swing voters in passing some version of national health care legislation?
This was certainly a political decision on Obama's part -- but not necessarily one that had very much to do with his own electoral prospects. The FISA issue simply isn't high-profile enough to register at the national level. Instead, it was a decision made with the politics of governance in mind: not a 2008 decision, but one for 2009.
6.20.2008
Today's Polls, 6/20
@ 7:15 PM
A new Rasmussen poll in the state of Nevada has John McCain leading Barack Obama by 3 points. This is a slight improvement for Obama from Rasmussen's previous poll, which had shown McCain ahead by 6. Nevertheless, Nevada remains one of those states where our regression model thinks that Obama's numbers have significant room to improve. Obama has outfundraised McCain by better than 4:1 in the Silver State, and Nevada has a highly secular population, a group that has performed well for Obama in other states.
So what gives? Nevada has historically been an apathetic state politically. It's turnout rate in the 2004 election was among the lowest in the country by any and all measures. And not that the following metric is the end-all, be-all, but when I rank the states from 1 to 50 in terms of the amount of per-capita traffic they contribute to FiveThirtyEight.com, Nevada ranks just 36th (the top three states, FWIW, are Massachusetts, Washington and Oregon; the bottom three are Mississippi, West Virginia, and Oklahoma). If Obama wants to win Nevada, he is probably going to have to rattle the cage a little harder than he might in another state.
In New Hampshire, which is anything but apathetic politically, Rasmussen has Barack Obama increasing his lead to 11 points; last month he led John McCain there by 5. Remember my rule of thumb about New Hampshire: its numbers tends to move about twice as much as the national average. So if Obama is leading by 11 points in New Hampshire, that would imply a 5.5 point lead nationally, which is just about where we have him.
Also two new polls out from SurveyUSA. In California, Barack Obama leads John McCain by 12 points, up from 7 points in their tracking last month. In Iowa, however, he leads by 4 -- down from 9 last month. I would be a little bit cautious about reading too much into either of the Iowa polls released within the past week as Iowans presently have bigger things to worry about.
Finally, while we don't usually focus on national polls, that's where a lot of the action has been today, with no fewer than seven of them released within the past 24 hours.
Newsweek's poll is the attention-getter, showing Barack Obama leading John McCain by 15 points. Is Barack Obama actually ahead by 15 points? Of course not. Newsweek's data tends to be fairly volatile, and we have a whole bunch of polling on both the state and national level that implies that Obama's real margin is closer to 5 points. Nevertheless, he has broken through a barrier of sorts. The last instance I can identify when a Democrat held a 15-point lead over a Republican nominee in any individual November trial heat poll is from November, 1996, when CBS News gave Bill Clinton an 18-point lead over Bob Dole on the eve of the election.
Other national polling, CNBC-style: Gallup Tracker: Obama +2; Rasmussen: Obama +4; USA Today/Gallup: Obama +6; FOX: Obama +4; Ipsos: Obama +7; and Harris Interactive, Obama +11.
So what gives? Nevada has historically been an apathetic state politically. It's turnout rate in the 2004 election was among the lowest in the country by any and all measures. And not that the following metric is the end-all, be-all, but when I rank the states from 1 to 50 in terms of the amount of per-capita traffic they contribute to FiveThirtyEight.com, Nevada ranks just 36th (the top three states, FWIW, are Massachusetts, Washington and Oregon; the bottom three are Mississippi, West Virginia, and Oklahoma). If Obama wants to win Nevada, he is probably going to have to rattle the cage a little harder than he might in another state.
In New Hampshire, which is anything but apathetic politically, Rasmussen has Barack Obama increasing his lead to 11 points; last month he led John McCain there by 5. Remember my rule of thumb about New Hampshire: its numbers tends to move about twice as much as the national average. So if Obama is leading by 11 points in New Hampshire, that would imply a 5.5 point lead nationally, which is just about where we have him.
Also two new polls out from SurveyUSA. In California, Barack Obama leads John McCain by 12 points, up from 7 points in their tracking last month. In Iowa, however, he leads by 4 -- down from 9 last month. I would be a little bit cautious about reading too much into either of the Iowa polls released within the past week as Iowans presently have bigger things to worry about.
Finally, while we don't usually focus on national polls, that's where a lot of the action has been today, with no fewer than seven of them released within the past 24 hours.
Newsweek's poll is the attention-getter, showing Barack Obama leading John McCain by 15 points. Is Barack Obama actually ahead by 15 points? Of course not. Newsweek's data tends to be fairly volatile, and we have a whole bunch of polling on both the state and national level that implies that Obama's real margin is closer to 5 points. Nevertheless, he has broken through a barrier of sorts. The last instance I can identify when a Democrat held a 15-point lead over a Republican nominee in any individual November trial heat poll is from November, 1996, when CBS News gave Bill Clinton an 18-point lead over Bob Dole on the eve of the election.
Other national polling, CNBC-style: Gallup Tracker: Obama +2; Rasmussen: Obama +4; USA Today/Gallup: Obama +6; FOX: Obama +4; Ipsos: Obama +7; and Harris Interactive, Obama +11.
McCain VP: Pawlenty Guarantees MN, WI?
@ 11:21 AM
Yesterday, James Pethokoukis of US News and World Report reported that Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty is high in the running for John McCain's VP selection. The claim from the source for the story, "a high-ranking McCain campaign official," also accompanies a mention that internal polling shows Pawlenty "delivering" both Minnesota and Wisconsin to McCain in the fall.
Wow, I had no idea it was that easy. Just name a guy as VP, and because he's from the region, a couple states you look like a longshot to win suddenly become yours. I mean, they should totally do that; it's a no-brainer.
Minnesota's last ten public polls have showed Obama leading in 9 instances, and the one instance McCain led was 47-46 by SurveyUSA in mid-March. Since then, SurveyUSA's once a month polling has shown Obama with leads of +6, +5 and +1 (their February poll had Obama +7). Rasmussen has shown Obama leads of 14, 15 and 13. The Star-Tribune poll of 1117 respondents in mid-May had Obama up 13 points. 538 regression analysis puts Obama in front by 9.3%, and predicts a 10.4% win.
In Wisconsin, it's Rasmussen who has the race somewhat close, with its June 5 poll putting Obama up by 2, its May 5 poll McCain up by 4, and its late March poll showing McCain up 2. Unfortunately for McCain, those two Rasmussen polls in March and early May are the only Wisconsin public polls that have McCain in front. SurveyUSA's last 5 polls have Obama up 9, 6, 5, 4 and 11, working from this past Sunday back to late February. As is the case in Minnesota, the trend is going Obama's way, with 538 regression putting Obama 8.2% in front and projecting an 8.4% win.
McCain's internal polling apparently says Minnesotans are homers under the Pawlenty Theory. Or, the spin is that Kerry's 3.5% win in 2004 is the biggest margin by which Obama can beat McCain whereas McCain can siphon that off with a strategic VP pick, and all the polls showing a much, much wider lead in Minnesota are a mirage.
But of course, if you pick a governor from one state as vice-president, that carries so much weight that even citizens of neighboring states suddenly fall in line. A hundred thousand Wisconsin voters who were planning to vote Obama just think, "hey, I totally heard that guy Pawlenty is from near this state, I don't really have a strong opinion on any other factor in this race, I gotta flip my vote from what I am currently telling pollsters!" (Obviously, telling pollsters by representative sample).
Did we mention Obama's Illinois also borders Wisconsin? So let's thread this needle for Wisconsin voters. Gotta not have very strong opinions about Obama or McCain to start. Have to be wishy-washy and flippable. They have to absorb the info - as low-info voters or ambivalent voters or low-frequency voters - to assign weight and value to the fact that the lower-tier candidate is from a neighboring state, while not assigning weight and value to the fact that the higher-tier candidate from the other party is from a neighboring state. They then have to elevate that factor's meaning over and above the meanings of other arbitrary factors you hear from people who are low-info voters. Such as any factors that go into the reality that only 17% of the country, low-info voters included, thinks the country is on the right track.
Now, anyone who's talked to thousands of voters on the phones and at their doors and in random conversations knows that the reasons low-info voters come up with are almost uniformly frightening in terms of that person's mental processes on politics. And I mean that in a non-partisan way, whether the output of the bizarre calculation they share with you is support of your candidate or the opposition. The good news is nobody gets to be offended by this; if you're reading this post you already aren't a low-info voter. (Though I'm sure someone will entertainingly point out in comments how opinions like these are ruining the purity and sanctity of the site.) Regardless of all the obligatory paeans you hear to the Great Judgment of the American People from the talking heads, one always comes away from such discussions feeling depressed about how much dead weight there is out there in terms of informed citizenry.
It's important to understand that, almost by definition, the quirky calculus of low-info voters isn't subject to en masse influence by any particular trivia-quality factor such as VP's home state. It's nearly a tautology. To be persuadable by new information, you have to absorb that information. You have to think things like, "I like that guy and I'm gonna vote for him," which assumes you already have a basis for forming your opinion. And once you're down that road, you probably have a basic opinion about which of Obama or McCain you like better. Of course there are exceptions, but the point is they don't exist in the large numbers that would be required to change the bottom line outcome.
Granted, as a general rule, private, internal-use campaign polling is usually much better than public polling. So McCain's internal polling is supposedly identifying voters so much on the fence and so much under the powerful, hypnotic sway of Tim Pawlenty that they will flip their soft support, or come out and vote instead of sitting home. Or, McCain's internal polling shows something wildly different from what 538 projects for those two states.
Color Camp Obama unimpressed; they don't even list Minnesota in their top 17 most competitive states, not even bothering to send any of their 3,600 Organizing Fellows to Minnesota (Wisconsin gets some). That should tell you everything you need to infer what the internal private polling is telling Obama about Minnesota. And the big advertising buy in 18 states doesn't include Minnesota either.
Something tells me this is 2 parts internal political jockeying by Pawlenty patrons within the McCain camp, 1 part run-of-the-mill political hype. (McCain has his Lanny Davises and Terry McAuliffes too, though those two are absurdists for the ages, see links.)
At the end of the day, McCain may well pick Pawlenty, and there would be endless blather about how the Republicans are going to leverage Pawlenty's overwhelming 1%, 21,000 vote (out of nearly 2.2 million cast) Minnesota gubernatorial re-election win in 2006 into automatic electoral success in the fall. I'm not really sure Bridge Collapse Guy is going to be able to hit Barack Obama on inexperience, for example.
Finally, John McCain is in Ottawa (Canada) for a press conference today, and Pawlenty is a hockey fan, which gives me the transparently flimsy excuse I was seeking to get in a mention of the NHL Draft tonight in Ottawa. Who among us isn't hanging on who the St. Louis Blues will take with the 4th pick? Maybe the exact same number of Minnesotans and Wisconsans who would have voted for Obama but for Pawlenty.
Wow, I had no idea it was that easy. Just name a guy as VP, and because he's from the region, a couple states you look like a longshot to win suddenly become yours. I mean, they should totally do that; it's a no-brainer.
Minnesota's last ten public polls have showed Obama leading in 9 instances, and the one instance McCain led was 47-46 by SurveyUSA in mid-March. Since then, SurveyUSA's once a month polling has shown Obama with leads of +6, +5 and +1 (their February poll had Obama +7). Rasmussen has shown Obama leads of 14, 15 and 13. The Star-Tribune poll of 1117 respondents in mid-May had Obama up 13 points. 538 regression analysis puts Obama in front by 9.3%, and predicts a 10.4% win.
In Wisconsin, it's Rasmussen who has the race somewhat close, with its June 5 poll putting Obama up by 2, its May 5 poll McCain up by 4, and its late March poll showing McCain up 2. Unfortunately for McCain, those two Rasmussen polls in March and early May are the only Wisconsin public polls that have McCain in front. SurveyUSA's last 5 polls have Obama up 9, 6, 5, 4 and 11, working from this past Sunday back to late February. As is the case in Minnesota, the trend is going Obama's way, with 538 regression putting Obama 8.2% in front and projecting an 8.4% win.
McCain's internal polling apparently says Minnesotans are homers under the Pawlenty Theory. Or, the spin is that Kerry's 3.5% win in 2004 is the biggest margin by which Obama can beat McCain whereas McCain can siphon that off with a strategic VP pick, and all the polls showing a much, much wider lead in Minnesota are a mirage.
But of course, if you pick a governor from one state as vice-president, that carries so much weight that even citizens of neighboring states suddenly fall in line. A hundred thousand Wisconsin voters who were planning to vote Obama just think, "hey, I totally heard that guy Pawlenty is from near this state, I don't really have a strong opinion on any other factor in this race, I gotta flip my vote from what I am currently telling pollsters!" (Obviously, telling pollsters by representative sample).
Did we mention Obama's Illinois also borders Wisconsin? So let's thread this needle for Wisconsin voters. Gotta not have very strong opinions about Obama or McCain to start. Have to be wishy-washy and flippable. They have to absorb the info - as low-info voters or ambivalent voters or low-frequency voters - to assign weight and value to the fact that the lower-tier candidate is from a neighboring state, while not assigning weight and value to the fact that the higher-tier candidate from the other party is from a neighboring state. They then have to elevate that factor's meaning over and above the meanings of other arbitrary factors you hear from people who are low-info voters. Such as any factors that go into the reality that only 17% of the country, low-info voters included, thinks the country is on the right track.
Now, anyone who's talked to thousands of voters on the phones and at their doors and in random conversations knows that the reasons low-info voters come up with are almost uniformly frightening in terms of that person's mental processes on politics. And I mean that in a non-partisan way, whether the output of the bizarre calculation they share with you is support of your candidate or the opposition. The good news is nobody gets to be offended by this; if you're reading this post you already aren't a low-info voter. (Though I'm sure someone will entertainingly point out in comments how opinions like these are ruining the purity and sanctity of the site.) Regardless of all the obligatory paeans you hear to the Great Judgment of the American People from the talking heads, one always comes away from such discussions feeling depressed about how much dead weight there is out there in terms of informed citizenry.
It's important to understand that, almost by definition, the quirky calculus of low-info voters isn't subject to en masse influence by any particular trivia-quality factor such as VP's home state. It's nearly a tautology. To be persuadable by new information, you have to absorb that information. You have to think things like, "I like that guy and I'm gonna vote for him," which assumes you already have a basis for forming your opinion. And once you're down that road, you probably have a basic opinion about which of Obama or McCain you like better. Of course there are exceptions, but the point is they don't exist in the large numbers that would be required to change the bottom line outcome.
Granted, as a general rule, private, internal-use campaign polling is usually much better than public polling. So McCain's internal polling is supposedly identifying voters so much on the fence and so much under the powerful, hypnotic sway of Tim Pawlenty that they will flip their soft support, or come out and vote instead of sitting home. Or, McCain's internal polling shows something wildly different from what 538 projects for those two states.
Color Camp Obama unimpressed; they don't even list Minnesota in their top 17 most competitive states, not even bothering to send any of their 3,600 Organizing Fellows to Minnesota (Wisconsin gets some). That should tell you everything you need to infer what the internal private polling is telling Obama about Minnesota. And the big advertising buy in 18 states doesn't include Minnesota either.
Something tells me this is 2 parts internal political jockeying by Pawlenty patrons within the McCain camp, 1 part run-of-the-mill political hype. (McCain has his Lanny Davises and Terry McAuliffes too, though those two are absurdists for the ages, see links.)
At the end of the day, McCain may well pick Pawlenty, and there would be endless blather about how the Republicans are going to leverage Pawlenty's overwhelming 1%, 21,000 vote (out of nearly 2.2 million cast) Minnesota gubernatorial re-election win in 2006 into automatic electoral success in the fall. I'm not really sure Bridge Collapse Guy is going to be able to hit Barack Obama on inexperience, for example.
Finally, John McCain is in Ottawa (Canada) for a press conference today, and Pawlenty is a hockey fan, which gives me the transparently flimsy excuse I was seeking to get in a mention of the NHL Draft tonight in Ottawa. Who among us isn't hanging on who the St. Louis Blues will take with the 4th pick? Maybe the exact same number of Minnesotans and Wisconsans who would have voted for Obama but for Pawlenty.
How (not) to win over Clinton supporters
@ 4:00 AM
Between the 18 million people who voted for Hillary Clinton in the primaries and the many others who supported her candidacy but didn't cast a ballot for her, it is safe to say that John McCain will win the votes of literally millions of Hillary Clinton supporters in the November election. Almost all of these people will have well-considered and perfectly rational reasons for voting for McCain. Perhaps they don't think that Obama has the experience to be President. Perhaps they tended to side more with John McCain on the issues to begin with, but voted for Clinton because they liked her personally. An exceptionally large cross-section of the American public liked either Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama. Although there is a heavy degree of overlap between the two constituencies, there is a lot of room at the margins.
McCain, however, appears to be less interested in speaking to the millions of Clinton voters who fall somewhere between the cracks, and more interested in engaging the handful of crazies who dislike Barack Obama for wholly irrational reasons. Take Will Bower, the founder of a group called PUMA ("Party Unity My Ass"). On Saturday, Bower met with John McCain. On Wednesday, Bower attended Larry Sinclair's press conference, saw Sinclair literally accuse Obama of murder, saw Sinclair's lawyer wearing a kilt, saw Sinclair flee the room after the press conference because he was moments away from being arrested, and came away saying that Sinclair's story was "worth exploring". That means that McCain is either one or two degrees removed from the lunatic fringe, depending on what you think of Bower's state of mind.
Another of the people McCain met with, Paula Abeles, has a history of unethical and arguably racist behavior. Another was Harriet Christian, who gained her 15 minutes of notoriety by referring to Barack Obama as an "inadequate black man". Another is an author for the blog/conspiracist site No Quarter, which within the past week has accused of Obama of behavior ranging from having a liaison with Sinclair to promoting pedophilia through his Kids for Obama website.
There is too much risk to McCain that one of these people will become even more unhinged, and do or say something that gives him guilt by association problems. This really isn't that far removed from meeting with the "9/11 trUthers for Johnny MAC!" Facebook group. And to what benefit? So that you can be accused of pandering by Michelle Malkin? News flash: these people are not swing voters. Will Bower founded a group named Party Unity My Ass. He is not going to vote for Barack Obama. Paul Abeles is probably a racist. She is not going to vote for Barack Obama. Harriet Christian's vote is in the bag, Senator McCain. You do not need to win her over.
So what can McCain do to speak to the overwhelming majority of former Clinton supporters who are not batshit crazy? I think the communication has to be more implicit -- in fact, almost subliminal. The McCain campaign has actually been close to doing this a couple of times, although the execution in both cases was clumsy. The first time was during McCain's "green background" speech on June 3rd when he repeatedly used the phrase "That's not change you can believe in!", which explicitly echoed a phrase used by Hillary Clinton during the Texas Primary debate (Clinton's coda, "That's change you can Xerox", was not received well by the audience). The second was yesterday, when the McCain campaign accused the Obama campaign of "frat house" behavior for insisting that they be allowed to join McCain conference calls -- though the reference seemed out-of-context here, the phrasing was very Wolfsonesque.
As I said, these are ineffective examples of what might be an effective strategy for McCain. But the point is that Clinton spent 18 months fighting Barack Obama for the nomination, and there are a lot of lessons that can be drawn from that. Some subset of those things her campaign did and said that were effective back then are probably also going to be among the most effective ways now to dog-whistle to her supporters.
McCain, however, appears to be less interested in speaking to the millions of Clinton voters who fall somewhere between the cracks, and more interested in engaging the handful of crazies who dislike Barack Obama for wholly irrational reasons. Take Will Bower, the founder of a group called PUMA ("Party Unity My Ass"). On Saturday, Bower met with John McCain. On Wednesday, Bower attended Larry Sinclair's press conference, saw Sinclair literally accuse Obama of murder, saw Sinclair's lawyer wearing a kilt, saw Sinclair flee the room after the press conference because he was moments away from being arrested, and came away saying that Sinclair's story was "worth exploring". That means that McCain is either one or two degrees removed from the lunatic fringe, depending on what you think of Bower's state of mind.
Another of the people McCain met with, Paula Abeles, has a history of unethical and arguably racist behavior. Another was Harriet Christian, who gained her 15 minutes of notoriety by referring to Barack Obama as an "inadequate black man". Another is an author for the blog/conspiracist site No Quarter, which within the past week has accused of Obama of behavior ranging from having a liaison with Sinclair to promoting pedophilia through his Kids for Obama website.
There is too much risk to McCain that one of these people will become even more unhinged, and do or say something that gives him guilt by association problems. This really isn't that far removed from meeting with the "9/11 trUthers for Johnny MAC!" Facebook group. And to what benefit? So that you can be accused of pandering by Michelle Malkin? News flash: these people are not swing voters. Will Bower founded a group named Party Unity My Ass. He is not going to vote for Barack Obama. Paul Abeles is probably a racist. She is not going to vote for Barack Obama. Harriet Christian's vote is in the bag, Senator McCain. You do not need to win her over.
So what can McCain do to speak to the overwhelming majority of former Clinton supporters who are not batshit crazy? I think the communication has to be more implicit -- in fact, almost subliminal. The McCain campaign has actually been close to doing this a couple of times, although the execution in both cases was clumsy. The first time was during McCain's "green background" speech on June 3rd when he repeatedly used the phrase "That's not change you can believe in!", which explicitly echoed a phrase used by Hillary Clinton during the Texas Primary debate (Clinton's coda, "That's change you can Xerox", was not received well by the audience). The second was yesterday, when the McCain campaign accused the Obama campaign of "frat house" behavior for insisting that they be allowed to join McCain conference calls -- though the reference seemed out-of-context here, the phrasing was very Wolfsonesque.
As I said, these are ineffective examples of what might be an effective strategy for McCain. But the point is that Clinton spent 18 months fighting Barack Obama for the nomination, and there are a lot of lessons that can be drawn from that. Some subset of those things her campaign did and said that were effective back then are probably also going to be among the most effective ways now to dog-whistle to her supporters.
Another Vote for Chuck Todd
@ 12:39 AM
For what it's worth, I agree with the spectrum of commentary from Kos, John Cole, Goldberg, Yglesias, etc. trickling in about the expansion of Chuck Todd's role at NBC, whether it's the helm of Meet the Press or his own show. Todd's been a breath of fresh air throughout this whirlwind primary season and clearly proved his value to number-crunching and political analysis.
It's a sad circumstance to be talking about this, and I'd guess Todd himself is still buried in the numbness of the loss of his friend and mentor. But we appreciate his work and want to add our voices to the quiet speculation about how NBC will realign its political talent in the wake of such an earthquake. Todd's been a revelation this campaign season and should have a bigger platform.
Also for what it's worth, Luke Russert is as impressive a 22-year old as I've seen in a long time. He's handled this event publicly with grace, humor, poise, courage, and a hell of a big heart. He strikes me as an old soul. That kid's character, clearly nurtured by his family, proves the amplified tribute to his father is authentic.
Here's echoing Nate's post last week about Tim Russert. Godspeed.
It's a sad circumstance to be talking about this, and I'd guess Todd himself is still buried in the numbness of the loss of his friend and mentor. But we appreciate his work and want to add our voices to the quiet speculation about how NBC will realign its political talent in the wake of such an earthquake. Todd's been a revelation this campaign season and should have a bigger platform.
Also for what it's worth, Luke Russert is as impressive a 22-year old as I've seen in a long time. He's handled this event publicly with grace, humor, poise, courage, and a hell of a big heart. He strikes me as an old soul. That kid's character, clearly nurtured by his family, proves the amplified tribute to his father is authentic.
Here's echoing Nate's post last week about Tim Russert. Godspeed.
6.19.2008
Evening Polling Update, 6/19
@ 8:13 PM
I very much do not want to set an expectation that we're going to be running the numbers more than once a day, but with polling volume especially heavy lately, we're making some accommodations. There is new polling out in Georgia and Colorado, each of which shows the race tightening.
Rasmussen conducted the Colorado poll, which has Barack Obama with a 43-41 lead. That 2-point advantage is down from 6 points a month ago. But in Georgia, Insider Advantage has that state tightening to a single point; John McCain leads 44-43, with 6 points going to Bob Barr. Insider Advantage's prior poll in Georgia, which also included Barr in the match-ups, had John McCain ahead by 10.
Earlier this week, I ripped on the Obama campaign for designating Georgia as a swing state. No previous polling had shown Obama within single digits there -- a Rasmussen poll conducted the day after the primaries ended had it McCain +10. I doubt that the state is truly within the margin of error right now. But it is certainly close enough -- with the known unknowns of the Barr vote and African-American turnout -- to be included in Obama's ad buy, as the candidate is doing. This may also be a reminder that you can often infer something about a campaign's internal polling in a state before the public data catches up. The McCain camp, for their part, seems as pleased as a peach:
Rasmussen conducted the Colorado poll, which has Barack Obama with a 43-41 lead. That 2-point advantage is down from 6 points a month ago. But in Georgia, Insider Advantage has that state tightening to a single point; John McCain leads 44-43, with 6 points going to Bob Barr. Insider Advantage's prior poll in Georgia, which also included Barr in the match-ups, had John McCain ahead by 10.
Earlier this week, I ripped on the Obama campaign for designating Georgia as a swing state. No previous polling had shown Obama within single digits there -- a Rasmussen poll conducted the day after the primaries ended had it McCain +10. I doubt that the state is truly within the margin of error right now. But it is certainly close enough -- with the known unknowns of the Barr vote and African-American turnout -- to be included in Obama's ad buy, as the candidate is doing. This may also be a reminder that you can often infer something about a campaign's internal polling in a state before the public data catches up. The McCain camp, for their part, seems as pleased as a peach:
The McCain campaign on Thursday said they welcome Obama's expenditure.As to the Colorado result: the patterns here are getting harder rather than easier to detect, but just as he's gotten an especially large bounce out of Appalachia, there is a certain type of state where Obama has gotten little bump at all, or his numbers have even ticked downward. These are the states that I sometimes think of as the Great White North: places like Oregon and Washington, and Minnesota, and Colorado. These states have fair numbers of Democrats but, with the possible exception of Minnesota, they don't tend to be as institutionally Democratic as states East of the Mississippi. They remain among Obama's best states, but he may be running into some kind of ceiling in terms of partisan support.
"We're obviously overjoyed when Barack Obama spends money in a state that we are very, very confident that John McCain will carry in November," McCain spokesman Jeff Sadosky said.
Today's Polls, 6/19
@ 12:00 PM
For the Democrats, it must feel like 2000 all over again. A day after Quinnipiac and American Research Group showed Barack Obama with his first leads in Florida, Rasmussen finds him still 8 points behind. That's a slight improvement from Rasmussen's last poll in Florida, which had shown Obama trailing by 10 points, but obviously a long way from something that would get the job done in November.
We talked a little bit yesterday about the differences in accounting for party identification between the different pollsters. Those differences seem as though they're particularly large in Florida, where Rasmussen has consistently had Obama way down, but Quinnipiac more competitive.
At the end of the day, however, what matters is not so much the Florida result in the abstract, but where it stands relative to other states. Our model calls Florida a toss-up -- but it's also giving Obama credit for about a 5 point lead nationally. If the election tightens, is Florida still a state in which he wants to invest resources? Were I running his campaign, I'd commission some internal polling of the state, as Florida is so resource-intensive that a decision may need to be made on it relatively early.
That's about it insofar as the polling goes today. Rasmuseen's national tracker still has Obama ahead by 3 points; Gallup will not be releasing numbers today. Economist/YouGov also has some national numbers out that I'd failed to be mindful of; Obama leads by 3 points in their poll conducted this week, and led by 4 last week, after having trailed in most of The Economist's polling throughout the month of May.
We talked a little bit yesterday about the differences in accounting for party identification between the different pollsters. Those differences seem as though they're particularly large in Florida, where Rasmussen has consistently had Obama way down, but Quinnipiac more competitive.
At the end of the day, however, what matters is not so much the Florida result in the abstract, but where it stands relative to other states. Our model calls Florida a toss-up -- but it's also giving Obama credit for about a 5 point lead nationally. If the election tightens, is Florida still a state in which he wants to invest resources? Were I running his campaign, I'd commission some internal polling of the state, as Florida is so resource-intensive that a decision may need to be made on it relatively early.
That's about it insofar as the polling goes today. Rasmuseen's national tracker still has Obama ahead by 3 points; Gallup will not be releasing numbers today. Economist/YouGov also has some national numbers out that I'd failed to be mindful of; Obama leads by 3 points in their poll conducted this week, and led by 4 last week, after having trailed in most of The Economist's polling throughout the month of May.
Coming Soon
@ 11:08 AM
Yes, an analysis of Rasmussen's Florida numbers. But also a new poll tracking graphic. It risks information overload, but ought to do a much better job of telling you how the sausage is made.
Why Obama should visit Alaska, Part II
@ 1:14 AM
Two more reasons why Barack Obama should visit Alaska -- and soon:
Firstly, John McCain would face a tough choice between potentially watching the state flip to Obama and having to pay a visit himself. Apart from the jet lag, what is the downside of visiting Alaska? The McCain team seems to have a fear of acknowledging weakness on the electoral map; hence, their reticence to admit that Virginia (among others) is a swing state. It's one thing for McCain to visit Kentucky or Louisiana -- states that are not especially competitive this year, but that went Democratic as late as 1996. But Alaska has always been as red as red gets. So McCain either looks like he's in panic mode because he has to visit Alaska, or with a little luck for Obama, a poll will come out later this summer showing Obama a couple of points ahead, which might also trigger some bad press for McCain.
Secondly, Obama could force McCain to clarify his position on drilling the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). McCain has now come out in favor of offshore drilling, but gave a non-answer answer to a Missourian's question about ANWR drilling today, which McCain has consistently and somewhat vocally opposed doing in the past. Most Alaskans want to drill the ANWR, so McCain would either have to (i) explain why he wants to drill everywhere else but not the ANWR -- not an easy sell to Alaskans or (ii) come out in favor of ANWR drilling, which creates a much clearer flip-flop from his previous record. Obama, though he also holds a position on ANWR that would be unpopular with the locals (and probably the rest of the country), can at least place a claim to being consistent. Obama is not going to be able to flip the the offshore drilling issue like he did the gas tax -- it is too easy for McCain to frame it as a matter of national security -- but at least he would be staging the issue in such a way as to encourage McCain to flop.
Firstly, John McCain would face a tough choice between potentially watching the state flip to Obama and having to pay a visit himself. Apart from the jet lag, what is the downside of visiting Alaska? The McCain team seems to have a fear of acknowledging weakness on the electoral map; hence, their reticence to admit that Virginia (among others) is a swing state. It's one thing for McCain to visit Kentucky or Louisiana -- states that are not especially competitive this year, but that went Democratic as late as 1996. But Alaska has always been as red as red gets. So McCain either looks like he's in panic mode because he has to visit Alaska, or with a little luck for Obama, a poll will come out later this summer showing Obama a couple of points ahead, which might also trigger some bad press for McCain.
Secondly, Obama could force McCain to clarify his position on drilling the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). McCain has now come out in favor of offshore drilling, but gave a non-answer answer to a Missourian's question about ANWR drilling today, which McCain has consistently and somewhat vocally opposed doing in the past. Most Alaskans want to drill the ANWR, so McCain would either have to (i) explain why he wants to drill everywhere else but not the ANWR -- not an easy sell to Alaskans or (ii) come out in favor of ANWR drilling, which creates a much clearer flip-flop from his previous record. Obama, though he also holds a position on ANWR that would be unpopular with the locals (and probably the rest of the country), can at least place a claim to being consistent. Obama is not going to be able to flip the the offshore drilling issue like he did the gas tax -- it is too easy for McCain to frame it as a matter of national security -- but at least he would be staging the issue in such a way as to encourage McCain to flop.
6.18.2008
Does Obama still have an Appalachia Problem?
@ 7:55 PM
I've alluded a couple of times to the fact that Barack Obama's problems in Appalachia, which had seemed to be so pervasive before, suddenly seem to have righted themselves. While he is not running as strong as Hillary Clinton probably would in the region, his numbers now look fairly normal for a non-Southern Democrat.
Two purely Appalachian states have had polling released since the end of the primary campaign. Those are Arkansas, where Rasmussen showed Obama with a 15-point improvement, and Kentucky, where SurveyUSA showed him cutting his deficit from 24 points to 12.
We can also look at the before and after versions of Quinnipiac's Swing State polling, concentrating on Obama's numbers in Southern Ohio and in Southwest and Central Pennsylvania, which are usually classified as part of the Appalachia. Obama's numbers have improved significantly in those regions too:
Beyond Ohio and Pennsylvania, this could have implications in West Virginia, where Rasmussen had him trailing John McCain by 8 points just before the primaries concluded. If he gets the same 10+ point bounce in West Virginia that he has gotten elsewhere in the region, the state suddenly looks extremely competitive -- which is why our model is inferring that West Virginia should be a pale shade of pink rather than a ruby red.
Two purely Appalachian states have had polling released since the end of the primary campaign. Those are Arkansas, where Rasmussen showed Obama with a 15-point improvement, and Kentucky, where SurveyUSA showed him cutting his deficit from 24 points to 12.
We can also look at the before and after versions of Quinnipiac's Swing State polling, concentrating on Obama's numbers in Southern Ohio and in Southwest and Central Pennsylvania, which are usually classified as part of the Appalachia. Obama's numbers have improved significantly in those regions too:
Region May June Change
Southeast OH -20 -15 +5
Southwest OH -14 +3 +17
Southwest PA -13 +2 +15
Central PA -14 TIE +14
Arkansas -24 -9 +15
Kentucky -24 -12 +12
=============================================
AVERAGE -18.2 -5.2 +13.0Beyond Ohio and Pennsylvania, this could have implications in West Virginia, where Rasmussen had him trailing John McCain by 8 points just before the primaries concluded. If he gets the same 10+ point bounce in West Virginia that he has gotten elsewhere in the region, the state suddenly looks extremely competitive -- which is why our model is inferring that West Virginia should be a pale shade of pink rather than a ruby red.
Afternoon Polling Update, 6/18
@ 7:08 PM
So many polls, so little time! This is everything that's been released today, including the results from our morning edition.
Let's begin in Ohio, where Rasmussen's latest data contradicts the notion that Barack Obama is surging in the state. He still trails John McCain by one point in their polling; McCain had also led by one point in their May survey. There are several factors to consider here. Firstly, this poll postdates the Quinnipiac poll by a few days. I'm not yet convinced that Obama's bounce is receding, in part because there haven't really been any intervening news events to give some momentum back to John McCain, but that's always something to keep in mind. Secondly, some of the pollsters (like SurveyUSA and PPP) that had shown Obama leading in Ohio by fairly large margins tend to have a more fluid/less grounded conception of party identification than does Rasmussen. In Ohio, they're finding a huge shift in party identification, with as much as 50 percent of the state identifying as Democrat, and running with those numbers as is. Since SurveyUSA and PPP identify a lot more Democrats in their sample, and since much of Obama's bounce appears to be in the form of bringing Democrats back home to their party, it is not surprising if they are showing more movement toward him.
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers about how one should measure party idenitifaction, and we won't really know who got it right until November. At a gut-feel level, it's hard not to imagine Ohio being somewhat close. At the same time, Obama's problems in the state had stemmed from his poor performance in Southern Ohio, which is part of Appalachia. And this is the region in which his bounce appears to be most profound: his polling has improved by 12 points in Kentucky and 15 in Arkansas, and he took some huge steps forward in Southern Ohio in Quinnipiac's regional breakdown.
Other Rasmussen polling does show a bounce for Obama. In Maine, he's ahead by 22 (up from 13 a month ago), and in Alaska, he trails McCain by just 4 points (down from 9 a month ago). There is certainly some novelty value in the notion of a Democrat competing in Alaska. But it's a state that the Obama campaign ought to be taking reasonably seriously: Alaska is the the youngest state in the country in a year where we have the largest-ever age gap between the two nominees. Indeed, it's probably time for Obama to visit Alaska. I don't have any numbers on this, but I would guess that candidate visits make more difference in smaller states, and particularly those that are out of the way geographically. If Obama visits Alaska, it will create a ton of earned media, and McCain will probably have to follow him to defend the state.
The notorious A.R.G. (American Research Group) is out with their first general election polling of the year; they have Obama leading by 5 points in Florida, and 12 in New Hampshire. You probably know that I don't have the highest opinion of ARG, but in their defense, their general election polling has tended to be pretty decent -- it's their primary polling that has been a mess. I do not, incidentally, find the New Hampshire result implausible, precisely because New Hampshire has some history of overreacting to current trends. With few New Hampshirites fitting into hard-and-fast demographic categories, and many of them identifying as independents, there is probably a higher fraction of swing voters there than any other state in the country. So as the country swings, New Hampshire swings twice over.
Finally, two results that tend to confirm our current impressions in a couple of states. In Virginia, Public Policy Polling has Obama ahead by 2 -- this is their first poll of the Commonwealth -- and in Wisconsin, SurveyUSA has Obama ahead by 9, up from 6 last month.
Let's begin in Ohio, where Rasmussen's latest data contradicts the notion that Barack Obama is surging in the state. He still trails John McCain by one point in their polling; McCain had also led by one point in their May survey. There are several factors to consider here. Firstly, this poll postdates the Quinnipiac poll by a few days. I'm not yet convinced that Obama's bounce is receding, in part because there haven't really been any intervening news events to give some momentum back to John McCain, but that's always something to keep in mind. Secondly, some of the pollsters (like SurveyUSA and PPP) that had shown Obama leading in Ohio by fairly large margins tend to have a more fluid/less grounded conception of party identification than does Rasmussen. In Ohio, they're finding a huge shift in party identification, with as much as 50 percent of the state identifying as Democrat, and running with those numbers as is. Since SurveyUSA and PPP identify a lot more Democrats in their sample, and since much of Obama's bounce appears to be in the form of bringing Democrats back home to their party, it is not surprising if they are showing more movement toward him.
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers about how one should measure party idenitifaction, and we won't really know who got it right until November. At a gut-feel level, it's hard not to imagine Ohio being somewhat close. At the same time, Obama's problems in the state had stemmed from his poor performance in Southern Ohio, which is part of Appalachia. And this is the region in which his bounce appears to be most profound: his polling has improved by 12 points in Kentucky and 15 in Arkansas, and he took some huge steps forward in Southern Ohio in Quinnipiac's regional breakdown.
Other Rasmussen polling does show a bounce for Obama. In Maine, he's ahead by 22 (up from 13 a month ago), and in Alaska, he trails McCain by just 4 points (down from 9 a month ago). There is certainly some novelty value in the notion of a Democrat competing in Alaska. But it's a state that the Obama campaign ought to be taking reasonably seriously: Alaska is the the youngest state in the country in a year where we have the largest-ever age gap between the two nominees. Indeed, it's probably time for Obama to visit Alaska. I don't have any numbers on this, but I would guess that candidate visits make more difference in smaller states, and particularly those that are out of the way geographically. If Obama visits Alaska, it will create a ton of earned media, and McCain will probably have to follow him to defend the state.
The notorious A.R.G. (American Research Group) is out with their first general election polling of the year; they have Obama leading by 5 points in Florida, and 12 in New Hampshire. You probably know that I don't have the highest opinion of ARG, but in their defense, their general election polling has tended to be pretty decent -- it's their primary polling that has been a mess. I do not, incidentally, find the New Hampshire result implausible, precisely because New Hampshire has some history of overreacting to current trends. With few New Hampshirites fitting into hard-and-fast demographic categories, and many of them identifying as independents, there is probably a higher fraction of swing voters there than any other state in the country. So as the country swings, New Hampshire swings twice over.
Finally, two results that tend to confirm our current impressions in a couple of states. In Virginia, Public Policy Polling has Obama ahead by 2 -- this is their first poll of the Commonwealth -- and in Wisconsin, SurveyUSA has Obama ahead by 9, up from 6 last month.
Obama's bounce in state polling
@ 9:10 AM
Below is a just-the-numbers list of all states that have been polled since the conclusion of the Democratic primaries that were also polled by that same polling firm in May; positive numbers indicate an Obama lead.
State May June Change
AR Rasmussen -24 -9 +15
KY SurveyUSA -24 -12 +12
OH Quinnipiac -4 +6 +10
KS Rasmussen -19 -10 +9
FL Quinnipiac -4 +4 +8
NY Siena +11 +18 +7
WA Rasmussen +11 +18 +7
PA Quinnipaic +6 +12 +6
WI Rasmussen -4 +2 +6
IA Rasmussen +2 +7 +5
VA Rasmussen -3 +1 +4
MI Rasmussen -1 +3 +4
WA SurveyUSA +14* +17 +3
NC Rasmussen -3 -2 +1
NC Civitas -5 -4 +1
MN Rasmussen +15 +13 -2
MN SurveyUSA +5 +1 -4
OR Rasmussen +14 +8 -6
=========================================
AVERAGE -0.7 +4.7 +5.4
* Average of two May surveys.Today's Polls, 6/18
@ 8:35 AM
A little more than two months ago, I ran through a scenario that predicted what might happen if half of the Hillary Clinton Democrats who said they were going to vote for John McCain instead gravitated back to Barack Obama. The prediction was that the so-called "unity bounce" would be worth 4-5 points to Obama in the popular vote, bringing him northward of 320 electoral votes and making him roughly a 3 to 1 favorite to win the election.
That is almost exactly where we have Barack Obama's numbers after a series of new polls from Quinnipiac. In Pennsylvania, Obama leads by 12 points -- up from 6 last month. His Ohio lead is 6 points -- he had trailed McCain by 4 points before. And then there is Florida, where Quinnipiac has Obama ahead by 4 points. Barack Obama has never before led a Florida poll -- not against John McCain, nor against Hillary Clinton -- so this is something of a watershed moment.
If Florida is in play, then John McCain's defense is completely broken; it was the one traditional swing state that always had looked off-limits to Obama. More frustratingly for McCain, he had spent the better part of three days in Florida earlier this month, hoping to raise doubts about Obama among Jewish voters. Although Quinnipiac does not break out the Jewish vote, Obama holds a 61-31 lead in Southeast Florida, where most of the state's Jewish population is concentrated.
Obama's surprisingly strong lead in Ohio isn't any better news for McCain. As recently as a week ago, McCain's strategy looked pretty simple: target Ohio and Michigan, and hope to win one if not both. But now, Ohio looks tough for him, and even if McCain can steal Michigan, Obama has so many other places he can pick up electoral votes -- Virginia, the Mountain West, Iowa, Missouri and now possibly Florida -- that McCain still might have trouble winning a close election.
Obama's lead nationally is still relatively small -- we have it at somewhere between 4 and 5 points -- but looks to be an unusually robust one in terms of the Electoral College. Rick Davis can probably give these numbers about another week or two to settle down before he has to start thinking about some fundamental changes in his candidate's messaging.
That is almost exactly where we have Barack Obama's numbers after a series of new polls from Quinnipiac. In Pennsylvania, Obama leads by 12 points -- up from 6 last month. His Ohio lead is 6 points -- he had trailed McCain by 4 points before. And then there is Florida, where Quinnipiac has Obama ahead by 4 points. Barack Obama has never before led a Florida poll -- not against John McCain, nor against Hillary Clinton -- so this is something of a watershed moment.
If Florida is in play, then John McCain's defense is completely broken; it was the one traditional swing state that always had looked off-limits to Obama. More frustratingly for McCain, he had spent the better part of three days in Florida earlier this month, hoping to raise doubts about Obama among Jewish voters. Although Quinnipiac does not break out the Jewish vote, Obama holds a 61-31 lead in Southeast Florida, where most of the state's Jewish population is concentrated.
Obama's surprisingly strong lead in Ohio isn't any better news for McCain. As recently as a week ago, McCain's strategy looked pretty simple: target Ohio and Michigan, and hope to win one if not both. But now, Ohio looks tough for him, and even if McCain can steal Michigan, Obama has so many other places he can pick up electoral votes -- Virginia, the Mountain West, Iowa, Missouri and now possibly Florida -- that McCain still might have trouble winning a close election.
Obama's lead nationally is still relatively small -- we have it at somewhere between 4 and 5 points -- but looks to be an unusually robust one in terms of the Electoral College. Rick Davis can probably give these numbers about another week or two to settle down before he has to start thinking about some fundamental changes in his candidate's messaging.
6.17.2008
Defining a "Must Win" (Technical)
@ 8:29 PM
I had previously been defining a "Must-Win State" (see the Swing State Anaylsis graph along the right-hand side of the page) as a state which is won the highest percentage of the time by the candidate winning the election. The problem with this definition is that it was producing some skew toward Obama-friendly states, since we now have Obama winning the election the strong majority of the time period.
The new definition is that a Must-Win State is a state won the highest percentage of the time by the winning candidate when the election is close. By "close", I mean an election in which the popular vote is within 4 percentage points. If the popular vote is outside that 4 percentage point range, it is pretty much mathematically impossible for the trailing candidate to win in the Electoral College, meaning that the electoral math becomes irrelevant. So these are the states that the candidate needs to win when winning individual states matters.
The new definition is that a Must-Win State is a state won the highest percentage of the time by the winning candidate when the election is close. By "close", I mean an election in which the popular vote is within 4 percentage points. If the popular vote is outside that 4 percentage point range, it is pretty much mathematically impossible for the trailing candidate to win in the Electoral College, meaning that the electoral math becomes irrelevant. So these are the states that the candidate needs to win when winning individual states matters.
Trendline now calculated from daily numbers
@ 4:40 PM
I have switched from calculating our trendline adjustment based on a weekly aggregation of polls to one instead based on daily numbers. The methodology otherwise remains the same.
The reason for the change is simply that based on some experimentation, the daily calculation appears to be a little bit more robust -- it fluctuates less from day to day as new results are added. This is also how Professor Erikson had suggested that I perform the trend calculation originally. The daily method does tend to give more deference to national tracking polls in extracting its trendlines, but since Rasmussen and Gallup are interviewing literally tens of thousands of voters between them each week, I'm not sure that this is a bad thing.
As a side benefit, the daily version of the trend adjustment seems to produce a cooler-looking graph:
The reason for the change is simply that based on some experimentation, the daily calculation appears to be a little bit more robust -- it fluctuates less from day to day as new results are added. This is also how Professor Erikson had suggested that I perform the trend calculation originally. The daily method does tend to give more deference to national tracking polls in extracting its trendlines, but since Rasmussen and Gallup are interviewing literally tens of thousands of voters between them each week, I'm not sure that this is a bad thing.
As a side benefit, the daily version of the trend adjustment seems to produce a cooler-looking graph:
Today's Polls, 6/17
@ 4:11 PM
An odd day of polling, but one attention-grabbing result dominates the rest. That is from Ohio, where Public Policy Polling has Barack Obama ahead by 11 points. While Public Policy Polling developed a reputation as being somewhat Obama-friendly in the primaries, its track record is fairly strong, and its prior Ohio poll -- taken way back in March -- had shown McCain ahead by 8 points. As Ohio is probably the single most important state in this election (it's by no means the only important state, but it's pretty darned important), this result is enough to drive Obama past the 67 percent threshold in our overall electoral projection; we presently have him as about a 2:1 favorite to win the election.
In Minnesota, however, SurveyUSA has Obama with just a 1-point lead over McCain. SurveyUSA's methodology takes a more fluid view of party identification, and so it tends to produce results that can be more encouraging for the non-dominant party in a particular state. Its most recent previous Minnesota poll, taken back in May, had shown Obama ahead by 6 points.
In North Carolina, Civitas has John McCain ahead by 4 points -- down a tick from the 5-point lead he held a month ago. Obama has yet to show a lead in North Carolina, but has trailed by somewhere between 2 and 4 points in the three most recent polls of the state.
There is also a SurveyUSA poll out in Kentucky that shows Obama trailing by 12 points. This poll made it across our wires too late to be included in our metrics, but it speaks to the extent that Obama is starting to improve his numbers among lapsed, Clinton-leaning Democrats, particularly in Appalachia. Obama had trailed by 24 points in Survey USA's May poll of Kentucky, and by as many as 36 points previously.
There are also a series of national polls out, all of which have consolidated in the area of Obama +4, exactly the popular vote margin that we attribute to him based on the state-by-state polling results.
So what to make of the meme that Obama's numbers haven't been bouncing? The only way that you can come to that conclusion is if you cherrypick results. There have been a few dozen polls released since Clinton conceded the primaries, and our methodology extracts an average bounce of about 4 points between them. Four points is not so large that some individual polls won't show a bounce, particularly if the bounce is concentrated in particular states and regions. But bounce Obama has, and the longer Republicans remain in denial about it, the less time they'll have to catch up.
In Minnesota, however, SurveyUSA has Obama with just a 1-point lead over McCain. SurveyUSA's methodology takes a more fluid view of party identification, and so it tends to produce results that can be more encouraging for the non-dominant party in a particular state. Its most recent previous Minnesota poll, taken back in May, had shown Obama ahead by 6 points.
In North Carolina, Civitas has John McCain ahead by 4 points -- down a tick from the 5-point lead he held a month ago. Obama has yet to show a lead in North Carolina, but has trailed by somewhere between 2 and 4 points in the three most recent polls of the state.
There is also a SurveyUSA poll out in Kentucky that shows Obama trailing by 12 points. This poll made it across our wires too late to be included in our metrics, but it speaks to the extent that Obama is starting to improve his numbers among lapsed, Clinton-leaning Democrats, particularly in Appalachia. Obama had trailed by 24 points in Survey USA's May poll of Kentucky, and by as many as 36 points previously.
There are also a series of national polls out, all of which have consolidated in the area of Obama +4, exactly the popular vote margin that we attribute to him based on the state-by-state polling results.
So what to make of the meme that Obama's numbers haven't been bouncing? The only way that you can come to that conclusion is if you cherrypick results. There have been a few dozen polls released since Clinton conceded the primaries, and our methodology extracts an average bounce of about 4 points between them. Four points is not so large that some individual polls won't show a bounce, particularly if the bounce is concentrated in particular states and regions. But bounce Obama has, and the longer Republicans remain in denial about it, the less time they'll have to catch up.
Can a VP Nominee "Win" a State?
@ 3:20 PM
As a prelude to some work Nate is doing on VP picks, one of the common conventional wisdom canards on presidential elections is that the presidential nominee can - and maybe should - pick a vice-presidential candidate who adds a particular state into the win column in the fall. For example, Monday afternoon on the MSNBC show assigned to David Gregory, an inane conversation took place about the notion that Rudy Giuliani could bring New Jersey into play if he were McCain's VP nominee. This highly questionable theory about just what electoral gain a VP can contribute deserves closer inspection.
Consider the rationales offered for many potential choices even now: Ted Strickland for Obama or Rob Portman for McCain because they bring Ohio, one of the Virginia options for Obama because they bring Virginia, or Tim Pawlenty for McCain because he “puts Minnesota in play.” Further examples are numerous. Bill Richardson supposedly brings New Mexico and the Southwest in general; other candidates are considered to have a strike against them if they do not bring an obvious electoral benefit.
The emphasis placed on such a strategic pick is born of two consecutive nailbiter elections, where the flip of one battleground state has determined the winner. Although it’s somewhat understandable that this conventional wisdom has emerged, the evidence demonstrates it’s hypothetically sketchy at best.
In looking at the vice-presidential selections of the past five decades or so since television has expanded the regionality of presidential elections, it’s clear that, in reality, both major parties rarely have nominated VP candidates as a strategic electoral vote collector, and to the extent they have set about deliberately trying to add a state with a VP pick it has almost never worked.
Taking a look at the Republicans and working backward, Wyoming (Cheney) was always in the Republican column except for Johnson’s ’64 landslide; New York (Kemp) had been reliably blue since the 60s with the exception of the Nixon and Reagan landslide years; Indiana (Quayle) and Kansas (Dole) had been reliably red since FDR except for ’64. Even Spiro Agnew, when he was added to Nixon’s ticket in 1968, could not bring Maryland into the Republican column until 1972 as the incumbent in a national landslide. Republican VP picks in 1964 (Miller, New York) and 1960 (Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts) failed to bring those states into the fold, and it’s hard to think Republicans chose Cabot Lodge strategically in a year where the Democratic presidential nominee was from the same state.
You could argue that selecting George Bush in 1980 was a strategic pick to gather Texas, a state that had voted Democratic essentially since the Civil War except for Eisenhower’s two terms and Nixon’s ’72 landslide. But given the larger macro forces at work in Texas, a state that voted Democratic for most of the previous 100 years and then hasn’t been competitive for Dems since 1976, it’s hard to chalk that shift up to the popularity of George Bush or appreciation to Republicans for putting him on the ticket. Put another way, it would be like Obama choosing Sebelius of Kansas and then Republicans not being competitive there for the next three decades and counting.
For Republicans, one really has to go back to Richard Nixon of California where a state flipped from Democratic (5 straight elections) to Republican. Even then, the popularity of FDR and Eisenhower were far bigger macro forces than the drawing power of a young Richard Nixon.
For Democrats, John Edwards obviously did not make a competitive state out of North Carolina, whose only post-Southern Strategy flip back into the Democratic column was Carter’s 1976 win. In 2000, Democrats won Connecticut for the third consecutive presidential year as part of a larger solidification of the northeast.
Although Dems won Tennessee in 1992 and 1996 with native son Al Gore on the ticket, bringing the state back into the Democratic column for the first time since Carter’s lone post-Civil Rights Act 1976 win, the fact that as the headliner Al Gore couldn’t win his own state in 2000 indicates that Bill Clinton had more to do with winning Tennessee in the 90s than did the VP choice. Similarly, the choice of Estes Kefauver in 1956 did not win Tennessee for Dems at a time when 1952’s loss of the state was an anomaly from the previous couple decades.
Lloyd Bentsen could not bring Texas back for the Democrats, the racist Geraldine Ferraro could not hold New York in the 1984 landslide, and Sargent Shriver in 1972 could not keep Maryland’s three previous Democratic preferences going strong.
The best Democratic examples of a VP helping with a state are Walter Mondale in 1976 and 1980, Edmund Muskie in 1968 and Lyndon Johnson in 1960. Muskie is perhaps the best example, simply because with the exception of 1964’s landslide, Maine hadn’t strayed from the Republican column since Woodrow Wilson in 1912, and then promptly went back into the red column afterward. Lyndon Johnson undoubtedly helped the Catholic Kennedy in Texas, but Texas at that time was reliably Democratic anyway. And Walter Mondale certainly helped the Baptist Southerner Carter in 1976 and 1980, but Minnesota had been a reliably Democratic state since FDR, with the exception of Eisenhower’s two elections and the ’72 landslide.
In order for a vice-presidential candidate’s home state to be a strategic addition, it would have to be true that but for the selection, that party’s ticket would not have carried the state. And you really have to think about how this would come about. Which voters would vote for one ticket who would ordinarily vote for the other ticket or stay home? This extra margin could be a function of extra in-state voter organization and/or extra enthusiasm that makes the difference in a razor-thin race. Such hypothetical voters have to be politically plugged in enough that they know they definitely like the VP nominee, but undecided enough about the two major presidential choices that it’s the VP who closes the deal. Not only does it seem a little far-fetched that such voters would be around in any meaningful numbers to tilt an important electoral battleground one direction or another, but it seems especially far-fetched in a macro contrast election year such as this one.
My pet theory that spins off this VP-electoral vote argument, untested and probably untestable, is that such voters are more likely to exist in small, typically ignored states with 3-5 EVs. For example, the pride for North Dakotans of having one of their own in such a high profile role. Or Hawaiians. Even that might not be enough, but it’s more in alignment with intuition about history-making candidacies capturing the imagination of voters who might otherwise have stayed home or gone the other way. This theory certainly dovetails with the best example in the last 5 decades: Edmund Muskie of small-state Maine.
Consider the rationales offered for many potential choices even now: Ted Strickland for Obama or Rob Portman for McCain because they bring Ohio, one of the Virginia options for Obama because they bring Virginia, or Tim Pawlenty for McCain because he “puts Minnesota in play.” Further examples are numerous. Bill Richardson supposedly brings New Mexico and the Southwest in general; other candidates are considered to have a strike against them if they do not bring an obvious electoral benefit.
The emphasis placed on such a strategic pick is born of two consecutive nailbiter elections, where the flip of one battleground state has determined the winner. Although it’s somewhat understandable that this conventional wisdom has emerged, the evidence demonstrates it’s hypothetically sketchy at best.
In looking at the vice-presidential selections of the past five decades or so since television has expanded the regionality of presidential elections, it’s clear that, in reality, both major parties rarely have nominated VP candidates as a strategic electoral vote collector, and to the extent they have set about deliberately trying to add a state with a VP pick it has almost never worked.
Taking a look at the Republicans and working backward, Wyoming (Cheney) was always in the Republican column except for Johnson’s ’64 landslide; New York (Kemp) had been reliably blue since the 60s with the exception of the Nixon and Reagan landslide years; Indiana (Quayle) and Kansas (Dole) had been reliably red since FDR except for ’64. Even Spiro Agnew, when he was added to Nixon’s ticket in 1968, could not bring Maryland into the Republican column until 1972 as the incumbent in a national landslide. Republican VP picks in 1964 (Miller, New York) and 1960 (Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts) failed to bring those states into the fold, and it’s hard to think Republicans chose Cabot Lodge strategically in a year where the Democratic presidential nominee was from the same state.
You could argue that selecting George Bush in 1980 was a strategic pick to gather Texas, a state that had voted Democratic essentially since the Civil War except for Eisenhower’s two terms and Nixon’s ’72 landslide. But given the larger macro forces at work in Texas, a state that voted Democratic for most of the previous 100 years and then hasn’t been competitive for Dems since 1976, it’s hard to chalk that shift up to the popularity of George Bush or appreciation to Republicans for putting him on the ticket. Put another way, it would be like Obama choosing Sebelius of Kansas and then Republicans not being competitive there for the next three decades and counting.
For Republicans, one really has to go back to Richard Nixon of California where a state flipped from Democratic (5 straight elections) to Republican. Even then, the popularity of FDR and Eisenhower were far bigger macro forces than the drawing power of a young Richard Nixon.
For Democrats, John Edwards obviously did not make a competitive state out of North Carolina, whose only post-Southern Strategy flip back into the Democratic column was Carter’s 1976 win. In 2000, Democrats won Connecticut for the third consecutive presidential year as part of a larger solidification of the northeast.
Although Dems won Tennessee in 1992 and 1996 with native son Al Gore on the ticket, bringing the state back into the Democratic column for the first time since Carter’s lone post-Civil Rights Act 1976 win, the fact that as the headliner Al Gore couldn’t win his own state in 2000 indicates that Bill Clinton had more to do with winning Tennessee in the 90s than did the VP choice. Similarly, the choice of Estes Kefauver in 1956 did not win Tennessee for Dems at a time when 1952’s loss of the state was an anomaly from the previous couple decades.
Lloyd Bentsen could not bring Texas back for the Democrats, the racist Geraldine Ferraro could not hold New York in the 1984 landslide, and Sargent Shriver in 1972 could not keep Maryland’s three previous Democratic preferences going strong.
The best Democratic examples of a VP helping with a state are Walter Mondale in 1976 and 1980, Edmund Muskie in 1968 and Lyndon Johnson in 1960. Muskie is perhaps the best example, simply because with the exception of 1964’s landslide, Maine hadn’t strayed from the Republican column since Woodrow Wilson in 1912, and then promptly went back into the red column afterward. Lyndon Johnson undoubtedly helped the Catholic Kennedy in Texas, but Texas at that time was reliably Democratic anyway. And Walter Mondale certainly helped the Baptist Southerner Carter in 1976 and 1980, but Minnesota had been a reliably Democratic state since FDR, with the exception of Eisenhower’s two elections and the ’72 landslide.
In order for a vice-presidential candidate’s home state to be a strategic addition, it would have to be true that but for the selection, that party’s ticket would not have carried the state. And you really have to think about how this would come about. Which voters would vote for one ticket who would ordinarily vote for the other ticket or stay home? This extra margin could be a function of extra in-state voter organization and/or extra enthusiasm that makes the difference in a razor-thin race. Such hypothetical voters have to be politically plugged in enough that they know they definitely like the VP nominee, but undecided enough about the two major presidential choices that it’s the VP who closes the deal. Not only does it seem a little far-fetched that such voters would be around in any meaningful numbers to tilt an important electoral battleground one direction or another, but it seems especially far-fetched in a macro contrast election year such as this one.
My pet theory that spins off this VP-electoral vote argument, untested and probably untestable, is that such voters are more likely to exist in small, typically ignored states with 3-5 EVs. For example, the pride for North Dakotans of having one of their own in such a high profile role. Or Hawaiians. Even that might not be enough, but it’s more in alignment with intuition about history-making candidacies capturing the imagination of voters who might otherwise have stayed home or gone the other way. This theory certainly dovetails with the best example in the last 5 decades: Edmund Muskie of small-state Maine.
Guess Who's Blogging for the National Press Club?
@ 1:34 AM
Last time I'll delve into this particular off-topic topic, but I was directed today to the writings of Steve O'Hearn, the chair of the National Press Club's New Media Committee who maintains a blog at the National Press Club's blogging website. Suffice it to say that I disagree with pretty much everything that Steve has to say -- from his position on Larry Sinclair to his insistence (three days after the Montana and South Dakota primaries and one day after Clinton announced that she would concede) that the Democratic nomination race was "far from over", to his calling Tom Shales, the Washington Post's Pulitzer Prize- winning media critic, a "cretin". And then there's the matter of his preferring AltaVista to Google...
But that's not what I wanted to draw your attention to. Instead, I wanted to see who else had a blog on the National Press Club's website. Not very many people do. There is O'Hearn's blog, and then blogs for several of the NPC's committees, and a blog for the Press Club's softball team. And then there is a blog for...
Jeff Gannon.
Yes, that Jeff Gannon. The fake reporter from a fake news organization who asked fake questions at White House press conferences. And who also happens to be a gay escort.
This man has a blog at the National Press Club's website.
In this context, the National Press Club's decision to host a press conference for Larry Sinclair makes a lot more sense.
But that's not what I wanted to draw your attention to. Instead, I wanted to see who else had a blog on the National Press Club's website. Not very many people do. There is O'Hearn's blog, and then blogs for several of the NPC's committees, and a blog for the Press Club's softball team. And then there is a blog for...
Jeff Gannon.
Yes, that Jeff Gannon. The fake reporter from a fake news organization who asked fake questions at White House press conferences. And who also happens to be a gay escort.
This man has a blog at the National Press Club's website.
In this context, the National Press Club's decision to host a press conference for Larry Sinclair makes a lot more sense.
Tea Leaves
@ 12:45 AM
To follow up on Sean's post, Sean Reagan at The Back Forty (not our Sean) tracked down a list of 17 states in which the Obama campaign is focusing its Organizing Fellows program. We can contrast these against the 16 states that McCain identified as toss-ups in its strategy briefing, and the 17 states that appear on one of the two versions of our Swing State Analysis:
One needs to be careful when pruning through these lists, because they may have as much to do with branding as the realities of what the campaign will ultimately do (particularly McCain's list, which was couched in what amounted to a donor pitch). Nevertheless, the contrasts are interesting. Obama sees North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey and Georgia as competitive whereas McCain does not. McCain sees Connecticut, Maine and Minnesota as competitive whereas Obama does not. Both candidates claim to want to focus on Washington and Oregon, even though the 538 list does not see them as competitive. Neither candidate claims to be focusing on Indiana, Montana or North Dakota, although our lists consider those states to competitive.
The states on McCain's list went to John Kerry by an average of 1 point. The states on Obama's list went to George W. Bush by an average of 2 points. The states on the 538 list went to Bush by an average of 6 points. McCain's list is ridiculously aggressive in a climate where the partisan advantage is shifting to the Democrats. One can understand that he does not want to lock into a defensive posture this early in the campaign, but he dawdles in organizing Virginia and North Carolina, he may find it impossible to regain the lead in the former, and difficult to shake Obama in the latter.
My critique of Obama's list would be the inclusion of Georgia rather than Indiana. This may be a reflection of the Obama campaign's belief that it can improve registration and turnout among traditionally low-turnout groups, like the African-Americans and young voters that are plentiful in Georgia. I think I like Indiana better, however, from the standpoint of portfolio theory. It's still very difficult to imagine Obama winning Georgia without winning North Carolina, and if he's won North Carolina, he almost certainly won't need Georgia. Indiana, on the other hand, offers a relatively unique set of circumstances. Obama is the first Midwestern Democrat to have received his party's nomination in years (and hails from Chicago, almost literally in Indiana's back yard). The Democrats devoted attention to Indiana for the first time in years as a result of the state's important primary. And Indiana is an extremely manufacturing-heavy state at a time of recession. I don't quite trust the couple of polls that showed Obama ahead in Indiana, but I can more easily see it being a surprise state that actually makes the difference between winning and losing the election.
One needs to be careful when pruning through these lists, because they may have as much to do with branding as the realities of what the campaign will ultimately do (particularly McCain's list, which was couched in what amounted to a donor pitch). Nevertheless, the contrasts are interesting. Obama sees North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey and Georgia as competitive whereas McCain does not. McCain sees Connecticut, Maine and Minnesota as competitive whereas Obama does not. Both candidates claim to want to focus on Washington and Oregon, even though the 538 list does not see them as competitive. Neither candidate claims to be focusing on Indiana, Montana or North Dakota, although our lists consider those states to competitive.
The states on McCain's list went to John Kerry by an average of 1 point. The states on Obama's list went to George W. Bush by an average of 2 points. The states on the 538 list went to Bush by an average of 6 points. McCain's list is ridiculously aggressive in a climate where the partisan advantage is shifting to the Democrats. One can understand that he does not want to lock into a defensive posture this early in the campaign, but he dawdles in organizing Virginia and North Carolina, he may find it impossible to regain the lead in the former, and difficult to shake Obama in the latter.
My critique of Obama's list would be the inclusion of Georgia rather than Indiana. This may be a reflection of the Obama campaign's belief that it can improve registration and turnout among traditionally low-turnout groups, like the African-Americans and young voters that are plentiful in Georgia. I think I like Indiana better, however, from the standpoint of portfolio theory. It's still very difficult to imagine Obama winning Georgia without winning North Carolina, and if he's won North Carolina, he almost certainly won't need Georgia. Indiana, on the other hand, offers a relatively unique set of circumstances. Obama is the first Midwestern Democrat to have received his party's nomination in years (and hails from Chicago, almost literally in Indiana's back yard). The Democrats devoted attention to Indiana for the first time in years as a result of the state's important primary. And Indiana is an extremely manufacturing-heavy state at a time of recession. I don't quite trust the couple of polls that showed Obama ahead in Indiana, but I can more easily see it being a surprise state that actually makes the difference between winning and losing the election.
538's Battlegrounds as of Mid-June
@ 12:02 AM
Those with field experience may recognize the conventional wisdom/general rule that 5 points is the most a great field program's ground game can make up against an accurate poll of voter preference.
According to 538 regression analysis, there are currently eleven states closer than 5 points, most of which show McCain with a narrow lead to defend.
In order of closeness and color coded by who currently leads, they are:
1. Virginia, 0.2%
2. Missouri, 0.3%
3. Nevada, 0.6%
4. New Hampshire, 1.0%
5. Michigan, 1.5%
6. Ohio, 1.6%
7. Indiana, 1.7%
8. North Carolina, 3.3%
9. North Dakota, 3.8%
10. Florida, 4.0%
11. Montana, 4.5%
Electorally, the 39 states and DC that lie outside this 5-point range: Obama 252, McCain 157.
For what it's worth, there are twelve states between 5 and 10 points, and each candidate has 6 of them. Obama's are Colorado (+5.1%), Pennsylvania (+5.7%), New Mexico (+6.3%), Wisconsin (+6.4%), Iowa (+8.7%), and New Jersey (+9.4%), for a total of 67 EVs. McCain's are Alaska (+6.1%), South Dakota (+6.6%), West Virginia (+8.2%), Louisiana (+8.9%), South Carolina (+8.9%) and Georgia (+9.9%), for a total of 43 EVs.
What the 5-10% group tells us is that while Obama is currently pressing McCain hard in the under 5% group, if McCain could apply an across the board 2% adjustment in his favor in every state, suddenly there would be 11 states under 5% and McCain would hold a lead in seven states ranging in closeness from Ohio (+0.4%) to Indiana (+3.7%). Obama would hold a lead in four states ranging from Colorado (+3.1%) to Wisconsin (+4.4%) with Pennsylvania and New Mexico in between. And Obama would lead 207-205 electorally in the states outside the 5% margin.
If we want to arbitrarily mark the line at 8%, Obama leads 207-151 electorally with 17 states being inside that margin. Obama leads in 7 of those states that hold 86 EVs, and McCain leads in 10 with 94 EVs.
Obviously, the state races will change over time with some tightening and some being put away. Organization, energy and GOTV programs will make an impact, but we can only speculate right now as to which campaign will take better advantage of the ground game.
What's especially interesting about the close states is what a cultural range those states represent. Montana, New Hampshire, Virginia, Michigan, Nevada and Florida are all culturally such different states that it seems obvious the battle lines in this race haven't settled in yet. In a month or two after the country has had some time to size these two candidates up side by side, we should start seeing some stronger patterns emerge. But for now, let's be a little thankful that this isn't yet another dreary three-state race (OH, FL, PA).
UPDATE: With Nate's updates and new polling data tonight, some of the numbers have shifted. There are now twelve states under 5 points, as New Mexico became closer (+2.5%). Here's the new list, with the 38 + DC states outside the margin: Obama 247, McCain 157.
1. Missouri, 0.3%
2. Nevada, 0.4%
3. Indiana, 0.7%
4. Michigan, 1.6%
5. Virginia, 1.8%
6. Florida, 2.0%
7. New Mexico, 2.5%
8. New Hampshire, 2.6%
9. North Carolina, 2.7%
10. Ohio, 2.9%
11. North Dakota, 3.2%
12. Montana, 4.2%
According to 538 regression analysis, there are currently eleven states closer than 5 points, most of which show McCain with a narrow lead to defend.
In order of closeness and color coded by who currently leads, they are:
1. Virginia, 0.2%
2. Missouri, 0.3%
3. Nevada, 0.6%
4. New Hampshire, 1.0%
5. Michigan, 1.5%
6. Ohio, 1.6%
7. Indiana, 1.7%
8. North Carolina, 3.3%
9. North Dakota, 3.8%
10. Florida, 4.0%
11. Montana, 4.5%
Electorally, the 39 states and DC that lie outside this 5-point range: Obama 252, McCain 157.
For what it's worth, there are twelve states between 5 and 10 points, and each candidate has 6 of them. Obama's are Colorado (+5.1%), Pennsylvania (+5.7%), New Mexico (+6.3%), Wisconsin (+6.4%), Iowa (+8.7%), and New Jersey (+9.4%), for a total of 67 EVs. McCain's are Alaska (+6.1%), South Dakota (+6.6%), West Virginia (+8.2%), Louisiana (+8.9%), South Carolina (+8.9%) and Georgia (+9.9%), for a total of 43 EVs.
What the 5-10% group tells us is that while Obama is currently pressing McCain hard in the under 5% group, if McCain could apply an across the board 2% adjustment in his favor in every state, suddenly there would be 11 states under 5% and McCain would hold a lead in seven states ranging in closeness from Ohio (+0.4%) to Indiana (+3.7%). Obama would hold a lead in four states ranging from Colorado (+3.1%) to Wisconsin (+4.4%) with Pennsylvania and New Mexico in between. And Obama would lead 207-205 electorally in the states outside the 5% margin.
If we want to arbitrarily mark the line at 8%, Obama leads 207-151 electorally with 17 states being inside that margin. Obama leads in 7 of those states that hold 86 EVs, and McCain leads in 10 with 94 EVs.
Obviously, the state races will change over time with some tightening and some being put away. Organization, energy and GOTV programs will make an impact, but we can only speculate right now as to which campaign will take better advantage of the ground game.
What's especially interesting about the close states is what a cultural range those states represent. Montana, New Hampshire, Virginia, Michigan, Nevada and Florida are all culturally such different states that it seems obvious the battle lines in this race haven't settled in yet. In a month or two after the country has had some time to size these two candidates up side by side, we should start seeing some stronger patterns emerge. But for now, let's be a little thankful that this isn't yet another dreary three-state race (OH, FL, PA).
UPDATE: With Nate's updates and new polling data tonight, some of the numbers have shifted. There are now twelve states under 5 points, as New Mexico became closer (+2.5%). Here's the new list, with the 38 + DC states outside the margin: Obama 247, McCain 157.
1. Missouri, 0.3%
2. Nevada, 0.4%
3. Indiana, 0.7%
4. Michigan, 1.6%
5. Virginia, 1.8%
6. Florida, 2.0%
7. New Mexico, 2.5%
8. New Hampshire, 2.6%
9. North Carolina, 2.7%
10. Ohio, 2.9%
11. North Dakota, 3.2%
12. Montana, 4.2%
6.16.2008
Today's Polls, 6/16
@ 9:36 PM
The headliner tonight is in Virginia, where Rasmussen has Barack Obama moving into a tiny, 1-point lead after having trailed John McCain by 3 points in May. Virginia has been a target of Democrats from the get-go in this campaign, but it's of particular importance to Obama because it enables another series of parlays for winning the election. If Plan A was holding the Kerry states and winning Ohio, and Plan B was winning Iowa and 2-3 of the Southwestern swing states, Plan C is winning the Kerry states plus Iowa and Virginia, which would get him to 272 electoral votes.
Two other polling results also show a bounce for Obama. In Kansas, John McCain leads by 10 in a Rasmussen poll; he had led by 22 a month ago. And in New York (which is polled way more than it needs to be), Obama leads by 18 in a Siena poll, up from 11 last month. If you mapped the states out in n-dimensional space according to their demographic characteristics, New York, Virginia and Kansas would form something of an equilateral triangle. Obama has received a pretty significant bounce in each of them, suggesting that his uptick is fairly widespread.
Two other polling results also show a bounce for Obama. In Kansas, John McCain leads by 10 in a Rasmussen poll; he had led by 22 a month ago. And in New York (which is polled way more than it needs to be), Obama leads by 18 in a Siena poll, up from 11 last month. If you mapped the states out in n-dimensional space according to their demographic characteristics, New York, Virginia and Kansas would form something of an equilateral triangle. Obama has received a pretty significant bounce in each of them, suggesting that his uptick is fairly widespread.
Popular Vote v Electoral Vote
@ 4:24 PM
This might be my favorite graph that we've done so far: a comparison of Barack Obama's popular and electoral vote totals across the first 1,000 simulations that we ran last night:
Several interesting things to point out:
1. The relationship between the popular vote and the electoral vote is approximately linear, except at the endpoints. As a rule of thumb, a gain of one percentage point in a Obama's popular vote share results in a gain of 25 electoral votes. This is also, you will note, a pretty steep slope. If Obama wins the election by 4 percentage points, he projects to win by approximately 100 electoral votes (319-219).
2. The regression line crosses the y-intercept at 269.3 electoral votes, which is almost exactly half of 538. That means that there does not appear to be any systematic advantage in the electoral vote math to one candidate or another, at least based on our present rendering of these numbers.
3. Where you do see a little bit of skew are those scenarios where one candidate wins by about 5-15 percentage points. In those cases, the winning candidate tends to win by more electoral votes than is predicted by the regression line. This is because an especially high number of states are within reach for one or another candidate. In contrast to 2004, when 16 states and the District of Columbia were decided by 20 or more points, very few are polling that way this year.
4. The range of possible outcomes given any specific value of the popular vote is about 80-100 electoral votes wide. For example, an Obama win by 5 percentage points could easily be associated with any number from about 290 electoral votes up to as many as 390, depending on how the individual states shake out. Likewise, for any given value of the electoral vote, the range of the popular vote margin is about 6 or 7 percentage points wide. What this means, among other things, is that it's virtually impossible for a candidate to win the electoral college while losing the popular vote by more than about 3 or 3.5 percentage points.
Several interesting things to point out:
1. The relationship between the popular vote and the electoral vote is approximately linear, except at the endpoints. As a rule of thumb, a gain of one percentage point in a Obama's popular vote share results in a gain of 25 electoral votes. This is also, you will note, a pretty steep slope. If Obama wins the election by 4 percentage points, he projects to win by approximately 100 electoral votes (319-219).
2. The regression line crosses the y-intercept at 269.3 electoral votes, which is almost exactly half of 538. That means that there does not appear to be any systematic advantage in the electoral vote math to one candidate or another, at least based on our present rendering of these numbers.
3. Where you do see a little bit of skew are those scenarios where one candidate wins by about 5-15 percentage points. In those cases, the winning candidate tends to win by more electoral votes than is predicted by the regression line. This is because an especially high number of states are within reach for one or another candidate. In contrast to 2004, when 16 states and the District of Columbia were decided by 20 or more points, very few are polling that way this year.
4. The range of possible outcomes given any specific value of the popular vote is about 80-100 electoral votes wide. For example, an Obama win by 5 percentage points could easily be associated with any number from about 290 electoral votes up to as many as 390, depending on how the individual states shake out. Likewise, for any given value of the electoral vote, the range of the popular vote margin is about 6 or 7 percentage points wide. What this means, among other things, is that it's virtually impossible for a candidate to win the electoral college while losing the popular vote by more than about 3 or 3.5 percentage points.
Weekend Poll Catchup
@ 5:38 AM
When my friend Geoff and I went to debate camp together (yes, there is something even dorkier than writing about polls), Geoff had a screensaver with an obnoxious lime green background and that pronounced in some very tacky, Windows 3.0 kind of font: "SLEEP IS THE ENEMY". I don't quite feel that way myself, but lately I've begun understand where Geoff was coming from. We were so busy rolling out methodological changes over the weekend that we didn't bother to document the latest polls. So let's see what we've got on the polling front.
In Arkansas, Rasmussen has Barack Obama closing to within 9 points. While this is hardly a fantastic result for a Democrat in Arkansas, it does represent an enormous improvement from Obama's prior polling in the state, which had shown him down by as many as 29 points. This result is easier to understand in light of our analysis of Obama's bounce, which seems to be concentrated in states with strong Democratic party identification but relatively few African-Americans -- Clinton country, in other words. Can Obama actually close Arkansas to the point where it becomes competitive? If Hillary Clinton is his VP choice -- Clinton still gets much more of a home-state effect in Arkansas than her adopted home of New York -- the state is probably in play. Otherwise, it probably isn't, although if the Clintons are particularly vigorous in their campaigning, it might get teasingly close.
In Oregon, Rasmussen has Obama ahead by 8. This poll has been cited by some McCain supporters a a sign that Obama's bounce is waning, since Rasmussen's last poll had him up 14 there. However, that May poll had been taken right as Obama had begun to campaign toward that state's primary; Rasmussen's March poll had shown him up by 6. No matter how you interpret the trend, Oregon looks pretty safe for Obama, but given Clinton's paucity of support in the state, there was perhaps less room for Obama to gain further ground there.
The New York Times has decided to poll the Empire State, which shows Obama leading John McCain 51-32. Although this is the Times' first poll in New York this year, Obama's 19-point margin as large as in any New York poll conducted this year. So once again, the same pattern: big Clinton state, bigger bounce.
Finally, in Nevada, a Mason-Dixon poll shows John McCain ahead by 2 points, 44-42. Mason-Dixon had last polled Nevada way back in December, at which point McCain led by 6. Although you have to go back to March to find a survey where Obama led in Nevada (the state is notoriously hard to poll and hasn't been polled much), the state's demographics should be relatively friendly to him, and he should theoretically be on the right side of the Yucca Mountain issue. With that said, in most of the scenarios* where Obama wins by way of the Southwestern swing states, he only needs two out of three to win, so Colorado and New Mexico may remain his first targets.
* For example, Kerry states + Iowa + Colorado + New Mexico is a winning combination; if he wins those states but loses New Hampshire, the election ends in a 269-269 tie that would probably be resolved in Obama's favor in the House.
In Arkansas, Rasmussen has Barack Obama closing to within 9 points. While this is hardly a fantastic result for a Democrat in Arkansas, it does represent an enormous improvement from Obama's prior polling in the state, which had shown him down by as many as 29 points. This result is easier to understand in light of our analysis of Obama's bounce, which seems to be concentrated in states with strong Democratic party identification but relatively few African-Americans -- Clinton country, in other words. Can Obama actually close Arkansas to the point where it becomes competitive? If Hillary Clinton is his VP choice -- Clinton still gets much more of a home-state effect in Arkansas than her adopted home of New York -- the state is probably in play. Otherwise, it probably isn't, although if the Clintons are particularly vigorous in their campaigning, it might get teasingly close.
In Oregon, Rasmussen has Obama ahead by 8. This poll has been cited by some McCain supporters a a sign that Obama's bounce is waning, since Rasmussen's last poll had him up 14 there. However, that May poll had been taken right as Obama had begun to campaign toward that state's primary; Rasmussen's March poll had shown him up by 6. No matter how you interpret the trend, Oregon looks pretty safe for Obama, but given Clinton's paucity of support in the state, there was perhaps less room for Obama to gain further ground there.
The New York Times has decided to poll the Empire State, which shows Obama leading John McCain 51-32. Although this is the Times' first poll in New York this year, Obama's 19-point margin as large as in any New York poll conducted this year. So once again, the same pattern: big Clinton state, bigger bounce.
Finally, in Nevada, a Mason-Dixon poll shows John McCain ahead by 2 points, 44-42. Mason-Dixon had last polled Nevada way back in December, at which point McCain led by 6. Although you have to go back to March to find a survey where Obama led in Nevada (the state is notoriously hard to poll and hasn't been polled much), the state's demographics should be relatively friendly to him, and he should theoretically be on the right side of the Yucca Mountain issue. With that said, in most of the scenarios* where Obama wins by way of the Southwestern swing states, he only needs two out of three to win, so Colorado and New Mexico may remain his first targets.
* For example, Kerry states + Iowa + Colorado + New Mexico is a winning combination; if he wins those states but loses New Hampshire, the election ends in a 269-269 tie that would probably be resolved in Obama's favor in the House.
A Refinement to the Adjustment, Part II
@ 3:43 AM
The principal criticism of the Trend Adjustment that I introduced on Saturday is that it assumed that the trend was uniform across all states. Even if we can demonstrate that Barack Obama has gained, say, 3 points in his polling on average, and even if that average was taken across a fairly robust group of state and national polls, it might not hold that the bounce would be felt the same in Utah as it might be in Massachusetts.
I agree entirely with this criticism in theory. I would also argue that it is probably better to assume a uniform trend than no trend at all. The polling has become dense enough (particuarly if we include national polls) that we're getting a pretty fair mix of state and national polls in any given week. It is unlikely that Obama could improve his position in say 10 out of 12 state polls, and 5 out of 6 national polls, without his also being likely to have improved his position in other states that weren't polled during this period.
Nevertheless, it would clearly be best if we could have our cake and eat it too: adjust for the most recent trends (in a somewhat cautious way) without having to take some of the state-by-state specificity out of our model. I think I've developed a reasonable way to accomplsih that.
The basic way that we developed the trend estimator was to express each polling result as a combination of two dummy variables, one representing the state/pollster combination (e.g. "Quinnipac-Florida" or "Zogby-Delaware") and the other the week in which the poll was conducted. Each poll in our database can thus can be expressed in the form of a regression equation:
...'Margin' represents the polling result (Obama's total less McCain's), whereas the squiggly little 'e' you see is a term denoting the residual error/uncertainty. Technically speaking, there are coefficient terms on the two dummy variables, though over the long run, these coefficients will by definition equal one. Likewise, the error term will definitionally equal zero over the long run. However, just because the coefficients equal one on average does not mean that they do so in every single case. Another way to express our regression would be to embed the uncertainty term in the time-trend dummy, as follows:
In this equation, m represents a multiplier on the weekly trend variable. It is trivial to solve for m.
In a state which is more impacted by a time-defendant trend, m will be greater than one. In a state that is less impacted by the trend, it will be less than one.
Once we have a derived an m for each poll in our database, we can then regress it against a series of demographic variables in the state where the poll was conducted to see whether there is any pattern to the residuals. Since our particular concern is with recent trends, we weight recent polls much more heavily when conducting this analysis. (A couple of technical notes: we discard any cases in which the pollster has polled the state just once, as m will always be one in these cases. Also, we discard cases where the weekly dummy is a very small number -- anything less than one, in fact -- as this can produce very large, highly erratic values of m).
The demographic regression that I perform on m includes relatively few variables. This is because there aren't all that many useful data points to work with -- we need very recent polls, and for those polls to have been conducted in a state that the pollster surveyed previously -- so there is more risk of overfitting the model. The particular variables we include are a state's partisan ID index, its Kerry vote share in 2004, its black population, its Hispanic population, its average per capita income, its percentage of senior citizens, and its percentage of evangelicals. With the exception of the Kerry and 'partisan' variables, which are too fundamental to the model to be excluded, these variables have the virtue of not being strongly intercorrelated with one another.
As it turns out, there are some patterns in where Obama's bounce is showing up. It is coming in states where Democrats have a strong party identification advantage (no surprise), and seems to be especially strong in states where many voters are registered as Democrats, but where John Kerry did not perform well in 2004. This particularly describes states like West Virginia and Arkansas, where Obama's numbers have improved significantly, and where (assuredly not coincidentally) Hillary Clinton also performed well. The other observable trend is that Obama's bounce has been larger in states where there are not a lot of African-American voters, simply because there are few marginal gains for him to make among that demographic. It will probably always be the case in this election that states with lots of African-American voters will be less responsive to trends in the polling numbers.
This demographic regression allows us to estimate a unique value of m for each state. I cap the values of m at 0.0 and 2.0, respectively. The average value of m will not necessarily be 1.0, as it could be the case that particular kinds of states are especially predisposed to a bounce, and those states have also been polled more frequently (in fact, this does appear to have been the case to a small degree over the past couple weeks). The present m values for some representative states are as follows:
Taking into account the sensitivity of individual states to time trends produces a slightly less impressive result for Obama than we had been figuring on over the weekend, as his bounce seems to be most profound in states where he was already well ahead (like Massachusetts), or where he is probably too far behind to catch up (like Oklahoma). Still, we have seen at least some bounce for Obama across a large and relatively diverse array of states, and can expect to see that trend manifested in other states where new polls will come out unless his bounce begins to recede nationally.
I agree entirely with this criticism in theory. I would also argue that it is probably better to assume a uniform trend than no trend at all. The polling has become dense enough (particuarly if we include national polls) that we're getting a pretty fair mix of state and national polls in any given week. It is unlikely that Obama could improve his position in say 10 out of 12 state polls, and 5 out of 6 national polls, without his also being likely to have improved his position in other states that weren't polled during this period.
Nevertheless, it would clearly be best if we could have our cake and eat it too: adjust for the most recent trends (in a somewhat cautious way) without having to take some of the state-by-state specificity out of our model. I think I've developed a reasonable way to accomplsih that.
The basic way that we developed the trend estimator was to express each polling result as a combination of two dummy variables, one representing the state/pollster combination (e.g. "Quinnipac-Florida" or "Zogby-Delaware") and the other the week in which the poll was conducted. Each poll in our database can thus can be expressed in the form of a regression equation:
...'Margin' represents the polling result (Obama's total less McCain's), whereas the squiggly little 'e' you see is a term denoting the residual error/uncertainty. Technically speaking, there are coefficient terms on the two dummy variables, though over the long run, these coefficients will by definition equal one. Likewise, the error term will definitionally equal zero over the long run. However, just because the coefficients equal one on average does not mean that they do so in every single case. Another way to express our regression would be to embed the uncertainty term in the time-trend dummy, as follows:
In this equation, m represents a multiplier on the weekly trend variable. It is trivial to solve for m.
In a state which is more impacted by a time-defendant trend, m will be greater than one. In a state that is less impacted by the trend, it will be less than one.
Once we have a derived an m for each poll in our database, we can then regress it against a series of demographic variables in the state where the poll was conducted to see whether there is any pattern to the residuals. Since our particular concern is with recent trends, we weight recent polls much more heavily when conducting this analysis. (A couple of technical notes: we discard any cases in which the pollster has polled the state just once, as m will always be one in these cases. Also, we discard cases where the weekly dummy is a very small number -- anything less than one, in fact -- as this can produce very large, highly erratic values of m).
The demographic regression that I perform on m includes relatively few variables. This is because there aren't all that many useful data points to work with -- we need very recent polls, and for those polls to have been conducted in a state that the pollster surveyed previously -- so there is more risk of overfitting the model. The particular variables we include are a state's partisan ID index, its Kerry vote share in 2004, its black population, its Hispanic population, its average per capita income, its percentage of senior citizens, and its percentage of evangelicals. With the exception of the Kerry and 'partisan' variables, which are too fundamental to the model to be excluded, these variables have the virtue of not being strongly intercorrelated with one another.
As it turns out, there are some patterns in where Obama's bounce is showing up. It is coming in states where Democrats have a strong party identification advantage (no surprise), and seems to be especially strong in states where many voters are registered as Democrats, but where John Kerry did not perform well in 2004. This particularly describes states like West Virginia and Arkansas, where Obama's numbers have improved significantly, and where (assuredly not coincidentally) Hillary Clinton also performed well. The other observable trend is that Obama's bounce has been larger in states where there are not a lot of African-American voters, simply because there are few marginal gains for him to make among that demographic. It will probably always be the case in this election that states with lots of African-American voters will be less responsive to trends in the polling numbers.
This demographic regression allows us to estimate a unique value of m for each state. I cap the values of m at 0.0 and 2.0, respectively. The average value of m will not necessarily be 1.0, as it could be the case that particular kinds of states are especially predisposed to a bounce, and those states have also been polled more frequently (in fact, this does appear to have been the case to a small degree over the past couple weeks). The present m values for some representative states are as follows:
Kentucky 1.98In adjusting our polling numbers, we take the trend from our LOESS estimator and multiply it by m. For example, say that our LOESS curve estimates that Barack Obama is polling 3 points stronger now on average than he was three weeks ago. If we take a 3-week old poll from Kentucky, we will adjust it upward (toward Obama) by (3 x 1.98) = 5.94 points. In California, we will adjust it by (3 x 0.97) = 2.91 points. And in Arizona, we would adjust it by only 0.87 points.
Arkansas 1.93
Massachusetts 1.76
Oklahoma 1.66
New York 1.37
Michigan 1.05
North Carolina 1.01
California 0.97
Pennsylvania 0.93
Florida 0.71
Nevada 0.70
Ohio 0.54
Arizona 0.29
Utah 0.00
Taking into account the sensitivity of individual states to time trends produces a slightly less impressive result for Obama than we had been figuring on over the weekend, as his bounce seems to be most profound in states where he was already well ahead (like Massachusetts), or where he is probably too far behind to catch up (like Oklahoma). Still, we have seen at least some bounce for Obama across a large and relatively diverse array of states, and can expect to see that trend manifested in other states where new polls will come out unless his bounce begins to recede nationally.
A Refinement to the Adjustment, Part I
@ 1:35 AM
In consideration of everyone's feedback, I am making two refinements to the timeline adjustment that I introduced yesterday.
The first refinement is to slightly dampen the effect of the timeline adjustment at the endpoints of the curve. The second is to use a state-specific timeline adjustment, rather than a one-size-fits all model. I will describe the first adjustment in this post.
Before I continue, I want to make clear what the goal of this project is. I want to provide you, at any given moment in time, with the best possible projection of what's going to happen in the November election. This is inherently a forward-looking exercise. If what you're interested in instead is simply a summation of what the polls are telling you now, there are plenty of other websites that can provide that for you. I do require that the projections be based on objective and quantifiable evidence. For example, I'm not going to say: "McCain is awful on the campaign trail, and people don't realize it yet. Let's take 5 points off his averages". Nor am I going to say "I heard from a well-connected source that the Republicans have put together a devastating attack ad on Barack Obama. We'd better cut his win percentage by 10 points". But that doesn't mean I'm going to limit myself to simply averaging the current polls.
* * *
In the long methodological discussion that we have had over the past couple days, there is one important point that hasn't been raised. Suppose you grant me that my timeline adjustment does an essentially optimal job of telling you what would happen if the election were held today? Does it necessarily follow that that the best projection of what would happen if the election were held today is also the best projection available to us of what would happen if the election were held tomorrow?
In other words, suppose that we are holding an election for the President of Hell. The candidates are Gary Condit and Mark Foley. In June, Foley leads by 2 points. In July, Foley leads by 5 points. What is our best possible projection in July of what the outcome will be in November? There are three possible answers to that question.
1. The random walk hypothesis. There is no way to guess whether the polls will move upward or downward in any given future period. Therefore, if a candidate's current lead in the polling is 5 points, our best guess at the eventual election outcome is 5 points.
2. The bounce hypothesis. Polls have some tendency to regress back to the mean established in previous periods. Therefore, if a candidate leads by 2 points in June, and by 5 points in July, our best guess is that he will probably finish somewhere between 2 points and 5 points ahead.
3. The trend hypothesis. This is sort of the opposite of the bounce hypothesis. Polling from previous periods does tell us something, but those polls are inversely related with the eventual outcome. So if Foley leads by 2 points in June and 5 points in July, that is evidence that he is trending upward, and is likely to eventually win by some number greater than 5 points.
I've tried to produce an answer to this question in several different ways, revisiting it this weekend by using Andrew Gelman's dataset. In some cases, like in 1988 or the summer of 1992, when the movement in the polls was fairly unidirectional for long periods of time, the more recent your poll was, the better off you'd be. In other cases, like in 2000 and 2004, the polls tended to oscillate, as though regressing back toward the mean; a bounce was usually just a bounce.
We can model this more formally by using different LOESS curves. The smoothness of a LOESS curve is determined by something called the smoothing parameter. A smoothing parameter of .7 or .8 will give you a very conservative curve that reacts slowly to new information (put differently, it still places some value in old information). A smoothing parameter of .3, on other hand, will give you an extremely volatile curve that gives a strong presumption to the most current information.
I went back and tried to evaluate whether there was an optimal smoothing parameter based on the weekly national polling averages from 1988, 1992, 2000 and 2004 (skipping 1996 because my dataset is scattershot for that year). I was looking for an answer in the following form: with X weeks to go until the general election, you will minimize your error by using smoothing parameter Y. If Y is a smaller number, like .3, that would be evidence for the random walk hypothesis or perhaps even the trend hypothesis. If Y is closer to .8, that would be evidence for the bounce hypothesis.
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question. Different parameters performed better or worse in different elections, and at different points in those elections. All smoothing parameters from about .3 to .8 produced roughly the same average error when applied to the weekly polling data, with a possible exception of the two weeks immediately prior to the election, when a smaller parameter (e.g. a more sensitive curve) may be more desirable.
What this tells us is that it's frankly a judgment call as to how much emphasis we want to give to the most recent polling results. Neither the random walk hypothesis nor the bounce hypothesis can really be ruled out (we can probably rule out the trend hypothesis, however, as that would require low smoothing parameters to be demonstrably better than higher ones).
What I wound up doing was using a hybrid smoothing parameter, which is conservative toward the endpoints of the curve, but more aggressive in the middle of the curve.
There is a good, logical reason to do this, namely that we have less information available to us at the endpoints of the curve than we do in the middle. We can fairly clearly isolate the impact of something like Jeremiah Wright's first appearance on the scene, because we can look at polling both before and afterward: we see Obama's polls tumbling and then recovering. However, in trying to evaluate the polls right now, we only know what the polls were in the past; we do not know in which direction they'll move in the future. The hybrid curve allows us both to be fairly aggressive in isolating events that might have impacted the polls in the past, but also erring on the side of caution about the present direction of the polls.
The net effect of all of this is a somewhat more conservative estimate of Barack Obama's current strength in the polling; we know he's bouncing, but we don't know how long that bounce is going to last. If his polling remains strong into next week, that will be three weeks in a row where his numbers have shown a marked improvement, and even the most conservative estimator will start to give him credit for more or less the entirety of his bounce. If he and McCain regress back to a tie, on the other hand, we may even start to take a point or two away from polls that were conducted over the past couple of weeks. This is one thing, by the way, that I think some of the McCain supporters around here are missing. If Obama's post-nomination bounce does prove to be a temporary thing, we will be able to adjust for this more quickly, and recognize that states that were polled frequently during this period may not be as strong for him as they appear.
The first refinement is to slightly dampen the effect of the timeline adjustment at the endpoints of the curve. The second is to use a state-specific timeline adjustment, rather than a one-size-fits all model. I will describe the first adjustment in this post.
Before I continue, I want to make clear what the goal of this project is. I want to provide you, at any given moment in time, with the best possible projection of what's going to happen in the November election. This is inherently a forward-looking exercise. If what you're interested in instead is simply a summation of what the polls are telling you now, there are plenty of other websites that can provide that for you. I do require that the projections be based on objective and quantifiable evidence. For example, I'm not going to say: "McCain is awful on the campaign trail, and people don't realize it yet. Let's take 5 points off his averages". Nor am I going to say "I heard from a well-connected source that the Republicans have put together a devastating attack ad on Barack Obama. We'd better cut his win percentage by 10 points". But that doesn't mean I'm going to limit myself to simply averaging the current polls.
* * *
In the long methodological discussion that we have had over the past couple days, there is one important point that hasn't been raised. Suppose you grant me that my timeline adjustment does an essentially optimal job of telling you what would happen if the election were held today? Does it necessarily follow that that the best projection of what would happen if the election were held today is also the best projection available to us of what would happen if the election were held tomorrow?
In other words, suppose that we are holding an election for the President of Hell. The candidates are Gary Condit and Mark Foley. In June, Foley leads by 2 points. In July, Foley leads by 5 points. What is our best possible projection in July of what the outcome will be in November? There are three possible answers to that question.
1. The random walk hypothesis. There is no way to guess whether the polls will move upward or downward in any given future period. Therefore, if a candidate's current lead in the polling is 5 points, our best guess at the eventual election outcome is 5 points.
2. The bounce hypothesis. Polls have some tendency to regress back to the mean established in previous periods. Therefore, if a candidate leads by 2 points in June, and by 5 points in July, our best guess is that he will probably finish somewhere between 2 points and 5 points ahead.
3. The trend hypothesis. This is sort of the opposite of the bounce hypothesis. Polling from previous periods does tell us something, but those polls are inversely related with the eventual outcome. So if Foley leads by 2 points in June and 5 points in July, that is evidence that he is trending upward, and is likely to eventually win by some number greater than 5 points.
I've tried to produce an answer to this question in several different ways, revisiting it this weekend by using Andrew Gelman's dataset. In some cases, like in 1988 or the summer of 1992, when the movement in the polls was fairly unidirectional for long periods of time, the more recent your poll was, the better off you'd be. In other cases, like in 2000 and 2004, the polls tended to oscillate, as though regressing back toward the mean; a bounce was usually just a bounce.
We can model this more formally by using different LOESS curves. The smoothness of a LOESS curve is determined by something called the smoothing parameter. A smoothing parameter of .7 or .8 will give you a very conservative curve that reacts slowly to new information (put differently, it still places some value in old information). A smoothing parameter of .3, on other hand, will give you an extremely volatile curve that gives a strong presumption to the most current information.
I went back and tried to evaluate whether there was an optimal smoothing parameter based on the weekly national polling averages from 1988, 1992, 2000 and 2004 (skipping 1996 because my dataset is scattershot for that year). I was looking for an answer in the following form: with X weeks to go until the general election, you will minimize your error by using smoothing parameter Y. If Y is a smaller number, like .3, that would be evidence for the random walk hypothesis or perhaps even the trend hypothesis. If Y is closer to .8, that would be evidence for the bounce hypothesis.
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question. Different parameters performed better or worse in different elections, and at different points in those elections. All smoothing parameters from about .3 to .8 produced roughly the same average error when applied to the weekly polling data, with a possible exception of the two weeks immediately prior to the election, when a smaller parameter (e.g. a more sensitive curve) may be more desirable.
What this tells us is that it's frankly a judgment call as to how much emphasis we want to give to the most recent polling results. Neither the random walk hypothesis nor the bounce hypothesis can really be ruled out (we can probably rule out the trend hypothesis, however, as that would require low smoothing parameters to be demonstrably better than higher ones).
What I wound up doing was using a hybrid smoothing parameter, which is conservative toward the endpoints of the curve, but more aggressive in the middle of the curve.
There is a good, logical reason to do this, namely that we have less information available to us at the endpoints of the curve than we do in the middle. We can fairly clearly isolate the impact of something like Jeremiah Wright's first appearance on the scene, because we can look at polling both before and afterward: we see Obama's polls tumbling and then recovering. However, in trying to evaluate the polls right now, we only know what the polls were in the past; we do not know in which direction they'll move in the future. The hybrid curve allows us both to be fairly aggressive in isolating events that might have impacted the polls in the past, but also erring on the side of caution about the present direction of the polls.
The net effect of all of this is a somewhat more conservative estimate of Barack Obama's current strength in the polling; we know he's bouncing, but we don't know how long that bounce is going to last. If his polling remains strong into next week, that will be three weeks in a row where his numbers have shown a marked improvement, and even the most conservative estimator will start to give him credit for more or less the entirety of his bounce. If he and McCain regress back to a tie, on the other hand, we may even start to take a point or two away from polls that were conducted over the past couple of weeks. This is one thing, by the way, that I think some of the McCain supporters around here are missing. If Obama's post-nomination bounce does prove to be a temporary thing, we will be able to adjust for this more quickly, and recognize that states that were polled frequently during this period may not be as strong for him as they appear.
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